Refresh HiveGrid Cloud reference snapshot
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
5e99e14772
commit
7f88026f79
5955 files changed
+1177325
-188362
No files matched your search
@@ -2,15 +2,20 @@ export const routeAccessClasses = [
|
||||
"public-health",
|
||||
"public-docs",
|
||||
"service-token",
|
||||
"platform-source-credential",
|
||||
"service-or-tenant-api-key",
|
||||
"optional-api-key-validation",
|
||||
"tenant-api-key",
|
||||
"tenant-webhook-credential",
|
||||
"provider-body-token-webhook",
|
||||
"provider-header-token-webhook",
|
||||
"provider-hmac-webhook",
|
||||
"webhook-signature",
|
||||
"provider-refetch-webhook",
|
||||
"jwt-auth",
|
||||
"auth-credential-exchange",
|
||||
"public-analytics-token",
|
||||
"public-analytics-overview",
|
||||
"canonical-redirect",
|
||||
] as const;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,41 +38,41 @@ export function routeAccessKey(route: Pick<RouteAccessInventoryEntry, "method" |
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export const routeAccessInventory = [
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/healthz",
|
||||
accessClass: "public-health",
|
||||
rationale: "Unauthenticated liveness probe returns only service status and request correlation metadata.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: false,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/v1/health",
|
||||
accessClass: "public-health",
|
||||
rationale: "Unauthenticated versioned liveness probe returns only service status and request correlation metadata.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: false,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/readyz",
|
||||
accessClass: "public-health",
|
||||
rationale: "Unauthenticated readiness probe returns redacted dependency status for infrastructure checks.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Dependency health state is exposed without implementation details.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/status",
|
||||
accessClass: "public-health",
|
||||
rationale: "Unauthenticated status probe for external uptime monitors. Returns boolean-only health, revision, region, uptime.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Boolean health state and deployment region tag only — no connection strings, hostnames or stack traces.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/metrics",
|
||||
accessClass: "service-token",
|
||||
rationale: "Prometheus scrape endpoint requires bearer METRICS_TOKEN. Returns 404 when METRICS_ENABLED is false.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Prom text-format counters and gauges — includes business KPIs (AI tokens, mail, webhook, queue depth). Token-protected.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/healthz",
|
||||
accessClass: "public-health",
|
||||
rationale: "Unauthenticated liveness probe returns only service status and request correlation metadata.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: false,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/v1/health",
|
||||
accessClass: "public-health",
|
||||
rationale: "Unauthenticated versioned liveness probe returns only service status and request correlation metadata.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: false,
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/readyz",
|
||||
accessClass: "public-health",
|
||||
rationale: "Unauthenticated readiness probe returns redacted dependency status for infrastructure checks.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Dependency health state is exposed without implementation details.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/status",
|
||||
accessClass: "public-health",
|
||||
rationale: "Unauthenticated status probe for external uptime monitors. Returns boolean-only health, revision, region, uptime.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Boolean health state and deployment region tag only — no connection strings, hostnames or stack traces.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/metrics",
|
||||
accessClass: "service-token",
|
||||
rationale: "Prometheus scrape endpoint requires bearer METRICS_TOKEN. Returns 404 when METRICS_ENABLED is false.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Prom text-format counters and gauges — includes business KPIs (AI tokens, mail, webhook, queue depth). Token-protected.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/v1/openapi.json",
|
||||
@@ -114,15 +119,18 @@ export const routeAccessInventory = [
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/api-keys/validate",
|
||||
accessClass: "optional-api-key-validation",
|
||||
rationale: "API-key validation optionally accepts a presented stored API key or service token and reports redacted validation status without requiring a prior credential.",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"API-key validation optionally accepts a presented stored API key or service token and reports redacted validation status without requiring a prior credential.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Returns redacted stored API-key metadata but never plaintext key material.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/ai/upload",
|
||||
accessClass: "service-token",
|
||||
rationale: "AI upload writes request content through configured S3-compatible service storage credentials and depends on server-side upload configuration.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Consumes uploaded file content and may return a public storage URL.",
|
||||
path: "/v1/platform/leads",
|
||||
accessClass: "platform-source-credential",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Platform lead ingestion requires a rotatable, source-scoped bearer capability; the authenticated credential selects the configured source and is revalidated atomically during pre-tenant persistence.",
|
||||
sensitiveData:
|
||||
"Consumes bounded platform lead contact and attribution data while omitting source capability material and submitted lead data from responses and diagnostics.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
@@ -131,33 +139,63 @@ export const routeAccessInventory = [
|
||||
rationale: "Inbound support email verifies Mailjet webhook Basic-Auth credentials before resolving tenant inbound addresses and creating tickets.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Consumes signed email metadata and message body while omitting provider payloads and signing material from responses.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/email/inbound-mailjet",
|
||||
accessClass: "webhook-signature",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Tenant inbound email verifies Mailjet webhook Basic-Auth credentials before resolving tenant inbound addresses and creating lead/activity records.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Consumes signed email metadata and message body while omitting provider payloads, recipient content, and signing material from responses.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/admin-sales/email/provider-events",
|
||||
accessClass: "provider-hmac-webhook",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Provider-neutral admin email events require a timestamp-bound HMAC over the exact request body before an AdminUser RLS context is bound and an idempotent event is persisted.",
|
||||
sensitiveData:
|
||||
"Consumes bounded delivery and engagement metadata while responses omit recipient data, provider payloads, signing material, and AdminUser identifiers.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/admin-sales/email/bcc-inbound",
|
||||
accessClass: "webhook-signature",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Admin BCC ingestion requires both Mailjet HTTP Basic authentication and one exact signed, rotatable BCC capability before binding the embedded AdminUser RLS context.",
|
||||
sensitiveData:
|
||||
"Consumes bounded email headers and bodies while responses omit message content, recipient capability material, signing secrets, and AdminUser identifiers.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/analytics/events",
|
||||
accessClass: "public-analytics-token",
|
||||
rationale: "Analytics event ingestion is public-facing and scoped by analytics payload identifiers rather than browser session state.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Consumes analytics identifiers, URLs, routes, and event labels.",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Analytics event ingestion accepts only a bounded anonymous visitor identifier and writes tenantless records in the isolated platform analytics RLS context.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Consumes an anonymous analytics identifier, URLs, routes, and event labels; authenticated user and portal identifiers are rejected.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/analytics/page-views",
|
||||
accessClass: "public-analytics-token",
|
||||
rationale: "Analytics page-view ingestion is public-facing and scoped by analytics payload identifiers plus ignore-page settings.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Consumes analytics identifiers, URLs, and route names.",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Analytics page-view ingestion accepts only a bounded anonymous visitor identifier and writes tenantless records in the isolated platform analytics RLS context.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Consumes an anonymous analytics identifier, URLs, and route names; authenticated user and portal identifiers are rejected.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/v1/analytics/public",
|
||||
accessClass: "public-analytics-token",
|
||||
rationale: "Public analytics overview requires the analytics token header before returning aggregate metrics.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Returns aggregate analytics counts and top-level chart data.",
|
||||
accessClass: "public-analytics-overview",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Public analytics is enabled only by the operator-controlled setting and returns tenantless global aggregates from the isolated platform analytics RLS context.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Returns tenantless aggregate analytics counts and top-level chart data without user, tenant, or portal attribution.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/v1/analytics/admin",
|
||||
accessClass: "service-token",
|
||||
rationale: "Admin analytics overview requires service credentials before returning tenant or portal scoped metrics.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Returns aggregate analytics metrics that may be scoped to a portal identifier.",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Admin analytics requires service credentials plus an operator user identifier verified through the RLS-protected AdminUser row; optional portal reads require an exact tenant and portal pair.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Returns global tenantless aggregates or aggregate metrics for an explicitly tenant-bound portal scope.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
@@ -170,14 +208,16 @@ export const routeAccessInventory = [
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/v1/accounts",
|
||||
accessClass: "service-token",
|
||||
rationale: "Account listing requires service credentials before returning tenant account metadata and subscription summaries.",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Account listing requires service credentials plus an explicit operator user identifier that is rebound and verified through the RLS-protected AdminUser row before global tenant reads.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Returns tenant identifiers, names, slugs, icons, and subscription summary fields without plaintext secrets.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/v1/accounts/:id",
|
||||
accessClass: "service-token",
|
||||
rationale: "Account lookup requires service credentials before returning one tenant account metadata and subscription summary.",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Account lookup requires service credentials plus an explicit operator user identifier that is rebound and verified through the RLS-protected AdminUser row before global tenant resolution and tenant-bound detail reads.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Returns tenant identifiers, names, slugs, icons, and subscription summary fields without plaintext secrets.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -227,21 +267,62 @@ export const routeAccessInventory = [
|
||||
path: "/v1/leads",
|
||||
accessClass: "tenant-api-key",
|
||||
rationale: "Public API lead reads validate a tenant-bound API-key credential before querying only that credential's tenant scope.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Returns redacted lead-inbox fields for the credential-scoped tenant; raw payloads, anti-spam internals and credential material are omitted.",
|
||||
sensitiveData:
|
||||
"Returns redacted lead-inbox fields for the credential-scoped tenant; raw payloads, anti-spam internals and credential material are omitted.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/webhooks/incoming/:tenant/:slug",
|
||||
accessClass: "tenant-webhook-credential",
|
||||
rationale: "Incoming public webhooks enter through the canonical API host, resolve the tenant endpoint, validate the endpoint credential mode and create only tenant-scoped lead intake records.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Consumes third-party lead payloads and stores redacted ingestion metadata; API keys, webhook tokens, HMAC material and raw signing secrets are omitted from responses.",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Incoming public webhooks enter through the canonical API host, resolve the tenant endpoint, validate the endpoint credential mode and create only tenant-scoped lead intake records.",
|
||||
sensitiveData:
|
||||
"Consumes third-party lead payloads and stores redacted ingestion metadata; API keys, webhook tokens, HMAC material and raw signing secrets are omitted from responses.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/webhooks/telephony/aircall",
|
||||
accessClass: "provider-body-token-webhook",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Aircall webhook ingress authenticates the provider-issued body token against its stored hash, resolves exactly one tenant connection, and re-verifies the encrypted connection credential before RLS-scoped persistence.",
|
||||
sensitiveData:
|
||||
"Consumes bounded call lifecycle metadata and a write-only provider token; responses disclose no tenant, credential, rate-limit, or deduplication state.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/webhooks/telephony/hallopetra",
|
||||
accessClass: "provider-header-token-webhook",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"HalloPetra webhook ingress authenticates a dedicated custom Authorization header secret against its stored hash, resolves exactly one tenant connection, and re-verifies the encrypted connection credential before RLS-scoped persistence.",
|
||||
sensitiveData:
|
||||
"Consumes bounded post-call metadata and a write-only webhook secret; responses disclose no tenant, credential, rate-limit, or deduplication state, and native transcripts are not persisted.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/webhooks/admin-telephony/aircall",
|
||||
accessClass: "provider-body-token-webhook",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Admin Aircall webhook ingress hashes the provider-issued body token, resolves exactly one active AdminUser connection through the security-definer boundary, and binds that AdminUser RLS context before idempotent persistence.",
|
||||
sensitiveData:
|
||||
"Consumes bounded call lifecycle metadata and a write-only provider token; neutral responses disclose no AdminUser, connection, credential, rate-limit, or deduplication state.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/billing/lago/webhooks",
|
||||
accessClass: "provider-hmac-webhook",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Lago billing webhook ingress verifies the provider HMAC over the exact request body before binding the embedded customer tenant and applying replay-safe subscription state changes.",
|
||||
sensitiveData:
|
||||
"Consumes tenant-scoped subscription lifecycle metadata while responses omit customer identifiers, provider object identifiers, payloads, and signing material.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/billing/mollie/webhooks",
|
||||
accessClass: "provider-refetch-webhook",
|
||||
rationale: "Mollie billing webhook ingress accepts only the provider payment id, refetches that payment from Mollie server-side, and syncs only tenant-scoped billing metadata from the verified payment.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Consumes a provider payment id and stores redacted billing lifecycle metadata without returning provider payloads or plaintext credentials.",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Mollie billing webhook ingress accepts only the provider payment id, refetches that payment from Mollie server-side, and syncs only tenant-scoped billing metadata from the verified payment.",
|
||||
sensitiveData:
|
||||
"Consumes a provider payment id and stores redacted billing lifecycle metadata without returning provider payloads or plaintext credentials.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
@@ -255,14 +336,16 @@ export const routeAccessInventory = [
|
||||
path: "/v1/workspaces/:tenantId/auth/providers",
|
||||
accessClass: "service-token",
|
||||
rationale: "Workspace auth-provider discovery requires a service token before returning tenant-scoped SSO metadata.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Returns redacted OIDC/SAML provider metadata only; client secrets, SAML certificate bodies, private keys, token hashes, invite tokens, and raw metadata documents are omitted.",
|
||||
sensitiveData:
|
||||
"Returns redacted OIDC/SAML provider metadata only; client secrets, SAML certificate bodies, private keys, token hashes, invite tokens, and raw metadata documents are omitted.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/workspaces/:tenantId/context/revalidate",
|
||||
accessClass: "service-token",
|
||||
rationale: "Workspace context revalidation requires a service token before confirming tenant/user membership for a context switch.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Consumes tenant and user identifiers and returns a redacted validity envelope without provider secrets, invite tokens, token hashes, or SSO secret material.",
|
||||
sensitiveData:
|
||||
"Consumes tenant and user identifiers and returns a redacted validity envelope without provider secrets, invite tokens, token hashes, or SSO secret material.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
@@ -310,28 +393,33 @@ export const routeAccessInventory = [
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/v1/exports/:exportJobId/download-url",
|
||||
accessClass: "service-or-tenant-api-key",
|
||||
rationale: "Export download URL creation requires service credentials or a tenant-bound stored API key and blocks compliance-paused exports before returning a short-lived signed artifact URL envelope.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Returns a signed artifact URL envelope without artifact bucket/key values, storage credentials, pause reason internals, filters, or object bodies.",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Export download URL creation requires service credentials or a tenant-bound stored API key and blocks compliance-paused exports before returning a short-lived signed artifact URL envelope.",
|
||||
sensitiveData:
|
||||
"Returns a signed artifact URL envelope without artifact bucket/key values, storage credentials, pause reason internals, filters, or object bodies.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "GET",
|
||||
path: "/v1/exports/:exportJobId/progress",
|
||||
accessClass: "service-or-tenant-api-key",
|
||||
rationale: "Export progress polling requires service credentials or a tenant-bound stored API key; the handler scopes lookups to the caller's tenant and never leaks artifact bucket/key details.",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Export progress polling requires service credentials or a tenant-bound stored API key; the handler scopes lookups to the caller's tenant and never leaks artifact bucket/key details.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Returns export progress envelope (status, percent, rowCount) — no artifact URLs, no compliance-pause internals, no filters.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/devices/register",
|
||||
accessClass: "service-token",
|
||||
rationale: "Mobile push-token registration requires a service credential (bearer/API-key) carrying user identity; the body's userId + tenantId are reconciled against the authenticated principal downstream.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Persists device-bound push token. Stored token is hashed at rest; response contains only the registration id + masked token preview.",
|
||||
accessClass: "jwt-auth",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Mobile push-token registration derives its user exclusively from a verified active API-session JWT; optional tenant membership is revalidated before tenant/user RLS binding.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Persists a sensitive device-bound push token. The response contains registration metadata only and never returns the raw token.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
method: "POST",
|
||||
path: "/v1/devices/revoke",
|
||||
accessClass: "service-token",
|
||||
rationale: "Mobile push-token revocation requires a service credential; the handler revokes by token hash and never echoes the raw token.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Returns revocation confirmation without echoing the device token or push provider internals.",
|
||||
accessClass: "jwt-auth",
|
||||
rationale:
|
||||
"Mobile push-token revocation derives its owner exclusively from a verified active API-session JWT; optional tenant membership is revalidated before the ownership-constrained RLS write.",
|
||||
sensitiveData: "Foreign user or tenant tokens are treated as not found. The response never echoes the raw device token or provider internals.",
|
||||
},
|
||||
] as const satisfies readonly RouteAccessInventoryEntry[];
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user