Update hivegrid-cloud reference to latest main
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
e98d38e716
commit
7b21524c86
3781 files changed
+373484
-225607
No files matched your search
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
|
||||
-- R-P5 · Apps-Engine — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Companion to prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql (R-P2b) and the per-module RLS
|
||||
-- blocks (file/task/hr/crypto). The Apps-Engine tables ship in the tracked merge
|
||||
-- migration (created at main-merge per AD-21); this RLS block stays out of the
|
||||
-- auto-migration path (activation = coordinated P5 cutover, not a schema diff).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- IMPORTANT: `App` is a GLOBAL catalog table (no tenantId) → NO policy, NO RLS.
|
||||
-- Only the tenant-scoped rows are isolated: DataConnection, AppSyncRun,
|
||||
-- AppSyncRunLog, AppSyncItem.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- WHY DEFERRED: with RLS + FORCE on, any query WITHOUT `app.tenant_id` returns
|
||||
-- ZERO rows. The dataConnection/appSync services always scope by
|
||||
-- `where: { tenantId }` and run inside withTenantRLS(), so app-level scoping
|
||||
-- carries isolation until the cutover (runtime role → hivegrid_app).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment. Idempotent, DO-guarded (P3018).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Inverse per table:
|
||||
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
|
||||
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
tbl text;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY['DataConnection', 'AppSyncRun', 'AppSyncRunLog', 'AppSyncItem']
|
||||
LOOP
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
|
||||
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
|
||||
AND tablename = tbl
|
||||
AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
EXECUTE format(
|
||||
'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
|
||||
tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
|
||||
);
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
|
||||
END LOOP;
|
||||
|
||||
-- App is global → the restricted role only ever reads the catalog.
|
||||
GRANT SELECT ON "App" TO hivegrid_app;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Verify before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma):
|
||||
-- pnpm prisma validate · pnpm prisma migrate status
|
||||
-- CI: prisma migrate deploy against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch).
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
|
||||
-- R-P9a · Auftrag sub-areas — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred)
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Code-side access runs through withTenantRLS(); this block is applied during
|
||||
-- the coordinated restricted-role cutover, not as an automatic schema diff.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Inverse per table:
|
||||
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
|
||||
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
tbl text;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
|
||||
'ProjektMitglied',
|
||||
'ProjektTermin',
|
||||
'Rechnung',
|
||||
'ProjektChecklist',
|
||||
'ProjektChecklistItem',
|
||||
'AuftragPipelineStageConfig',
|
||||
'AcceptanceFormTemplate',
|
||||
'ProjectTemplate',
|
||||
'ScheduleEntry',
|
||||
'ScheduleConflict',
|
||||
'AbnahmeProtokoll',
|
||||
'AbnahmeSignatur',
|
||||
'OfflineSyncMutation'
|
||||
]
|
||||
LOOP
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
|
||||
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
|
||||
AND tablename = tbl
|
||||
AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
EXECUTE format(
|
||||
'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
|
||||
tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
|
||||
);
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
|
||||
END LOOP;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
|
||||
-- R-P12a Automation isolation artifact.
|
||||
-- Companion to prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql. Enable during the merge
|
||||
-- migration once the schema lands and the automation service has shipped.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Verification:
|
||||
-- psql "$DIRECT_URL" -f prisma/rls/automation-isolation.sql
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "AutomationRule" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "AutomationRule" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_automation_rule" ON "AutomationRule";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_automation_rule" ON "AutomationRule"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "AutomationRuleStep" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "AutomationRuleStep" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_automation_rule_step" ON "AutomationRuleStep";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_automation_rule_step" ON "AutomationRuleStep"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "AutomationExecution" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "AutomationExecution" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_automation_execution" ON "AutomationExecution";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_automation_execution" ON "AutomationExecution"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "AutomationStepExecution" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "AutomationStepExecution" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_automation_step_execution" ON "AutomationStepExecution";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_automation_step_execution" ON "AutomationStepExecution"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "AutomationCredential" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "AutomationCredential" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_automation_credential" ON "AutomationCredential";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_automation_credential" ON "AutomationCredential"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "AutomationTemplate" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "AutomationTemplate" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_automation_template" ON "AutomationTemplate";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_automation_template" ON "AutomationTemplate"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" IS NULL OR "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" IS NULL OR "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "AutomationTriggerMeter" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "AutomationTriggerMeter" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_automation_trigger_meter" ON "AutomationTriggerMeter";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_automation_trigger_meter" ON "AutomationTriggerMeter"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
|
||||
-- AK-P16b · P16 Booking — HARD DOUBLE-BOOKING GUARD (deferred, NOT in the Prisma schema)
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- The race-protection backstop for DoD 2: a PostgreSQL EXCLUDE USING gist
|
||||
-- constraint that makes it physically impossible to persist two OVERLAPPING active
|
||||
-- appointments for the SAME provider. This cannot be expressed in the Prisma schema
|
||||
-- (Prisma has no exclusion-constraint primitive), so — like the RLS block — it
|
||||
-- ships out-of-band: `psql -f` on the feature branch, folded into the merge
|
||||
-- migration at main-merge (AD-21).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- This is the second layer. The first layer is the application Serializable
|
||||
-- transaction in BookingSubmitService that re-checks slot availability and returns
|
||||
-- Klartext alternatives; this constraint guarantees correctness even under a lost
|
||||
-- race / concurrent writer, surfacing as a unique-violation the submit path maps to
|
||||
-- the same "slot just taken" Klartext.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- `held` counts as occupying (a past appointment that took place still blocks its
|
||||
-- slot for history integrity). `cancelled` / `no_show` / `rescheduled` free the slot.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Forward-only (DoD 28). Idempotent + DO-guarded (reproducible from an empty DB,
|
||||
-- P3018-safe — order-independent except for the extension, which is IF NOT EXISTS).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Inverse SQL:
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "Appointment" DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS appointment_no_overlap;
|
||||
-- -- (leave btree_gist installed; other modules may rely on it)
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
-- gist over a scalar (providerUserId) + a range (tstzrange) needs the btree_gist
|
||||
-- extension to put the equality column into the same gist index.
|
||||
CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS btree_gist;
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_constraint WHERE conname = 'appointment_no_overlap'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
-- One active appointment per provider per time range. The half-open range
|
||||
-- [startAt, endAt) means back-to-back appointments (end == next start) do NOT
|
||||
-- conflict. Partial WHERE so only occupying statuses participate.
|
||||
EXECUTE '
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "Appointment"
|
||||
ADD CONSTRAINT appointment_no_overlap
|
||||
EXCLUDE USING gist (
|
||||
"providerUserId" WITH =,
|
||||
tstzrange("startAt", "endAt", ''[)'') WITH &&
|
||||
)
|
||||
WHERE (status IN (''scheduled'', ''held''))
|
||||
';
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Verify (after `prisma db push`):
|
||||
-- psql "$DIRECT_URL" -f prisma/rls/booking-constraints.sql
|
||||
-- -- then attempt two overlapping inserts for one providerUserId → 2nd raises
|
||||
-- -- 23P01 exclusion_violation (mapped to Klartext "slot just taken").
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
|
||||
-- AK-P16b · P16 Booking — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Companion to calendar-isolation.sql / email-isolation.sql / apps-engine-isolation.sql.
|
||||
-- The AK-P16b tables + enums + indexes ship in the tracked merge migration
|
||||
-- (prisma/migrations/<ts>_p16b_booking, created at main-merge per AD-21). What
|
||||
-- lives in THIS file is the Row-Level-Security block, DELIBERATELY kept out of the
|
||||
-- auto-migration path: enabling RLS + FORCE before every access sets the GUC would
|
||||
-- make queries return ZERO rows, so activation is a coordinated cutover (R-P2b's
|
||||
-- org-wide P5 RLS cutover), not a schema diff.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- SCOPE: every AK-P16b table is ALWAYS tenant-scoped, so all get policies here:
|
||||
-- BookingPage, BookingPageProvider, AvailabilityRule, AvailabilityException,
|
||||
-- Appointment.
|
||||
-- NOTE on per-user owner-filtering (bookings.read_own): RLS isolates by TENANT. The
|
||||
-- stronger per-USER ownership rule (read_own users see only their own appointments,
|
||||
-- providerUserId = self) is enforced in the service layer (bookingAccess.server.ts
|
||||
-- owner-check + where: { providerUserId }).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- CODE-SIDE PRECONDITIONS — DONE (AK-P16b):
|
||||
-- 1. [x] Every AK-P16b web service runs each DB op for these tables inside
|
||||
-- withTenantRLS() (booking submit/admin/lifecycle paths). The public
|
||||
-- booking flow resolves the tenant from the {tenant} URL segment first.
|
||||
-- The app-level scoping (where: { tenantId, ... }) carries isolation until cutover.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- WHAT REMAINS — "Teil B" = the org-wide P5 RLS cutover (Raffael / R-P2b):
|
||||
-- a. Ship this block as its own forward-only migration.
|
||||
-- b. Switch the runtime DB connection to the restricted role `hivegrid_app`
|
||||
-- (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS); otherwise FORCE is a no-op for a superuser and
|
||||
-- an empty-read trap for a non-superuser owner. The GRANTs below cover it.
|
||||
-- c. Staging cutover + live cross-tenant 404 verification.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment per block. Order-dependent DDL is
|
||||
-- DO-guarded (P3018 protection: reproducible from an empty DB). Idempotent.
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
-- Row-level security on all AK-P16b tenant-scoped booking tables ---------------
|
||||
-- Pattern: "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true). The second
|
||||
-- argument `true` returns NULL instead of erroring when the GUC is not (yet) set
|
||||
-- — the policy then matches nothing (fail-closed).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Inverse per table:
|
||||
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
|
||||
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
tbl text;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
|
||||
'BookingPage',
|
||||
'BookingPageProvider',
|
||||
'AvailabilityRule',
|
||||
'AvailabilityException',
|
||||
'Appointment'
|
||||
]
|
||||
LOOP
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
-- FORCE so the table owner is subject to the policies too (otherwise the
|
||||
-- owner silently bypasses RLS).
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
|
||||
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
|
||||
AND tablename = tbl
|
||||
AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
EXECUTE format(
|
||||
'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
|
||||
tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
|
||||
);
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
-- The restricted app role (R-P2b's hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS) needs table
|
||||
-- privileges to reach the rows the policy then filters.
|
||||
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
|
||||
END LOOP;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Verify green before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma):
|
||||
-- pnpm prisma validate
|
||||
-- pnpm prisma migrate status
|
||||
-- CI: `prisma migrate deploy` against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch).
|
||||
-- Coordination: align ordering with R-P2b — P2 ships withTenantRLS()
|
||||
-- (SET LOCAL app.tenant_id); without a tenant context the policies match nothing
|
||||
-- (no data leak, just empty results) until the runtime role is hivegrid_app.
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
|
||||
-- AK-P16a · P16 Calendar-Sync (Google) — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Companion to email-isolation.sql / apps-engine-isolation.sql / hr-isolation.sql.
|
||||
-- The AK-P16a tables + enums + indexes ship in the tracked merge migration
|
||||
-- (prisma/migrations/<ts>_p16a_calendar, created at main-merge per AD-21). What
|
||||
-- lives in THIS file is the Row-Level-Security block, DELIBERATELY kept out of the
|
||||
-- auto-migration path: enabling RLS + FORCE before every access sets the GUC would
|
||||
-- make queries return ZERO rows, so activation is a coordinated cutover (R-P2b's
|
||||
-- org-wide P5 RLS cutover), not a schema diff.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- SCOPE: every AK-P16a table is ALWAYS tenant-scoped, so all get policies here:
|
||||
-- CalendarConnection, CalendarEvent, CalendarEventMapping, CalendarSyncCursor,
|
||||
-- CalendarWebhookEvent, CalendarConflict.
|
||||
-- NOTE on per-user leak-protection (DoD 3): RLS isolates by TENANT. The stronger
|
||||
-- per-USER ownership rule (external event contents are owner-only) is enforced in
|
||||
-- the service layer (calendarAccess.server.ts owner-check + where: { userId }).
|
||||
-- CalendarEventMapping has no userId column; its isolation is tenant-level here
|
||||
-- and owner-level via its parent CalendarConnection in code.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- CODE-SIDE PRECONDITIONS — DONE (AK-P16a):
|
||||
-- 1. [x] Every AK-P16a web/worker service runs each DB op for these tables
|
||||
-- inside withTenantRLS() (calendar sync/write/conflict paths).
|
||||
-- The app-level scoping (where: { tenantId, userId }) carries isolation until
|
||||
-- cutover.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- WHAT REMAINS — "Teil B" = the org-wide P5 RLS cutover (Raffael / R-P2b):
|
||||
-- a. Ship this block as its own forward-only migration.
|
||||
-- b. Switch the runtime DB connection to the restricted role `hivegrid_app`
|
||||
-- (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS); otherwise FORCE is a no-op for a superuser and
|
||||
-- an empty-read trap for a non-superuser owner. The GRANTs below cover it.
|
||||
-- c. Staging cutover + live cross-tenant 404 verification.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment per block. Order-dependent DDL is
|
||||
-- DO-guarded (P3018 protection: reproducible from an empty DB). Idempotent.
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
-- Row-level security on all AK-P16a tenant-scoped calendar tables --------------
|
||||
-- Pattern: "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true). The second
|
||||
-- argument `true` returns NULL instead of erroring when the GUC is not (yet) set
|
||||
-- — the policy then matches nothing (fail-closed).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Inverse per table:
|
||||
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
|
||||
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
tbl text;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
|
||||
'CalendarConnection',
|
||||
'CalendarEvent',
|
||||
'CalendarEventMapping',
|
||||
'CalendarSyncCursor',
|
||||
'CalendarWebhookEvent',
|
||||
'CalendarConflict'
|
||||
]
|
||||
LOOP
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
-- FORCE so the table owner is subject to the policies too (otherwise the
|
||||
-- owner silently bypasses RLS).
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
|
||||
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
|
||||
AND tablename = tbl
|
||||
AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
EXECUTE format(
|
||||
'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
|
||||
tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
|
||||
);
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
-- The restricted app role (R-P2b's hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS) needs table
|
||||
-- privileges to reach the rows the policy then filters.
|
||||
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
|
||||
END LOOP;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Verify green before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma):
|
||||
-- pnpm prisma validate
|
||||
-- pnpm prisma migrate status
|
||||
-- CI: `prisma migrate deploy` against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch).
|
||||
-- Coordination: align ordering with R-P2b — P2 ships withTenantRLS()
|
||||
-- (SET LOCAL app.tenant_id); without a tenant context the policies match nothing
|
||||
-- (no data leak, just empty results) until the runtime role is hivegrid_app.
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
|
||||
-- R-P6 · P6 CRM core — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Companion to R-P2b's prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql, AK-P4a's file-isolation.sql
|
||||
-- and AK-P4b's task-isolation.sql. The CRM tables + enums + indexes ship in the
|
||||
-- tracked merge migration prisma/migrations/<ts>_p6_crm (forward-only, DoD 28).
|
||||
-- What lives in THIS file is the Row-Level-Security block, DELIBERATELY kept out
|
||||
-- of the auto-migration path (same stance as task/file-isolation.sql): turning RLS
|
||||
-- on before every access sets the GUC would break the feature, so activation is a
|
||||
-- coordinated cutover, not a schema diff.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- WHY DEFERRED: enabling RLS + FORCE makes every CRM query WITHOUT `app.tenant_id`
|
||||
-- return ZERO rows. Per R-P2b's rule a table may only be RLS-enabled once ALL its
|
||||
-- accesses set the GUC. The app-level scoping (crmService/crmAccess run every DB op
|
||||
-- inside withTenantRLS()) carries isolation meanwhile (DoD 1 hard path).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- CODE-SIDE PRECONDITIONS — DONE (R-P6, 2026-06-29):
|
||||
-- 1. [x] All CRM web services run every DB op inside withTenantRLS()
|
||||
-- (apps/web/app/utils/integrations/crm/*.server.ts). The polymorphic
|
||||
-- custom-field / tag / activity writes are tenant-scoped by construction.
|
||||
-- 2. [ ] Worker maintenance crons (DSGVO archive sweeps) set the tenant GUC per
|
||||
-- tenant — wired when P7/P8 add Lead/Projekt retention (no CRM cron yet).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- WHAT REMAINS — "Teil B" = the org-wide P5 RLS cutover (Raffael / R-P2b):
|
||||
-- a. Ship this block as its own forward-only migration.
|
||||
-- b. Switch the runtime DB connection to the restricted role `hivegrid_app`
|
||||
-- (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS); otherwise FORCE is a no-op for a superuser.
|
||||
-- The GRANTs below already cover that role for the CRM tables.
|
||||
-- c. Staging cutover + live cross-tenant 404 verification.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment per block. Order-dependent DDL is
|
||||
-- DO-guarded (P3018 protection: reproducible from an empty DB). Idempotent.
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
-- Row-level security on all tenant-scoped CRM tables --------------------------
|
||||
-- Pattern: "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true). The second
|
||||
-- argument `true` returns NULL instead of erroring when the GUC is not (yet)
|
||||
-- set — the policy then matches nothing (fail-closed), and server-side scoping
|
||||
-- stays the hard path until the cutover.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Inverse per table:
|
||||
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
|
||||
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
tbl text;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
|
||||
'Kontakt', 'KontaktRelation', 'KontaktEmail', 'KontaktTelefon', 'Adresse',
|
||||
'CustomFieldDefinition', 'CustomFieldValue', 'Tag', 'TagAssignment'
|
||||
]
|
||||
LOOP
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
-- FORCE so the table owner is subject to the policies too (otherwise the
|
||||
-- owner silently bypasses RLS).
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
|
||||
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
|
||||
AND tablename = tbl
|
||||
AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
EXECUTE format(
|
||||
'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
|
||||
tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
|
||||
);
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
-- The restricted app role (R-P2b's hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS) needs table
|
||||
-- privileges to reach the rows the policy then filters.
|
||||
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
|
||||
END LOOP;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Verify green before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma):
|
||||
-- pnpm prisma validate
|
||||
-- pnpm prisma migrate status
|
||||
-- CI: `prisma migrate deploy` against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch).
|
||||
-- Coordination: align ordering with R-P2b — P2 ships withTenantRLS()
|
||||
-- (SET LOCAL app.tenant_id); without a tenant context the policies match nothing
|
||||
-- (no data leak, just empty results) until the runtime role is hivegrid_app.
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
|
||||
-- R-P5 · per-tenant encryption keys — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Companion to prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql (R-P2b) and the per-module RLS
|
||||
-- blocks (file/task/hr). The TenantEncryptionKey table ships in the tracked merge
|
||||
-- migration (created at main-merge per AD-21); the Row-Level-Security block lives
|
||||
-- HERE, deliberately out of the auto-migration path: enabling RLS before every
|
||||
-- access sets the GUC would break reads, so activation is a coordinated cutover.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- WHY DEFERRED: with RLS + FORCE on, any query WITHOUT `app.tenant_id` returns
|
||||
-- ZERO rows. The orchestration in packages/db/src/crypto/tenant-envelope.server.ts
|
||||
-- always scopes by `where: { tenantId }`, so app-level scoping carries isolation
|
||||
-- until the P5 cutover (R-P2b switches the runtime role to hivegrid_app,
|
||||
-- NOSUPERUSER NOBYPASSRLS).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- NOTE: the wrapped DEK is useless without the app master key, so even a full
|
||||
-- table leak exposes no plaintext. RLS here is defence-in-depth + symmetry with
|
||||
-- the other tenant tables, not the primary control.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment. Idempotent, DO-guarded (P3018).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Inverse:
|
||||
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "TenantEncryptionKey" FROM hivegrid_app;
|
||||
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "TenantEncryptionKey_tenant_isolation" ON "TenantEncryptionKey";
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "TenantEncryptionKey" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "TenantEncryptionKey" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "TenantEncryptionKey" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "TenantEncryptionKey" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
|
||||
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
|
||||
AND tablename = 'TenantEncryptionKey'
|
||||
AND policyname = 'TenantEncryptionKey_tenant_isolation'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
CREATE POLICY "TenantEncryptionKey_tenant_isolation" ON "TenantEncryptionKey"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "TenantEncryptionKey" TO hivegrid_app;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Verify before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma):
|
||||
-- pnpm prisma validate · pnpm prisma migrate status
|
||||
-- CI: prisma migrate deploy against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch).
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
-- R-P11b Dashboard isolation artifact.
|
||||
-- Companion to prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql. Enable during the merge
|
||||
-- migration once the schema lands and the dashboard service has shipped.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Verification:
|
||||
-- psql "$DIRECT_URL" -f prisma/rls/dashboard-isolation.sql
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "Dashboard" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "Dashboard" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_dashboard" ON "Dashboard";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_dashboard" ON "Dashboard"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "DashboardLayout" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "DashboardLayout" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_dashboard_layout" ON "DashboardLayout";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_dashboard_layout" ON "DashboardLayout"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "WidgetInstance" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "WidgetInstance" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_widget_instance" ON "WidgetInstance";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_widget_instance" ON "WidgetInstance"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
|
||||
-- VA-P23 · P23 Postfach-Sync (Gmail/Outlook) — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Companion to calendar-isolation.sql / email-isolation.sql. The VA-P23 tables +
|
||||
-- enums + indexes ship in the tracked merge migration (prisma/migrations/<ts>_
|
||||
-- p23_email_inbox, created at main-merge per AD-21). What lives in THIS file is
|
||||
-- the Row-Level-Security block, DELIBERATELY kept out of the auto-migration path:
|
||||
-- enabling RLS + FORCE before every access sets the GUC would make queries return
|
||||
-- ZERO rows, so activation is a coordinated cutover (R-P2b's org-wide P5 RLS
|
||||
-- cutover), not a schema diff.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- SCOPE: every VA-P23 table is ALWAYS tenant-scoped, so all get policies here:
|
||||
-- EmailIntegrationMailbox, EmailIntegrationMessage, EmailIntegrationSyncCursor,
|
||||
-- EmailIntegrationWebhookEvent.
|
||||
-- NOTE on per-user visibility (M09 Block I): RLS isolates by TENANT. The stronger
|
||||
-- per-USER rule (email.read_own sees only mailboxes with ownerUserId = self) is
|
||||
-- enforced in the service layer (emailInboxAccess.server.ts + where clauses).
|
||||
-- The webhook-ingest lookups (mailbox by subscription id / email address) run
|
||||
-- WITHOUT a tenant GUC by design (provider pushes carry no tenant) — same
|
||||
-- documented exception as the calendar webhook route.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- CODE-SIDE PRECONDITIONS — DONE (VA-P23):
|
||||
-- 1. [x] Every VA-P23 web/worker service runs each DB op for these tables
|
||||
-- inside withTenantRLS() (sync/match/list/send paths), except the two
|
||||
-- documented global webhook lookups above.
|
||||
-- The app-level scoping (where: { tenantId, ownerUserId }) carries isolation
|
||||
-- until cutover.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- WHAT REMAINS — "Teil B" = the org-wide P5 RLS cutover (Raffael / R-P2b):
|
||||
-- a. Ship this block as its own forward-only migration.
|
||||
-- b. Switch the runtime DB connection to the restricted role `hivegrid_app`
|
||||
-- (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS); otherwise FORCE is a no-op for a superuser and
|
||||
-- an empty-read trap for a non-superuser owner. The GRANTs below cover it.
|
||||
-- c. Staging cutover + live cross-tenant 404 verification.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment per block. Order-dependent DDL is
|
||||
-- DO-guarded (P3018 protection: reproducible from an empty DB). Idempotent.
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
-- Row-level security on all VA-P23 tenant-scoped email-inbox tables ------------
|
||||
-- Pattern: "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true). The second
|
||||
-- argument `true` returns NULL instead of erroring when the GUC is not (yet) set
|
||||
-- — the policy then matches nothing (fail-closed).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Inverse per table:
|
||||
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
|
||||
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
tbl text;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
|
||||
'EmailIntegrationMailbox',
|
||||
'EmailIntegrationMessage',
|
||||
'EmailIntegrationSyncCursor',
|
||||
'EmailIntegrationWebhookEvent'
|
||||
]
|
||||
LOOP
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
-- FORCE so the table owner is subject to the policies too (otherwise the
|
||||
-- owner silently bypasses RLS).
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
|
||||
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
|
||||
AND tablename = tbl
|
||||
AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
EXECUTE format(
|
||||
'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
|
||||
tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
|
||||
);
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
-- The restricted app role (R-P2b's hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS) needs table
|
||||
-- privileges to reach the rows the policy then filters.
|
||||
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
|
||||
END LOOP;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Verify green before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma):
|
||||
-- pnpm prisma validate
|
||||
-- pnpm prisma migrate status
|
||||
-- CI: `prisma migrate deploy` against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch).
|
||||
-- Coordination: align ordering with R-P2b — P2 ships withTenantRLS()
|
||||
-- (SET LOCAL app.tenant_id); without a tenant context the policies match nothing
|
||||
-- (no data leak, just empty results) until the runtime role is hivegrid_app.
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
|
||||
-- AK-P14a · P14 Email foundation — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Companion to hr-isolation.sql / crypto-isolation.sql / task-isolation.sql. The
|
||||
-- AK-P14a tables + enums + indexes ship in the tracked merge migration
|
||||
-- (prisma/migrations/<ts>_p14a_email_foundation, created at main-merge per AD-21).
|
||||
-- What lives in THIS file is the Row-Level-Security block, DELIBERATELY kept out
|
||||
-- of the auto-migration path: enabling RLS + FORCE before every access sets the
|
||||
-- GUC would make queries return ZERO rows, so activation is a coordinated cutover
|
||||
-- (R-P2b's org-wide P5 RLS cutover), not a schema diff.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- SCOPE: only the genuinely new, ALWAYS-tenant tables get policies here:
|
||||
-- AK-P14a: TenantSendingDomain, EmailSuppressionList, EmailTemplate.
|
||||
-- AK-P14b: RecipientSegment, SegmentSnapshotMember, CampaignVariant,
|
||||
-- KontaktMarketingConsent, Unsubscribe.
|
||||
-- The pre-existing boilerplate email tables (EmailSender / Campaign /
|
||||
-- OutboundEmail) carry a NULLABLE tenantId (global/operator sender) and predate
|
||||
-- this ticket; retrofitting RLS onto them is out of AK-P14a scope.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- CODE-SIDE PRECONDITIONS — DONE (AK-P14a):
|
||||
-- 1. [x] Every AK-P14a web/worker service runs every DB op for these tables
|
||||
-- inside withTenantRLS() (emailDomainService / suppression paths).
|
||||
-- The app-level scoping (where: { tenantId }) carries isolation until cutover.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- WHAT REMAINS — "Teil B" = the org-wide P5 RLS cutover (Raffael / R-P2b):
|
||||
-- a. Ship this block as its own forward-only migration.
|
||||
-- b. Switch the runtime DB connection to the restricted role `hivegrid_app`
|
||||
-- (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS); otherwise FORCE is a no-op for a superuser and
|
||||
-- an empty-read trap for a non-superuser owner. The GRANTs below cover it.
|
||||
-- c. Staging cutover + live cross-tenant 404 verification.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment per block. Order-dependent DDL is
|
||||
-- DO-guarded (P3018 protection: reproducible from an empty DB). Idempotent.
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
-- Row-level security on all AK-P14a tenant-scoped email tables ----------------
|
||||
-- Pattern: "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true). The second
|
||||
-- argument `true` returns NULL instead of erroring when the GUC is not (yet) set
|
||||
-- — the policy then matches nothing (fail-closed).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Inverse per table:
|
||||
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
|
||||
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
tbl text;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
|
||||
'TenantSendingDomain',
|
||||
'EmailSuppressionList',
|
||||
'EmailTemplate',
|
||||
-- AK-P14b — email marketing tables (always tenant-scoped).
|
||||
'RecipientSegment',
|
||||
'SegmentSnapshotMember',
|
||||
'CampaignVariant',
|
||||
'KontaktMarketingConsent',
|
||||
'Unsubscribe'
|
||||
]
|
||||
LOOP
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
-- FORCE so the table owner is subject to the policies too (otherwise the
|
||||
-- owner silently bypasses RLS).
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
|
||||
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
|
||||
AND tablename = tbl
|
||||
AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
EXECUTE format(
|
||||
'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
|
||||
tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
|
||||
);
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
-- The restricted app role (R-P2b's hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS) needs table
|
||||
-- privileges to reach the rows the policy then filters.
|
||||
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
|
||||
END LOOP;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Verify green before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma):
|
||||
-- pnpm prisma validate
|
||||
-- pnpm prisma migrate status
|
||||
-- CI: `prisma migrate deploy` against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch).
|
||||
-- Coordination: align ordering with R-P2b — P2 ships withTenantRLS()
|
||||
-- (SET LOCAL app.tenant_id); without a tenant context the policies match nothing
|
||||
-- (no data leak, just empty results) until the runtime role is hivegrid_app.
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
||||
-- AK-P16c · Forms — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in auto-migration)
|
||||
-- Code-side access runs through formsAccess + tenant scoped Prisma filters.
|
||||
-- Enabling FORCE RLS is coordinated with the restricted runtime role cutover.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Inverse per table:
|
||||
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
|
||||
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
tbl text;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY['Form', 'FormField', 'FormSubmission', 'FormFile', 'FormAction', 'FormActionLog']
|
||||
LOOP
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
|
||||
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
|
||||
AND tablename = tbl
|
||||
AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
EXECUTE format(
|
||||
'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
|
||||
tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
|
||||
);
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
|
||||
END LOOP;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
|
||||
-- AK-P21 · Privacy/GDPR — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- The AK-P21 GDPR tables ship in the phase merge migration per AD-21. This file
|
||||
-- carries the coordinated RLS cutover block only. It is intentionally outside the
|
||||
-- auto-migration path because FORCE RLS before every code path sets app.tenant_id
|
||||
-- would make reads fail closed.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- SCOPE:
|
||||
-- Tenant-scoped: GdprExportJob, TenantDeletionRequest, AvvAcceptance.
|
||||
-- Global catalog: Subprocessor (no tenantId), so no RLS policy here.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Forward-only. Inverse SQL:
|
||||
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
|
||||
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
tbl text;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
|
||||
'GdprExportJob',
|
||||
'TenantDeletionRequest',
|
||||
'AvvAcceptance'
|
||||
]
|
||||
LOOP
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
|
||||
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
|
||||
AND tablename = tbl
|
||||
AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
EXECUTE format(
|
||||
'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
|
||||
tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
|
||||
);
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
|
||||
END LOOP;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
|
||||
-- AK-P17a · P17 HR-Hub core — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Companion to R-P2b's prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql, AK-P4a's
|
||||
-- prisma/rls/file-isolation.sql and AK-P4b's prisma/rls/task-isolation.sql. The
|
||||
-- HR tables + enums + indexes ship in the tracked merge migration
|
||||
-- (prisma/migrations/<ts>_p17a_hr_core, created at main-merge per AD-21). What
|
||||
-- lives in THIS file is the Row-Level-Security block, DELIBERATELY kept out of
|
||||
-- the auto-migration path (same stance as task-isolation.sql): turning RLS on
|
||||
-- before every access sets the GUC would break the feature, so activation is a
|
||||
-- coordinated cutover, not a schema diff.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- WHY DEFERRED: enabling RLS + FORCE makes every HR query WITHOUT `app.tenant_id`
|
||||
-- return ZERO rows. Per R-P2b's rule a table may only be RLS-enabled once ALL its
|
||||
-- accesses set the GUC. The app-level scoping (where: { tenantId }) carries
|
||||
-- isolation meanwhile.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- CODE-SIDE PRECONDITIONS — DONE (AK-P17a):
|
||||
-- 1. [x] Every HR web service runs every DB op inside withTenantRLS()
|
||||
-- (apps/web/app/utils/integrations/hr*Service.server.ts). Internal
|
||||
-- composition reuses the active transaction client via *WithTx helpers;
|
||||
-- functions never nest withTenantRLS(). The only unwrapped access is the
|
||||
-- GLOBAL User lookup (display-name resolution): User is not
|
||||
-- tenant-scoped, so it stays on the db singleton.
|
||||
-- Proven by apps/web/app/utils/db/.server/rls-hr-isolation.integration.test.ts
|
||||
-- (own-tenant only, 0 cross-tenant, 0 without context, WITH CHECK blocks
|
||||
-- foreign insert).
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- WHAT REMAINS — "Teil B" = the org-wide P5 RLS cutover (Raffael / R-P2b):
|
||||
-- a. Ship this block as its own forward-only migration.
|
||||
-- b. Switch the runtime DB connection to the restricted role `hivegrid_app`
|
||||
-- (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS); otherwise FORCE is a no-op for a superuser and
|
||||
-- an empty-read trap for a non-superuser owner. The GRANTs below already
|
||||
-- cover that role for the HR tables.
|
||||
-- c. Staging cutover + live cross-tenant 404 verification.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment per block. Order-dependent DDL is
|
||||
-- DO-guarded (P3018 protection: reproducible from an empty DB). Idempotent.
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
|
||||
-- Row-level security on all tenant-scoped HR tables ---------------------------
|
||||
-- Pattern: tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true). The second
|
||||
-- argument `true` returns NULL instead of erroring when the GUC is not (yet) set
|
||||
-- — the policy then matches nothing (fail-closed), and server-side scoping stays
|
||||
-- the hard path until the cutover.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Inverse per table:
|
||||
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
|
||||
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
tbl text;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
|
||||
'HrEmployeeProfile',
|
||||
'HrLocation',
|
||||
'HrEmployeeDocument',
|
||||
'HrResource',
|
||||
'HrQuickLink',
|
||||
'EmployeePasswordSafeVault',
|
||||
'EmployeePasswordSafeEntry',
|
||||
'EmployeePasswordSafeAccess',
|
||||
-- AK-P17b workflow tables
|
||||
'EmployeeVacationRequest',
|
||||
'EmployeeSickLeaveReport',
|
||||
'HrAnnouncement',
|
||||
'HrAnnouncementRead',
|
||||
'HrAnnouncementReaction',
|
||||
'HrAnnouncementComment',
|
||||
'EmployeePayslip',
|
||||
'EmployeeUploadReminder',
|
||||
'EmployeeUploadReminderDispatch',
|
||||
'HrRequestTemplate',
|
||||
'HrRequest',
|
||||
'HrSurvey',
|
||||
'HrSurveyItem',
|
||||
'HrSurveySubmission'
|
||||
]
|
||||
LOOP
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
-- FORCE so the table owner is subject to the policies too (otherwise the
|
||||
-- owner silently bypasses RLS).
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
|
||||
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
|
||||
AND tablename = tbl
|
||||
AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
EXECUTE format(
|
||||
'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
|
||||
tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
|
||||
);
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
-- The restricted app role (R-P2b's hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS) needs table
|
||||
-- privileges to reach the rows the policy then filters.
|
||||
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
|
||||
END LOOP;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Verify green before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma):
|
||||
-- pnpm prisma validate
|
||||
-- pnpm prisma migrate status
|
||||
-- CI: `prisma migrate deploy` against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch,
|
||||
-- no order dependency on Raffael's P2 migration).
|
||||
-- Coordination: align ordering with R-P2b — P2 ships withTenantRLS()
|
||||
-- (SET LOCAL app.tenant_id); without a tenant context the policies match nothing
|
||||
-- (no data leak, just empty results) until the runtime role is hivegrid_app.
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
|
||||
-- R-P7 · Lead-Inbox — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in auto-migration)
|
||||
-- Mirrors the CRM/task/file isolation artifacts. Code-side access already runs
|
||||
-- inside withTenantRLS(); enabling FORCE RLS is coordinated with the restricted
|
||||
-- runtime role cutover.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Inverse per table:
|
||||
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
|
||||
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
tbl text;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY['InboxLead', 'LeadSource', 'LeadAntiSpamConfig']
|
||||
LOOP
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
|
||||
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
|
||||
AND tablename = tbl
|
||||
AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
EXECUTE format(
|
||||
'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
|
||||
tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
|
||||
);
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
|
||||
END LOOP;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
|
||||
-- R-P8a · Projekt/Pipeline core — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred)
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Code-side access runs through withTenantRLS(); this block is applied during
|
||||
-- the coordinated restricted-role cutover, not as an automatic schema diff.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Inverse per table:
|
||||
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
|
||||
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
tbl text;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
|
||||
'HiveNumberSeq',
|
||||
'Pipeline',
|
||||
'PipelineStage',
|
||||
'PipelineAccess',
|
||||
'PipelineFieldConfig',
|
||||
'PipelineFieldVisibility',
|
||||
'LostReason',
|
||||
'Projekt',
|
||||
'ProjektStageChange',
|
||||
'PipelineAggregateSnapshot',
|
||||
'ProjektKontakt'
|
||||
]
|
||||
LOOP
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
|
||||
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
|
||||
AND tablename = tbl
|
||||
AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
EXECUTE format(
|
||||
'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
|
||||
tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
|
||||
);
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
|
||||
END LOOP;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
||||
-- VR-P22b · Public API/Webhooks — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in auto-migration)
|
||||
-- Runtime code scopes by tenantId today; enabling FORCE RLS is coordinated with
|
||||
-- the restricted runtime role cutover.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Inverse per table:
|
||||
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
|
||||
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
tbl text;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
|
||||
'PublicIncomingWebhookEndpoint',
|
||||
'PublicWebhookIngestionLog',
|
||||
'PublicWebhookSubscription',
|
||||
'PublicWebhookDeliveryLog'
|
||||
]
|
||||
LOOP
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
|
||||
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
|
||||
AND tablename = tbl
|
||||
AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
EXECUTE format(
|
||||
'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
|
||||
tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
|
||||
);
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
|
||||
END LOOP;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
|
||||
-- R-P11a Global Search isolation artifact.
|
||||
-- Companion to prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql. These tables are tenant-scoped
|
||||
-- metadata around Meilisearch documents and recent searches. Enable during the
|
||||
-- merge migration once the schema lands.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Verification:
|
||||
-- psql "$DIRECT_URL" -f prisma/rls/search-isolation.sql
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "SearchIndexEntry" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "SearchIndexEntry" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_search_index_entry" ON "SearchIndexEntry";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_search_index_entry" ON "SearchIndexEntry"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.current_tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.current_tenant_id', true));
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "RecentSearch" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "RecentSearch" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_recent_search" ON "RecentSearch";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_recent_search" ON "RecentSearch"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.current_tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.current_tenant_id', true));
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
|
||||
-- AK-P16d signature tenant isolation. Activated in the merge migration together
|
||||
-- with the other module RLS blocks; feature branches only ship the policy source
|
||||
-- per AD-21.
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "SignatureProviderConnection" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "ProjektSignatureDocument" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "ProjektSignatureSigner" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE "SignatureEvent" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS signature_provider_connection_tenant_isolation ON "SignatureProviderConnection";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY signature_provider_connection_tenant_isolation ON "SignatureProviderConnection"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS projekt_signature_document_tenant_isolation ON "ProjektSignatureDocument";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY projekt_signature_document_tenant_isolation ON "ProjektSignatureDocument"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS projekt_signature_signer_tenant_isolation ON "ProjektSignatureSigner";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY projekt_signature_signer_tenant_isolation ON "ProjektSignatureSigner"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
|
||||
|
||||
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS signature_event_tenant_isolation ON "SignatureEvent";
|
||||
CREATE POLICY signature_event_tenant_isolation ON "SignatureEvent"
|
||||
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
|
||||
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
|
||||
+47
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
|
||||
-- AK-P20 · Billing + Onboarding — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
|
||||
-- =============================================================================
|
||||
-- Companion to R-P2b's prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql. This file documents the
|
||||
-- RLS block for the tenant-scoped tables introduced or tightened by AK-P20.
|
||||
-- Activation is deferred until all runtime paths set app.tenant_id via
|
||||
-- withTenantRLS(), matching the existing module rollout pattern.
|
||||
--
|
||||
-- Inverse per table:
|
||||
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
|
||||
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
|
||||
|
||||
DO $$
|
||||
DECLARE
|
||||
tbl text;
|
||||
BEGIN
|
||||
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
|
||||
'TenantSubscription',
|
||||
'TenantSubscriptionUsageRecord',
|
||||
'TenantFeatureOverride',
|
||||
'TenantProductConfiguration',
|
||||
'Credit',
|
||||
'OnboardingSession',
|
||||
'OnboardingDemoProvisioning'
|
||||
]
|
||||
LOOP
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
|
||||
|
||||
IF NOT EXISTS (
|
||||
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
|
||||
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
|
||||
AND tablename = tbl
|
||||
AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
|
||||
) THEN
|
||||
EXECUTE format(
|
||||
'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
|
||||
tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
|
||||
);
|
||||
END IF;
|
||||
|
||||
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
|
||||
END LOOP;
|
||||
END
|
||||
$$;
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user