Update hivegrid-cloud reference to latest main

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
davidandClaude Fable 5 committed 2026-07-08 16:15:37 +02:00
1 parent e98d38e716
commit 7b21524c86
3781 files changed
+373484 -225607

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@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ export const routeAccessClasses = [
"service-or-tenant-api-key",
"optional-api-key-validation",
"tenant-api-key",
"tenant-webhook-credential",
"webhook-signature",
"provider-refetch-webhook",
"jwt-auth",
"auth-credential-exchange",
"public-analytics-token",
@@ -185,12 +187,61 @@ export const routeAccessInventory = [
rationale: "Usage lookups enter through the canonical API host and validate tenant API-key credentials in the API runtime.",
sensitiveData: "Returns plan and remaining API usage metadata for the credential-scoped tenant.",
},
{
method: "GET",
path: "/v1/contacts",
accessClass: "tenant-api-key",
rationale: "Public API contact reads validate a tenant-bound API-key credential before querying only that credential's tenant scope.",
sensitiveData: "Returns redacted contact fields for the credential-scoped tenant; internal notes and credential material are omitted.",
},
{
method: "GET",
path: "/v1/companies",
accessClass: "tenant-api-key",
rationale: "Public API company reads validate a tenant-bound API-key credential before querying only that credential's tenant scope.",
sensitiveData: "Returns redacted organisation contact fields for the credential-scoped tenant; internal notes and credential material are omitted.",
},
{
method: "GET",
path: "/v1/deals",
accessClass: "tenant-api-key",
rationale: "Public API deal reads validate a tenant-bound API-key credential before querying only that credential's tenant scope.",
sensitiveData: "Returns redacted sales-pipeline project fields for the credential-scoped tenant; internal notes and credential material are omitted.",
},
{
method: "GET",
path: "/v1/projects",
accessClass: "tenant-api-key",
rationale: "Public API project reads validate a tenant-bound API-key credential before querying only that credential's tenant scope.",
sensitiveData: "Returns redacted project fields for the credential-scoped tenant; internal notes and credential material are omitted.",
},
{
method: "GET",
path: "/v1/tasks",
accessClass: "tenant-api-key",
rationale: "Public API task reads validate a tenant-bound API-key credential before querying only that credential's tenant scope.",
sensitiveData: "Returns redacted task fields for the credential-scoped tenant; internal notes and credential material are omitted.",
},
{
method: "GET",
path: "/v1/leads",
accessClass: "tenant-api-key",
rationale: "Public API lead reads validate a tenant-bound API-key credential before querying only that credential's tenant scope.",
sensitiveData: "Returns redacted lead-inbox fields for the credential-scoped tenant; raw payloads, anti-spam internals and credential material are omitted.",
},
{
method: "POST",
path: "/v1/billing/stripe/webhooks",
accessClass: "webhook-signature",
rationale: "Stripe billing webhook ingress enters through the canonical API host and verifies the raw signed payload in the API runtime.",
sensitiveData: "Consumes signed billing lifecycle webhook payloads without returning signing material or plaintext credentials.",
path: "/v1/webhooks/incoming/:tenant/:slug",
accessClass: "tenant-webhook-credential",
rationale: "Incoming public webhooks enter through the canonical API host, resolve the tenant endpoint, validate the endpoint credential mode and create only tenant-scoped lead intake records.",
sensitiveData: "Consumes third-party lead payloads and stores redacted ingestion metadata; API keys, webhook tokens, HMAC material and raw signing secrets are omitted from responses.",
},
{
method: "POST",
path: "/v1/billing/mollie/webhooks",
accessClass: "provider-refetch-webhook",
rationale: "Mollie billing webhook ingress accepts only the provider payment id, refetches that payment from Mollie server-side, and syncs only tenant-scoped billing metadata from the verified payment.",
sensitiveData: "Consumes a provider payment id and stores redacted billing lifecycle metadata without returning provider payloads or plaintext credentials.",
},
{
method: "POST",
@@ -255,62 +306,6 @@ export const routeAccessInventory = [
rationale: "Export artifact retention cleanup is an operator maintenance action and requires service credentials before enqueueing work.",
sensitiveData: "Consumes an optional bounded batch size and returns only queue task metadata plus request correlation.",
},
{
method: "GET",
path: "/v1/entities/:entity/rows",
accessClass: "service-or-tenant-api-key",
rationale: "Entity row listing requires a service token or scoped stored API key with read permission for the resolved entity.",
sensitiveData: "Returns tenant-scoped legacy entity row data.",
},
{
method: "POST",
path: "/v1/entities/:entity/rows",
accessClass: "service-or-tenant-api-key",
rationale: "Entity row creation requires a service token or scoped stored API key with create permission for the resolved entity.",
sensitiveData: "Consumes and stores tenant-scoped legacy entity row data.",
},
{
method: "GET",
path: "/v1/entities/:entity/rows/:rowId",
accessClass: "service-or-tenant-api-key",
rationale: "Entity row lookup requires a service token or scoped stored API key with read permission for the resolved entity.",
sensitiveData: "Returns tenant-scoped legacy entity row data.",
},
{
method: "PATCH",
path: "/v1/entities/:entity/rows/:rowId",
accessClass: "service-or-tenant-api-key",
rationale: "Entity row update requires a service token or scoped stored API key with update permission for the resolved entity.",
sensitiveData: "Consumes and returns tenant-scoped legacy entity row data.",
},
{
method: "DELETE",
path: "/v1/entities/:entity/rows/:rowId",
accessClass: "service-or-tenant-api-key",
rationale: "Entity row deletion requires a service token or scoped stored API key with delete permission for the resolved entity.",
sensitiveData: "Deletes tenant-scoped legacy entity row data and returns the deleted row id.",
},
{
method: "POST",
path: "/v1/relationships",
accessClass: "service-or-tenant-api-key",
rationale: "Relationship creation requires a service token or scoped stored API key with create permission for both related entities.",
sensitiveData: "Consumes row identifiers and returns relationship metadata.",
},
{
method: "GET",
path: "/v1/relationships/:id",
accessClass: "service-or-tenant-api-key",
rationale: "Relationship lookup requires a service token or scoped stored API key with read permission for both related entities.",
sensitiveData: "Returns relationship metadata with parent and child row envelopes.",
},
{
method: "DELETE",
path: "/v1/relationships/:id",
accessClass: "service-or-tenant-api-key",
rationale: "Relationship deletion requires a service token or scoped stored API key with delete permission for both related entities.",
sensitiveData: "Deletes and returns relationship metadata with parent and child row envelopes.",
},
{
method: "GET",
path: "/v1/exports/:exportJobId/download-url",
@@ -318,13 +313,6 @@ export const routeAccessInventory = [
rationale: "Export download URL creation requires service credentials or a tenant-bound stored API key and blocks compliance-paused exports before returning a short-lived signed artifact URL envelope.",
sensitiveData: "Returns a signed artifact URL envelope without artifact bucket/key values, storage credentials, pause reason internals, filters, or object bodies.",
},
{
method: "GET",
path: "/v1/entities/:entity",
accessClass: "service-token",
rationale: "Legacy entity lookup requires service credentials before returning the named entity detail graph.",
sensitiveData: "Returns legacy entity schema and relationship details.",
},
{
method: "GET",
path: "/v1/exports/:exportJobId/progress",