Update hivegrid-cloud reference to latest main
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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-- AK-P17a · P17 HR-Hub core — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Companion to R-P2b's prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql, AK-P4a's
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-- prisma/rls/file-isolation.sql and AK-P4b's prisma/rls/task-isolation.sql. The
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-- HR tables + enums + indexes ship in the tracked merge migration
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-- (prisma/migrations/<ts>_p17a_hr_core, created at main-merge per AD-21). What
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-- lives in THIS file is the Row-Level-Security block, DELIBERATELY kept out of
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-- the auto-migration path (same stance as task-isolation.sql): turning RLS on
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-- before every access sets the GUC would break the feature, so activation is a
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-- coordinated cutover, not a schema diff.
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--
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-- WHY DEFERRED: enabling RLS + FORCE makes every HR query WITHOUT `app.tenant_id`
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-- return ZERO rows. Per R-P2b's rule a table may only be RLS-enabled once ALL its
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-- accesses set the GUC. The app-level scoping (where: { tenantId }) carries
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-- isolation meanwhile.
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--
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-- CODE-SIDE PRECONDITIONS — DONE (AK-P17a):
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-- 1. [x] Every HR web service runs every DB op inside withTenantRLS()
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-- (apps/web/app/utils/integrations/hr*Service.server.ts). Internal
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-- composition reuses the active transaction client via *WithTx helpers;
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-- functions never nest withTenantRLS(). The only unwrapped access is the
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-- GLOBAL User lookup (display-name resolution): User is not
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-- tenant-scoped, so it stays on the db singleton.
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-- Proven by apps/web/app/utils/db/.server/rls-hr-isolation.integration.test.ts
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-- (own-tenant only, 0 cross-tenant, 0 without context, WITH CHECK blocks
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-- foreign insert).
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--
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-- WHAT REMAINS — "Teil B" = the org-wide P5 RLS cutover (Raffael / R-P2b):
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-- a. Ship this block as its own forward-only migration.
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-- b. Switch the runtime DB connection to the restricted role `hivegrid_app`
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-- (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS); otherwise FORCE is a no-op for a superuser and
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-- an empty-read trap for a non-superuser owner. The GRANTs below already
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-- cover that role for the HR tables.
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-- c. Staging cutover + live cross-tenant 404 verification.
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--
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-- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment per block. Order-dependent DDL is
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-- DO-guarded (P3018 protection: reproducible from an empty DB). Idempotent.
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Row-level security on all tenant-scoped HR tables ---------------------------
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-- Pattern: tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true). The second
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-- argument `true` returns NULL instead of erroring when the GUC is not (yet) set
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-- — the policy then matches nothing (fail-closed), and server-side scoping stays
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-- the hard path until the cutover.
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--
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-- Inverse per table:
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-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
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-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
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-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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DO $$
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DECLARE
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tbl text;
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BEGIN
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FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
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'HrEmployeeProfile',
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'HrLocation',
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'HrEmployeeDocument',
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'HrResource',
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'HrQuickLink',
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'EmployeePasswordSafeVault',
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'EmployeePasswordSafeEntry',
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'EmployeePasswordSafeAccess',
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-- AK-P17b workflow tables
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'EmployeeVacationRequest',
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'EmployeeSickLeaveReport',
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'HrAnnouncement',
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'HrAnnouncementRead',
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'HrAnnouncementReaction',
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'HrAnnouncementComment',
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'EmployeePayslip',
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'EmployeeUploadReminder',
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'EmployeeUploadReminderDispatch',
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'HrRequestTemplate',
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'HrRequest',
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'HrSurvey',
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'HrSurveyItem',
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'HrSurveySubmission'
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]
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LOOP
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EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
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-- FORCE so the table owner is subject to the policies too (otherwise the
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-- owner silently bypasses RLS).
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EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
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IF NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
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WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
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AND tablename = tbl
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AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
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) THEN
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EXECUTE format(
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'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
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tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
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);
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END IF;
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-- The restricted app role (R-P2b's hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS) needs table
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-- privileges to reach the rows the policy then filters.
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EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
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END LOOP;
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END
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$$;
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Verify green before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma):
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-- pnpm prisma validate
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-- pnpm prisma migrate status
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-- CI: `prisma migrate deploy` against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch,
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-- no order dependency on Raffael's P2 migration).
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-- Coordination: align ordering with R-P2b — P2 ships withTenantRLS()
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-- (SET LOCAL app.tenant_id); without a tenant context the policies match nothing
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-- (no data leak, just empty results) until the runtime role is hivegrid_app.
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-- =============================================================================
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