Update hivegrid-cloud reference to latest main

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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davidandClaude Fable 5 committed 2026-07-08 16:15:37 +02:00
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@@ -45,11 +45,11 @@ Every incident, regardless of severity, follows the same six phases. P2/P3 incid
Sources of detection (non-exhaustive):
- Sentry alert (especially `severity >= error` with `pii.scrubbed=false` tags)
- Audit-verifier nightly job (`compliance-audit-export` chain-validation)
- Audit-verifier nightly job (AuditEvent chain-validation once the HiveGrid verifier ticket lands)
- Metrics alert (login failure spike, queue depth spike, AI cost spike, webhook-delivery dead-letter spike)
- User / customer report via support or status-page
- Researcher report via [`vulnerability-disclosure.md`](./vulnerability-disclosure.md)
- Provider notification (Stripe / Mailjet / OpenAI / Bunny / Sentry / Authentik)
- Provider notification (Legacy-Provider / Mailjet / OpenAI / Bunny / Sentry / Authentik)
- IR team review of the [`threat-model.md`](./threat-model.md) residual-risk list
**Action**: open an incident in the operator's incident-tracker, page the IR Lead, set provisional severity, and start the timeline log.
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ Tactical levers (in roughly increasing impact):
- Disable affected **worker queue group** (`docs/ops/worker-queues.md`)
- Disable **outbound webhook delivery** (operator killswitch documented in `docs/architecture/outbox-pattern.md`)
- **Invalidate sessions** for affected users (mass-revoke via DB script; documented in `docs/operations/database-rollback.md`)
- **Rotate API keys / JWT secret / Stripe webhook secret** (rotation runbook in operator password manager)
- **Rotate API keys / JWT secret / Legacy-Provider webhook secret** (rotation runbook in operator password manager)
- **Block IP ranges** at WAF / Coolify edge
- **Take service offline** behind status-page maintenance — last resort
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ For each lever applied: record actor, timestamp, lever, scope, expected impact,
Goal: remove the root cause.
- Root-cause analysis (RCA) using AuditEvent hash-chain forensics — when [`compliance-audit-export`](../improvement-plan/10-compliance-polish/compliance-audit-export.md) lands, the verifier is the canonical forensics source; until then the operator uses Sentry traces + DB audit rows + metrics
- Root-cause analysis (RCA) using AuditEvent hash-chain forensics. Until the HiveGrid verifier lands, the operator uses Sentry traces + DB audit rows + metrics.
- Code fix authored on a feature branch, reviewed by Engineering Lead
- Tests added (regression + non-regression) — coverage gate enforced
- Patch deployed (Coolify auto-deploy or manual `prisma:migrate:deploy`)
@@ -117,13 +117,13 @@ docs/security/incidents/<YYYY-MM-DD>-<short-id>.md
(See [§9](#9-post-incident-review-template) for the template. The `incidents/` directory is created lazily — first incident is responsible for creating it with a `.gitkeep`.)
The post-mortem is reviewed at the next IR-team weekly. Action items are tracked in the improvement plan with phase + commit category. The [`threat-model.md`](./threat-model.md) is updated if a new control class was added or a residual risk needs to be re-classified.
The post-mortem is reviewed at the next IR-team weekly. Action items are tracked in HiveGrid tickets with phase + commit category. The [`threat-model.md`](./threat-model.md) is updated if a new control class was added or a residual risk needs to be re-classified.
## 4. Forensics
Forensics relies on three sources of truth, in order of preference:
1. **AuditEvent hash-chain** (canonical; tamper-evident once [`compliance-audit-export`](../improvement-plan/10-compliance-polish/compliance-audit-export.md) lands its verifier)
1. **AuditEvent hash-chain** (canonical once the HiveGrid verifier lands; use DB audit rows until then)
2. **Sentry events + breadcrumbs** (PII-scrubbed; subject to retention)
3. **Metrics + logs** (high-volume; subject to retention + sampling)
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ Some operations require break-glass access (e.g. direct DB write, secret rotatio
Documented break-glass procedures:
- **Direct DB write** — see `docs/operations/database-rollback.md`
- **Stripe webhook-secret rotation** — operator password-manager runbook
- **Legacy-Provider webhook-secret rotation** — operator password-manager runbook
- **JWT-secret rotation** — operator password-manager runbook (mass-revoke required)
- **IdP fallback (Authentik down)** — fall back to local admin credential; documented in `infra/authentik/README.md`
- **Backup restore in production** — `docs/ops/backup-cli.md` `restore` section