Update hivegrid-cloud reference to latest main

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
davidandClaude Fable 5 committed 2026-07-08 16:15:37 +02:00
1 parent e98d38e716
commit 7b21524c86
3781 files changed
+373484 -225607

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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { createFixedWindowRateLimiter, type FixedWindowRateLimiter, type SharedStore } from "@toolctrl/shared-store";
import { createFixedWindowRateLimiter, type FixedWindowRateLimiter, type SharedStore } from "@hivegrid/shared-store";
import { getSharedStore } from "../shared-store.js";
export const LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS = 60_000;
@@ -158,16 +158,17 @@ export function __resetLoginRateLimitStoreForTests(): void {
storeFactory = () => getSharedStore();
}
export function deriveLoginRateLimitClientIp(request: Pick<LoginRateLimitRequest, "headers" | "remoteAddress">): string {
const forwardedFor = readHeader(request.headers, "x-forwarded-for");
const forwardedClient = forwardedFor?.split(",")[0]?.trim();
if (forwardedClient) {
return forwardedClient;
}
// Trusted, proxy-set headers only. The leftmost X-Forwarded-For value is
// client-controlled, so keying the login throttle on it let an attacker reset
// their bucket by rotating the header (credential-stuffing bypass).
const TRUSTED_LOGIN_IP_HEADERS = ["cf-connecting-ip", "true-client-ip", "x-real-ip"] as const;
const realIp = readHeader(request.headers, "x-real-ip")?.trim();
if (realIp) {
return realIp;
export function deriveLoginRateLimitClientIp(request: Pick<LoginRateLimitRequest, "headers" | "remoteAddress">): string {
for (const headerName of TRUSTED_LOGIN_IP_HEADERS) {
const value = readHeader(request.headers, headerName)?.trim();
if (value) {
return value;
}
}
const remoteAddress = request.remoteAddress?.trim();