Update hivegrid-cloud reference to latest main
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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-- R-P6 · P6 CRM core — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Companion to R-P2b's prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql, AK-P4a's file-isolation.sql
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-- and AK-P4b's task-isolation.sql. The CRM tables + enums + indexes ship in the
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-- tracked merge migration prisma/migrations/<ts>_p6_crm (forward-only, DoD 28).
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-- What lives in THIS file is the Row-Level-Security block, DELIBERATELY kept out
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-- of the auto-migration path (same stance as task/file-isolation.sql): turning RLS
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-- on before every access sets the GUC would break the feature, so activation is a
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-- coordinated cutover, not a schema diff.
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--
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-- WHY DEFERRED: enabling RLS + FORCE makes every CRM query WITHOUT `app.tenant_id`
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-- return ZERO rows. Per R-P2b's rule a table may only be RLS-enabled once ALL its
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-- accesses set the GUC. The app-level scoping (crmService/crmAccess run every DB op
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-- inside withTenantRLS()) carries isolation meanwhile (DoD 1 hard path).
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--
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-- CODE-SIDE PRECONDITIONS — DONE (R-P6, 2026-06-29):
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-- 1. [x] All CRM web services run every DB op inside withTenantRLS()
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-- (apps/web/app/utils/integrations/crm/*.server.ts). The polymorphic
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-- custom-field / tag / activity writes are tenant-scoped by construction.
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-- 2. [ ] Worker maintenance crons (DSGVO archive sweeps) set the tenant GUC per
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-- tenant — wired when P7/P8 add Lead/Projekt retention (no CRM cron yet).
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--
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-- WHAT REMAINS — "Teil B" = the org-wide P5 RLS cutover (Raffael / R-P2b):
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-- a. Ship this block as its own forward-only migration.
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-- b. Switch the runtime DB connection to the restricted role `hivegrid_app`
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-- (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS); otherwise FORCE is a no-op for a superuser.
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-- The GRANTs below already cover that role for the CRM tables.
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-- c. Staging cutover + live cross-tenant 404 verification.
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--
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-- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment per block. Order-dependent DDL is
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-- DO-guarded (P3018 protection: reproducible from an empty DB). Idempotent.
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Row-level security on all tenant-scoped CRM tables --------------------------
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-- Pattern: "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true). The second
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-- argument `true` returns NULL instead of erroring when the GUC is not (yet)
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-- set — the policy then matches nothing (fail-closed), and server-side scoping
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-- stays the hard path until the cutover.
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--
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-- Inverse per table:
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-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
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-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
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-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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DO $$
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DECLARE
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tbl text;
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BEGIN
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FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
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'Kontakt', 'KontaktRelation', 'KontaktEmail', 'KontaktTelefon', 'Adresse',
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'CustomFieldDefinition', 'CustomFieldValue', 'Tag', 'TagAssignment'
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]
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LOOP
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EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
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-- FORCE so the table owner is subject to the policies too (otherwise the
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-- owner silently bypasses RLS).
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EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
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IF NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
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WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
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AND tablename = tbl
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AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
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) THEN
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EXECUTE format(
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'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
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tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
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);
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END IF;
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-- The restricted app role (R-P2b's hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS) needs table
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-- privileges to reach the rows the policy then filters.
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EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
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END LOOP;
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END
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$$;
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Verify green before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma):
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-- pnpm prisma validate
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-- pnpm prisma migrate status
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-- CI: `prisma migrate deploy` against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch).
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-- Coordination: align ordering with R-P2b — P2 ships withTenantRLS()
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-- (SET LOCAL app.tenant_id); without a tenant context the policies match nothing
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-- (no data leak, just empty results) until the runtime role is hivegrid_app.
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-- =============================================================================
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