Update hivegrid-cloud reference to latest main
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
e98d38e716
commit
7b21524c86
3781 files changed
+373484
-225607
No files matched your search
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ This runbook describes how operators install, grant, enable, disable, uninstall,
|
||||
Provision the plugin worker service now so staging and future production
|
||||
topology stay identical. In production, a `worker-plugin` service with
|
||||
`PLUGIN_RUNTIME_PRODUCTION_ENABLED` unset or `false` starts idle and does not
|
||||
consume `toolctrl.plugin-invoke`; readiness treats the production plugin runtime
|
||||
consume `hivegrid.plugin-invoke`; readiness treats the production plugin runtime
|
||||
as skipped in that gated state. After the external WASM sandbox signoff,
|
||||
`PLUGIN_RUNTIME_PRODUCTION_ENABLED=true` makes plugin readiness active on both
|
||||
`worker-general` and `worker-plugin`, requires `PLUGIN_TRUSTED_PUBLIC_KEYS`, and
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ allows the plugin worker to consume invocation jobs.
|
||||
|
||||
- General worker group: consumes outbox fanout, including `outbox.plugin-hook`.
|
||||
- Plugin worker group: runs sandboxed plugin invocations with `WORKER_QUEUE_GROUP=plugin`.
|
||||
- Redis/BullMQ queue: `toolctrl.plugin-invoke`.
|
||||
- Redis/BullMQ queue: `hivegrid.plugin-invoke`.
|
||||
- Postgres: stores installed plugin rows, per-user plugin config, capability use audit, settings-change audit, and lifecycle audit events.
|
||||
|
||||
Do not run plugin invocation in the web container. Keep plugin execution isolated from tenant web traffic so sandbox stalls, plugin traps, and crash tracking do not block core app requests.
|
||||
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ plugin-specific gates and operator actions.
|
||||
| `PLUGIN_RUNTIME_PRODUCTION_ENABLED` | Production rollout gate | Must be `true` in production before install, grant, enable, hook fanout, or plugin invoke workers run. Keep unset/false until external sign-off. |
|
||||
| `PLUGIN_HOOK_FANOUT_REQUIRED` | General-worker fanout fail-closed switch | Optional for staging/canaries. In production with `PLUGIN_RUNTIME_PRODUCTION_ENABLED=true` and Redis configured, hook fanout is required even when this is unset. |
|
||||
| `PLUGIN_TRUSTED_PUBLIC_KEYS` | CSV of trusted Ed25519 public keys | Empty means plugin signature verification fails closed. |
|
||||
| `WORKER_QUEUE_GROUP=plugin` | Starts the isolated plugin worker service | Required for `toolctrl.plugin-invoke` jobs. In production before runtime signoff it starts idle without queue consumers; after `PLUGIN_RUNTIME_PRODUCTION_ENABLED=true`, startup fails closed if invocation runtime dependencies cannot bootstrap. |
|
||||
| `WORKER_QUEUE_GROUP=plugin` | Starts the isolated plugin worker service | Required for `hivegrid.plugin-invoke` jobs. In production before runtime signoff it starts idle without queue consumers; after `PLUGIN_RUNTIME_PRODUCTION_ENABLED=true`, startup fails closed if invocation runtime dependencies cannot bootstrap. |
|
||||
| `WORKER_CONCURRENCY_PLUGIN` | Plugin worker concurrency | Defaults to the worker runtime value. Tune separately from mail/general workers. |
|
||||
| `PLUGIN_HOOK_FANOUT_ENABLED` | General-worker plugin hook fanout toggle | Leave unset/true when production runtime is enabled; explicit `false` makes readiness fail. |
|
||||
| `PLUGIN_CAPABILITY_USE_ENABLED` | General-worker capability-use persistence toggle | Leave unset/true when production runtime is enabled; explicit `false` makes readiness fail. |
|
||||
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ Higher-risk host-binding resource controls remain runtime follow-up work. Do not
|
||||
| Install / grant / revoke / enable / disable lifecycle | Implemented with tenant scope, permissions, audit events, JSON request validation, and capability review digest checks. | External WASM sandbox signoff plus `PLUGIN_RUNTIME_PRODUCTION_ENABLED=true` in the target environment. |
|
||||
| Uninstall lifecycle | CLI/operator-only escape hatch that deletes the tenant `Plugin` row and writes an audit event. It is not a tenant API/UI action. | Operator backup/delete decision for plugin-owned data plus the external runtime signoff gate. |
|
||||
| Settings iframe | Implemented with sandboxed iframe, restrictive CSP including `navigate-to 'none'`, denied iframe `allow` permissions, parent-side unexpected-navigation remount, channel-bound strict-schema versioned `plugin.settings.*` postMessage contract, and non-secret per-user config persistence. | Keep secret-like settings blocked until encrypted secret storage and host binding review land. |
|
||||
| Hook fanout | Implemented for the foundation hook set through `outbox.plugin-hook` on `worker-general` and `toolctrl.plugin-invoke` on `worker-plugin`. | Add payload/test coverage before enabling new hook families such as billing, auth, or richer workflow hooks. |
|
||||
| Hook fanout | Implemented for the foundation hook set through `outbox.plugin-hook` on `worker-general` and `hivegrid.plugin-invoke` on `worker-plugin`. | Add payload/test coverage before enabling new hook families such as billing, auth, or richer workflow hooks. |
|
||||
| Safe host bindings | `log` and `audit` are gateway-controlled and audited. | Confirm trusted public keys and worker-plugin health in the deployment runbook. |
|
||||
| Deferred host bindings | `http.outbound`, `secret.read`, `db.read`, `db.write`, `storage.read`, `storage.write`, and `tenant.info` intentionally fail closed. Future `http.outbound`, `secret.read`, and `db.read`/`db.write` calls already have runtime per-call scope guards for exact HTTPS host, key-pattern, and table-prefix contracts, but the bindings are not exposed yet. | Dedicated security review, SSRF/tenant-boundary tests, tenant-boundary/storage tests, secret redaction, audit contracts, and operator copy for each binding. |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ decision before destructive cleanup.
|
||||
|
||||
## Hook Delivery
|
||||
|
||||
The web/API side emits `plugin.hook.*` outbox events. The general worker consumes those events and fans out matching subscribers into `toolctrl.plugin-invoke`. The plugin worker then executes the WASM hook.
|
||||
The web/API side emits `plugin.hook.*` outbox events. The general worker consumes those events and fans out matching subscribers into `hivegrid.plugin-invoke`. The plugin worker then executes the WASM hook.
|
||||
|
||||
Current foundation hooks:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ The crash tracker counts failures per plugin and tenant in a sliding window. Whe
|
||||
Operator checks after auto-disable:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Inspect `AuditEvent` rows for `plugin.auto_disabled` (`sourceModule=worker.plugin-runtime`, `outcome=blocked`) and then lifecycle/capability-use rows.
|
||||
2. Run `toolctrl-cli plugins verify-audit-chain <tenantId> [--pluginId <pluginId>]` to verify the tenant-wide `PluginCapabilityUse` hash chain. `--pluginId` reports matching rows but does not slice the tenant chain.
|
||||
2. Run `hivegrid-cli plugins verify-audit-chain <tenantId> [--pluginId <pluginId>]` to verify the tenant-wide `PluginCapabilityUse` hash chain. `--pluginId` reports matching rows but does not slice the tenant chain.
|
||||
3. Inspect capability-use audit rows.
|
||||
4. Inspect worker logs with `pluginId`, `tenantId`, and queue job id.
|
||||
5. Confirm whether the failure is plugin code, manifest/capability mismatch, missing host binding, or host runtime error.
|
||||
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ After runtime changes:
|
||||
|
||||
```sh
|
||||
pnpm exec vitest run packages/plugin-runtime
|
||||
pnpm --filter @toolctrl/worker build
|
||||
pnpm --filter @hivegrid/worker build
|
||||
pnpm run verify:deploy-workflow
|
||||
pnpm run verify:docker-baseline
|
||||
```
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user