Update hivegrid-cloud reference to latest main

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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davidandClaude Fable 5 committed 2026-07-08 16:15:37 +02:00
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commit 7b21524c86
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@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ Mitigation links use `file:line` for the primary anchor. **Every linked line mus
| STRIDE | Attack scenario | Mitigation(s) | Residual risk |
| ------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Spoofing** | Attacker writes rows with another tenant's id. | Recorder is invocation-scoped — `tenantId` set once at construction (`audit.ts:114-119`) and copied into every record. Insertion goes through `PluginCapabilityUseStore.insertMany` (`apps/worker/src/jobs/plugin-capability-use.ts:39`), itself called only from the worker handler. | None at the runtime layer. The outbox queue must remain operator-only writeable. |
| **Tampering** | Rows modified after-write to hide an exfiltration. | Postgres-level: only the schema-owner role can `UPDATE` directly. App-level: there is no `UPDATE PluginCapabilityUse` code path. Rows are hash-chained per tenant through `prevHash` / `rowHash`, and operators verify integrity with `toolctrl-cli plugins verify-audit-chain <tenantId>`. | Keep the verifier in the production runbook; a web endpoint remains deferred. |
| **Tampering** | Rows modified after-write to hide an exfiltration. | Postgres-level: only the schema-owner role can `UPDATE` directly. App-level: there is no `UPDATE PluginCapabilityUse` code path. Rows are hash-chained per tenant through `prevHash` / `rowHash`, and operators verify integrity with `hivegrid-cli plugins verify-audit-chain <tenantId>`. | Keep the verifier in the production runbook; a web endpoint remains deferred. |
| **Repudiation** | Operator/tenant denies an action. | Two-tier evidence: per-invocation row (`Plugin.installedAt` + audit-events table for install) **and** per-capability-use row. | None. |
| **Info disclosure** | Body content stored in audit → DSGVO violation. | **Bodies are NEVER stored.** `payloadHash` is SHA-256 of an arg-shape descriptor only (`audit.ts:173-175`). No URL bodies, no DB row payloads. | None when used as designed. Plugin authors writing custom `descriptor` strings that contain PII are a separate problem — `hashCapabilityPayload` should be the only path. |
| **DoS** | Plugin spams the recorder until heap exhausts. | `maxEntries` cap (default 1024) per invocation (`audit.ts:91, 109`); excess entries are dropped with a `warn` log. | None. |
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ Mitigation links use `file:line` for the primary anchor. **Every linked line mus
| STRIDE | Attack scenario | Mitigation(s) | Residual risk |
| ---------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **DoS / availability** | After a sandbox-escape report, runtime must be killable quickly. | Stop/scale the dedicated `worker-plugin` service to zero (or redeploy it with `WORKER_ENABLED=false`), pause/drain `toolctrl.plugin-invoke`, and disable affected plugins through lifecycle controls. | Residual operator risk: this is an operational stop path, not a runtime env flag. Runbooks and deploy tooling must keep `worker-plugin` separately controllable from core workers. |
| **DoS / availability** | After a sandbox-escape report, runtime must be killable quickly. | Stop/scale the dedicated `worker-plugin` service to zero (or redeploy it with `WORKER_ENABLED=false`), pause/drain `hivegrid.plugin-invoke`, and disable affected plugins through lifecycle controls. | Residual operator risk: this is an operational stop path, not a runtime env flag. Runbooks and deploy tooling must keep `worker-plugin` separately controllable from core workers. |
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