Files
HiveGrid-Wireframes/03 Quellen und Referenzen/hivegrid-cloud/apps/mcp/src/http.ts
T
2026-07-08 16:15:37 +02:00

61 lines
2.0 KiB
TypeScript

import type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from "node:http";
import { McpHttpError } from "./errors.js";
export async function readJsonBody(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<unknown> {
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
let size = 0;
for await (const chunk of req) {
const buffer = Buffer.isBuffer(chunk) ? chunk : Buffer.from(String(chunk));
size += buffer.byteLength;
if (size > 1_000_000) {
throw new McpHttpError(413, "payload_too_large", "MCP request body is too large.");
}
chunks.push(buffer);
}
if (chunks.length === 0) {
return undefined;
}
try {
return JSON.parse(Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8"));
} catch {
throw new McpHttpError(400, "invalid_json", "MCP request body must be valid JSON.");
}
}
export function writeJson(res: ServerResponse, status: number, payload: unknown, headers: Record<string, string> = {}): void {
if (res.headersSent) {
return;
}
res.writeHead(status, {
"Content-Type": "application/json; charset=utf-8",
...headers,
});
res.end(JSON.stringify(payload));
}
// Trusted, proxy-set headers only. The leftmost X-Forwarded-For value is
// client-controlled, so keying a rate limit on it would let an attacker rotate
// their apparent IP. In this estate the MCP host sits behind Cloudflare, which
// sets CF-Connecting-IP and overwrites any client-supplied value.
const TRUSTED_IP_HEADERS = ["cf-connecting-ip", "true-client-ip", "x-real-ip"] as const;
export function getClientIp(req: IncomingMessage): string {
for (const headerName of TRUSTED_IP_HEADERS) {
const value = req.headers[headerName];
const candidate = (Array.isArray(value) ? value[0] : value)?.trim();
if (candidate) {
return candidate;
}
}
return req.socket.remoteAddress ?? "unknown";
}
export function getHeader(req: IncomingMessage, name: string): string | undefined {
const value = req.headers[name.toLowerCase()];
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
return value.at(-1);
}
return value;
}