Update hivegrid-cloud reference to latest main
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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-- AK-P16b · P16 Booking — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Companion to calendar-isolation.sql / email-isolation.sql / apps-engine-isolation.sql.
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-- The AK-P16b tables + enums + indexes ship in the tracked merge migration
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-- (prisma/migrations/<ts>_p16b_booking, created at main-merge per AD-21). What
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-- lives in THIS file is the Row-Level-Security block, DELIBERATELY kept out of the
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-- auto-migration path: enabling RLS + FORCE before every access sets the GUC would
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-- make queries return ZERO rows, so activation is a coordinated cutover (R-P2b's
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-- org-wide P5 RLS cutover), not a schema diff.
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--
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-- SCOPE: every AK-P16b table is ALWAYS tenant-scoped, so all get policies here:
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-- BookingPage, BookingPageProvider, AvailabilityRule, AvailabilityException,
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-- Appointment.
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-- NOTE on per-user owner-filtering (bookings.read_own): RLS isolates by TENANT. The
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-- stronger per-USER ownership rule (read_own users see only their own appointments,
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-- providerUserId = self) is enforced in the service layer (bookingAccess.server.ts
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-- owner-check + where: { providerUserId }).
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--
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-- CODE-SIDE PRECONDITIONS — DONE (AK-P16b):
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-- 1. [x] Every AK-P16b web service runs each DB op for these tables inside
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-- withTenantRLS() (booking submit/admin/lifecycle paths). The public
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-- booking flow resolves the tenant from the {tenant} URL segment first.
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-- The app-level scoping (where: { tenantId, ... }) carries isolation until cutover.
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--
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-- WHAT REMAINS — "Teil B" = the org-wide P5 RLS cutover (Raffael / R-P2b):
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-- a. Ship this block as its own forward-only migration.
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-- b. Switch the runtime DB connection to the restricted role `hivegrid_app`
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-- (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS); otherwise FORCE is a no-op for a superuser and
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-- an empty-read trap for a non-superuser owner. The GRANTs below cover it.
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-- c. Staging cutover + live cross-tenant 404 verification.
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--
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-- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment per block. Order-dependent DDL is
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-- DO-guarded (P3018 protection: reproducible from an empty DB). Idempotent.
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Row-level security on all AK-P16b tenant-scoped booking tables ---------------
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-- Pattern: "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true). The second
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-- argument `true` returns NULL instead of erroring when the GUC is not (yet) set
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-- — the policy then matches nothing (fail-closed).
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--
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-- Inverse per table:
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-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
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-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
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-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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DO $$
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DECLARE
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tbl text;
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BEGIN
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FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
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'BookingPage',
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'BookingPageProvider',
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'AvailabilityRule',
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'AvailabilityException',
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'Appointment'
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]
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LOOP
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EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
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-- FORCE so the table owner is subject to the policies too (otherwise the
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-- owner silently bypasses RLS).
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EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
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IF NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
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WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
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AND tablename = tbl
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AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
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) THEN
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EXECUTE format(
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'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
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tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
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);
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END IF;
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-- The restricted app role (R-P2b's hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS) needs table
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-- privileges to reach the rows the policy then filters.
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EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
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END LOOP;
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END
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$$;
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Verify green before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma):
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-- pnpm prisma validate
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-- pnpm prisma migrate status
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-- CI: `prisma migrate deploy` against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch).
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-- Coordination: align ordering with R-P2b — P2 ships withTenantRLS()
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-- (SET LOCAL app.tenant_id); without a tenant context the policies match nothing
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-- (no data leak, just empty results) until the runtime role is hivegrid_app.
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-- =============================================================================
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