Update hivegrid-cloud reference to latest main
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
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import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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import { getTrustedClientIp } from "./IpUtils";
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const req = (headers: Record<string, string>) => new Request("https://app.example.test/", { headers });
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describe("getTrustedClientIp", () => {
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it("prefers the Cloudflare-set CF-Connecting-IP over a spoofable X-Forwarded-For", () => {
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expect(
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getTrustedClientIp(req({ "x-forwarded-for": "1.2.3.4, 10.0.0.1", "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.5" })),
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).toBe("203.0.113.5");
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});
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it("never trusts X-Forwarded-For or X-Client-IP, even when they are the only headers present", () => {
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expect(getTrustedClientIp(req({ "x-forwarded-for": "203.0.113.9" }))).toBe("unknown");
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expect(getTrustedClientIp(req({ "x-client-ip": "203.0.113.9" }))).toBe("unknown");
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});
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it("falls back to True-Client-Ip then X-Real-IP", () => {
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expect(getTrustedClientIp(req({ "true-client-ip": "198.51.100.7" }))).toBe("198.51.100.7");
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expect(getTrustedClientIp(req({ "x-real-ip": "198.51.100.8" }))).toBe("198.51.100.8");
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});
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it("ignores non-IP trusted-header values and returns unknown when nothing valid is present", () => {
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expect(getTrustedClientIp(req({ "cf-connecting-ip": "not-an-ip" }))).toBe("unknown");
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expect(getTrustedClientIp(req({}))).toBe("unknown");
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});
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});
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@@ -66,6 +66,34 @@ export function getClientIPAddress(requestOrHeaders: Request | Headers): string
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return ipAddress ?? null;
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}
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/**
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* Trusted client-IP headers, in order of preference. These are set by the
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* edge/proxy and OVERWRITE any client-supplied value, so — unlike
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* X-Forwarded-For's leftmost entry or X-Client-IP — they cannot be spoofed by
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* the client. In this estate every public request passes through Cloudflare
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* (proxied), which sets CF-Connecting-IP. X-Real-IP is the immediate reverse
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* proxy (Traefik) hop as a fallback for non-Cloudflare paths.
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*/
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const trustedHeaderNames = Object.freeze(["CF-Connecting-IP", "True-Client-Ip", "X-Real-IP"] as const);
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/**
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* Get the client IP from a TRUSTED, proxy-set header only. Use this for
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* security-sensitive decisions (rate limiting, abuse throttles) where an
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* attacker must not be able to rotate their apparent IP by forging
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* X-Forwarded-For. Returns "unknown" when no trusted header is present (e.g.
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* local development without a proxy) so callers can still key a shared bucket.
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*/
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export function getTrustedClientIp(requestOrHeaders: Request | Headers): string {
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const headers = requestOrHeaders instanceof Request ? requestOrHeaders.headers : requestOrHeaders;
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for (const headerName of trustedHeaderNames) {
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const value = headers.get(headerName)?.trim();
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if (value && isIP(value)) {
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return value;
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}
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}
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return "unknown";
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}
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function parseForwardedHeader(value: string | null): string | null {
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if (!value) return null;
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for (let part of value.split(";")) {
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