export const routeAccessClasses = [ "public-health", "public-docs", "service-token", "platform-source-credential", "service-or-tenant-api-key", "optional-api-key-validation", "tenant-api-key", "tenant-webhook-credential", "provider-body-token-webhook", "provider-header-token-webhook", "provider-hmac-webhook", "webhook-signature", "provider-refetch-webhook", "jwt-auth", "auth-credential-exchange", "public-analytics-token", "public-analytics-overview", "canonical-redirect", ] as const; export type RouteAccessClass = (typeof routeAccessClasses)[number]; export type RouteMethod = "GET" | "POST" | "PUT" | "PATCH" | "DELETE" | "OPTIONS" | "ALL"; export type RouteAccessKey = `${RouteMethod} ${string}`; export type RouteAccessInventoryEntry = { method: RouteMethod; path: string; accessClass: RouteAccessClass; rationale: string; sensitiveData: boolean | string; }; export function routeAccessKey(route: Pick): RouteAccessKey { return `${route.method} ${route.path}`; } export const routeAccessInventory = [ { method: "GET", path: "/healthz", accessClass: "public-health", rationale: "Unauthenticated liveness probe returns only service status and request correlation metadata.", sensitiveData: false, }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/health", accessClass: "public-health", rationale: "Unauthenticated versioned liveness probe returns only service status and request correlation metadata.", sensitiveData: false, }, { method: "GET", path: "/readyz", accessClass: "public-health", rationale: "Unauthenticated readiness probe returns redacted dependency status for infrastructure checks.", sensitiveData: "Dependency health state is exposed without implementation details.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/status", accessClass: "public-health", rationale: "Unauthenticated status probe for external uptime monitors. Returns boolean-only health, revision, region, uptime.", sensitiveData: "Boolean health state and deployment region tag only — no connection strings, hostnames or stack traces.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/metrics", accessClass: "service-token", rationale: "Prometheus scrape endpoint requires bearer METRICS_TOKEN. Returns 404 when METRICS_ENABLED is false.", sensitiveData: "Prom text-format counters and gauges — includes business KPIs (AI tokens, mail, webhook, queue depth). Token-protected.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/openapi.json", accessClass: "public-docs", rationale: "OpenAPI discovery is intentionally public for client integration and contains schema metadata only.", sensitiveData: false, }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/docs", accessClass: "public-docs", rationale: "Documentation shell is intentionally public and renders the OpenAPI document without runtime data.", sensitiveData: false, }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/session/current-user", accessClass: "service-token", rationale: "Current service principal endpoint requires a bearer service token before returning authentication state.", sensitiveData: "Returns authenticated principal type metadata only.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/auth/login", accessClass: "auth-credential-exchange", rationale: "Login exchanges submitted email and password credentials for a short-lived JWT after password verification.", sensitiveData: "Consumes credentials and returns a JWT plus basic user identity.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/auth/refresh-token", accessClass: "jwt-auth", rationale: "Refresh requires an existing bearer JWT before issuing a replacement token for the same user.", sensitiveData: "Returns a JWT plus basic user identity.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/auth/logout", accessClass: "jwt-auth", rationale: "Logout requires an existing bearer JWT before revoking the active API session and clearing the API cookie.", sensitiveData: "Consumes JWT credential material but returns only a success envelope and expired cookie attributes.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/api-keys/validate", accessClass: "optional-api-key-validation", rationale: "API-key validation optionally accepts a presented stored API key or service token and reports redacted validation status without requiring a prior credential.", sensitiveData: "Returns redacted stored API-key metadata but never plaintext key material.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/platform/leads", accessClass: "platform-source-credential", rationale: "Platform lead ingestion requires a rotatable, source-scoped bearer capability; the authenticated credential selects the configured source and is revalidated atomically during pre-tenant persistence.", sensitiveData: "Consumes bounded platform lead contact and attribution data while omitting source capability material and submitted lead data from responses and diagnostics.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/support/inbound-email", accessClass: "webhook-signature", rationale: "Inbound support email verifies Mailjet webhook Basic-Auth credentials before resolving tenant inbound addresses and creating tickets.", sensitiveData: "Consumes signed email metadata and message body while omitting provider payloads and signing material from responses.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/email/inbound-mailjet", accessClass: "webhook-signature", rationale: "Tenant inbound email verifies Mailjet webhook Basic-Auth credentials before resolving tenant inbound addresses and creating lead/activity records.", sensitiveData: "Consumes signed email metadata and message body while omitting provider payloads, recipient content, and signing material from responses.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/admin-sales/email/provider-events", accessClass: "provider-hmac-webhook", rationale: "Provider-neutral admin email events require a timestamp-bound HMAC over the exact request body before an AdminUser RLS context is bound and an idempotent event is persisted.", sensitiveData: "Consumes bounded delivery and engagement metadata while responses omit recipient data, provider payloads, signing material, and AdminUser identifiers.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/admin-sales/email/bcc-inbound", accessClass: "webhook-signature", rationale: "Admin BCC ingestion requires both Mailjet HTTP Basic authentication and one exact signed, rotatable BCC capability before binding the embedded AdminUser RLS context.", sensitiveData: "Consumes bounded email headers and bodies while responses omit message content, recipient capability material, signing secrets, and AdminUser identifiers.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/analytics/events", accessClass: "public-analytics-token", rationale: "Analytics event ingestion accepts only a bounded anonymous visitor identifier and writes tenantless records in the isolated platform analytics RLS context.", sensitiveData: "Consumes an anonymous analytics identifier, URLs, routes, and event labels; authenticated user and portal identifiers are rejected.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/analytics/page-views", accessClass: "public-analytics-token", rationale: "Analytics page-view ingestion accepts only a bounded anonymous visitor identifier and writes tenantless records in the isolated platform analytics RLS context.", sensitiveData: "Consumes an anonymous analytics identifier, URLs, and route names; authenticated user and portal identifiers are rejected.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/analytics/public", accessClass: "public-analytics-overview", rationale: "Public analytics is enabled only by the operator-controlled setting and returns tenantless global aggregates from the isolated platform analytics RLS context.", sensitiveData: "Returns tenantless aggregate analytics counts and top-level chart data without user, tenant, or portal attribution.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/analytics/admin", accessClass: "service-token", rationale: "Admin analytics requires service credentials plus an operator user identifier verified through the RLS-protected AdminUser row; optional portal reads require an exact tenant and portal pair.", sensitiveData: "Returns global tenantless aggregates or aggregate metrics for an explicitly tenant-bound portal scope.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/notifications/stream", accessClass: "service-token", rationale: "Notification stream requires service credentials before returning tenant and user scoped in-app delivery diagnostics over SSE.", sensitiveData: "Returns bounded, sanitized notification delivery snapshots and cursors without provider payloads, metadata, or raw delivery secrets.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/accounts", accessClass: "service-token", rationale: "Account listing requires service credentials plus an explicit operator user identifier that is rebound and verified through the RLS-protected AdminUser row before global tenant reads.", sensitiveData: "Returns tenant identifiers, names, slugs, icons, and subscription summary fields without plaintext secrets.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/accounts/:id", accessClass: "service-token", rationale: "Account lookup requires service credentials plus an explicit operator user identifier that is rebound and verified through the RLS-protected AdminUser row before global tenant resolution and tenant-bound detail reads.", sensitiveData: "Returns tenant identifiers, names, slugs, icons, and subscription summary fields without plaintext secrets.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/usage", accessClass: "tenant-api-key", rationale: "Usage lookups enter through the canonical API host and validate tenant API-key credentials in the API runtime.", sensitiveData: "Returns plan and remaining API usage metadata for the credential-scoped tenant.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/contacts", accessClass: "tenant-api-key", rationale: "Public API contact reads validate a tenant-bound API-key credential before querying only that credential's tenant scope.", sensitiveData: "Returns redacted contact fields for the credential-scoped tenant; internal notes and credential material are omitted.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/companies", accessClass: "tenant-api-key", rationale: "Public API company reads validate a tenant-bound API-key credential before querying only that credential's tenant scope.", sensitiveData: "Returns redacted organisation contact fields for the credential-scoped tenant; internal notes and credential material are omitted.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/deals", accessClass: "tenant-api-key", rationale: "Public API deal reads validate a tenant-bound API-key credential before querying only that credential's tenant scope.", sensitiveData: "Returns redacted sales-pipeline project fields for the credential-scoped tenant; internal notes and credential material are omitted.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/projects", accessClass: "tenant-api-key", rationale: "Public API project reads validate a tenant-bound API-key credential before querying only that credential's tenant scope.", sensitiveData: "Returns redacted project fields for the credential-scoped tenant; internal notes and credential material are omitted.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/tasks", accessClass: "tenant-api-key", rationale: "Public API task reads validate a tenant-bound API-key credential before querying only that credential's tenant scope.", sensitiveData: "Returns redacted task fields for the credential-scoped tenant; internal notes and credential material are omitted.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/leads", accessClass: "tenant-api-key", rationale: "Public API lead reads validate a tenant-bound API-key credential before querying only that credential's tenant scope.", sensitiveData: "Returns redacted lead-inbox fields for the credential-scoped tenant; raw payloads, anti-spam internals and credential material are omitted.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/webhooks/incoming/:tenant/:slug", accessClass: "tenant-webhook-credential", rationale: "Incoming public webhooks enter through the canonical API host, resolve the tenant endpoint, validate the endpoint credential mode and create only tenant-scoped lead intake records.", sensitiveData: "Consumes third-party lead payloads and stores redacted ingestion metadata; API keys, webhook tokens, HMAC material and raw signing secrets are omitted from responses.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/webhooks/telephony/aircall", accessClass: "provider-body-token-webhook", rationale: "Aircall webhook ingress authenticates the provider-issued body token against its stored hash, resolves exactly one tenant connection, and re-verifies the encrypted connection credential before RLS-scoped persistence.", sensitiveData: "Consumes bounded call lifecycle metadata and a write-only provider token; responses disclose no tenant, credential, rate-limit, or deduplication state.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/webhooks/telephony/hallopetra", accessClass: "provider-header-token-webhook", rationale: "HalloPetra webhook ingress authenticates a dedicated custom Authorization header secret against its stored hash, resolves exactly one tenant connection, and re-verifies the encrypted connection credential before RLS-scoped persistence.", sensitiveData: "Consumes bounded post-call metadata and a write-only webhook secret; responses disclose no tenant, credential, rate-limit, or deduplication state, and native transcripts are not persisted.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/webhooks/admin-telephony/aircall", accessClass: "provider-body-token-webhook", rationale: "Admin Aircall webhook ingress hashes the provider-issued body token, resolves exactly one active AdminUser connection through the security-definer boundary, and binds that AdminUser RLS context before idempotent persistence.", sensitiveData: "Consumes bounded call lifecycle metadata and a write-only provider token; neutral responses disclose no AdminUser, connection, credential, rate-limit, or deduplication state.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/billing/lago/webhooks", accessClass: "provider-hmac-webhook", rationale: "Lago billing webhook ingress verifies the provider HMAC over the exact request body before binding the embedded customer tenant and applying replay-safe subscription state changes.", sensitiveData: "Consumes tenant-scoped subscription lifecycle metadata while responses omit customer identifiers, provider object identifiers, payloads, and signing material.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/billing/mollie/webhooks", accessClass: "provider-refetch-webhook", rationale: "Mollie billing webhook ingress accepts only the provider payment id, refetches that payment from Mollie server-side, and syncs only tenant-scoped billing metadata from the verified payment.", sensitiveData: "Consumes a provider payment id and stores redacted billing lifecycle metadata without returning provider payloads or plaintext credentials.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/email-sequences/mailjet/webhooks", accessClass: "webhook-signature", rationale: "Email-sequence provider webhooks verify Mailjet Basic-Auth credentials before correlating bounce events to provider message ids.", sensitiveData: "Consumes delivery event metadata while responses omit provider payloads, recipient data, and credentials.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/workspaces/:tenantId/auth/providers", accessClass: "service-token", rationale: "Workspace auth-provider discovery requires a service token before returning tenant-scoped SSO metadata.", sensitiveData: "Returns redacted OIDC/SAML provider metadata only; client secrets, SAML certificate bodies, private keys, token hashes, invite tokens, and raw metadata documents are omitted.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/workspaces/:tenantId/context/revalidate", accessClass: "service-token", rationale: "Workspace context revalidation requires a service token before confirming tenant/user membership for a context switch.", sensitiveData: "Consumes tenant and user identifiers and returns a redacted validity envelope without provider secrets, invite tokens, token hashes, or SSO secret material.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/workspaces/:tenantId/invites", accessClass: "service-token", rationale: "Workspace invite listing requires a service token before returning tenant-scoped invite lifecycle state.", sensitiveData: "Returns invite email, lifecycle timestamps, audit user ids, and tokenPrefix only; plaintext tokens and token hashes are omitted.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/workspaces/:tenantId/invites", accessClass: "service-token", rationale: "Workspace invite creation requires a service token before issuing a tenant-scoped invite token.", sensitiveData: "Consumes invite recipient details and returns the one-time plaintext invite token only in the create response.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/workspaces/:tenantId/invites/:inviteId/accept", accessClass: "service-token", rationale: "Workspace invite acceptance requires a service token and a one-time invite token before finalizing tenant membership invitation state.", sensitiveData: "Consumes plaintext invite token and returns redacted invite lifecycle metadata without echoing the token.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/workspaces/:tenantId/invites/:inviteId/revoke", accessClass: "service-token", rationale: "Workspace invite revocation requires a service token before finalizing the tenant-scoped invite as revoked.", sensitiveData: "Consumes revoke audit metadata and returns redacted invite lifecycle metadata without token material.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/events/webhooks/attempts/:id", accessClass: "webhook-signature", rationale: "Webhook retry verifies Mailjet webhook Basic-Auth credentials before looking up or queueing a known delivery attempt.", sensitiveData: "Consumes signed webhook delivery metadata and an attempt id while omitting provider payloads and signing material from responses.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/maintenance/export-retention/enqueue", accessClass: "service-token", rationale: "Export artifact retention cleanup is an operator maintenance action and requires service credentials before enqueueing work.", sensitiveData: "Consumes an optional bounded batch size and returns only queue task metadata plus request correlation.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/exports/:exportJobId/download-url", accessClass: "service-or-tenant-api-key", rationale: "Export download URL creation requires service credentials or a tenant-bound stored API key and blocks compliance-paused exports before returning a short-lived signed artifact URL envelope.", sensitiveData: "Returns a signed artifact URL envelope without artifact bucket/key values, storage credentials, pause reason internals, filters, or object bodies.", }, { method: "GET", path: "/v1/exports/:exportJobId/progress", accessClass: "service-or-tenant-api-key", rationale: "Export progress polling requires service credentials or a tenant-bound stored API key; the handler scopes lookups to the caller's tenant and never leaks artifact bucket/key details.", sensitiveData: "Returns export progress envelope (status, percent, rowCount) — no artifact URLs, no compliance-pause internals, no filters.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/devices/register", accessClass: "jwt-auth", rationale: "Mobile push-token registration derives its user exclusively from a verified active API-session JWT; optional tenant membership is revalidated before tenant/user RLS binding.", sensitiveData: "Persists a sensitive device-bound push token. The response contains registration metadata only and never returns the raw token.", }, { method: "POST", path: "/v1/devices/revoke", accessClass: "jwt-auth", rationale: "Mobile push-token revocation derives its owner exclusively from a verified active API-session JWT; optional tenant membership is revalidated before the ownership-constrained RLS write.", sensitiveData: "Foreign user or tenant tokens are treated as not found. The response never echoes the raw device token or provider internals.", }, ] as const satisfies readonly RouteAccessInventoryEntry[];