import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest"; import { verifyWebhookSignature, signWebhookPayload } from "./webhooks.js"; const SECRET = "whsec_test_super_secret"; const PAYLOAD = `{"event":"contact.created","data":{"id":"c_42"}}`; const TIMESTAMP = 1_700_000_000; describe("verifyWebhookSignature — defensive paths", () => { it("returns false when the provided signature is same-length but not valid hex", () => { // expectedHex is 64 hex chars; a 64-char all-`g` string passes the length // gate but decodes to an empty buffer, so timingSafeEqual throws and is caught. const provided = "g".repeat(64); expect( verifyWebhookSignature({ secret: SECRET, payload: PAYLOAD, signature: provided, timestamp: TIMESTAMP, now: () => TIMESTAMP * 1000, }) ).toBe(false); }); it("defaults to Date.now() for the replay window when no clock override is given", () => { const fresh = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000); const signature = signWebhookPayload({ secret: SECRET, payload: PAYLOAD, timestamp: fresh }); // No `now` passed → exercises the Date.now() default branch; a just-issued // signature is inside the 5-minute window. expect(verifyWebhookSignature({ secret: SECRET, payload: PAYLOAD, signature, timestamp: fresh })).toBe(true); }); it("does not strip a late `=` (index >= 16) as an algorithm prefix", () => { const signature = signWebhookPayload({ secret: SECRET, payload: PAYLOAD, timestamp: TIMESTAMP }); // Insert an `=` past position 16 — normalizeSignature must keep the value as-is, // so the now-malformed/longer string fails verification rather than being trimmed. const withLateEquals = `${signature.slice(0, 20)}=${signature.slice(20)}`; expect( verifyWebhookSignature({ secret: SECRET, payload: PAYLOAD, signature: withLateEquals, timestamp: TIMESTAMP, now: () => TIMESTAMP * 1000, }) ).toBe(false); }); });