Update hivegrid-cloud reference to latest main
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
e98d38e716
commit
7b21524c86
3781 files changed
+373484
-225607
No files matched your search
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
||||
// R-P5 (P5) — per-tenant data-encryption-key store for AD-8 envelope encryption.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// AD-21: one self-contained schema file per module. `tenantId` is a BARE String
|
||||
// scalar (no `@relation`) so this file has zero merge-conflict surface against
|
||||
// `core.prisma`/`accounts.prisma` (no back-relation field on Tenant needed).
|
||||
//
|
||||
// AD-8 (revised by EXT-06: app-side envelope, no cloud-KMS): each tenant has ONE
|
||||
// random Data-Encryption-Key (DEK). The DEK is never stored in the clear — only
|
||||
// WRAPPED with the app master key (the `KeyWrapper` in
|
||||
// packages/foundation/src/crypto/key-wrapper.ts; today EnvKeyWrapper over
|
||||
// CRYPTO_SECRET, later swappable for self-hosted Vault/OpenBao WITHOUT
|
||||
// re-encrypting any field). Sensitive fields across modules (HR password safe,
|
||||
// HR emergency contact, R-P5 OAuth/API-key credentials) are sealed with the
|
||||
// tenant DEK.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Crypto-shredding (M165 / AK-P21): deleting a tenant's row here makes ALL of
|
||||
// that tenant's envelope ciphertext permanently unreadable. The orchestration
|
||||
// (load/create/destroy + in-memory unwrapped-DEK cache) lives in
|
||||
// packages/db/src/crypto/tenant-envelope.server.ts.
|
||||
|
||||
/// One wrapped Data-Encryption-Key per tenant. `wrappedDek` is the tenant DEK
|
||||
/// encrypted with the app master key (never the plaintext DEK). `keyVersion`
|
||||
/// allows rotating the wrapping scheme without touching field ciphertext.
|
||||
model TenantEncryptionKey {
|
||||
id String @id @default(cuid())
|
||||
createdAt DateTime @default(now())
|
||||
updatedAt DateTime @updatedAt
|
||||
tenantId String @unique
|
||||
// The tenant DEK, wrapped (encrypted) with the app master key. Opaque blob;
|
||||
// useless without the master key, so a DB leak alone exposes nothing.
|
||||
wrappedDek Bytes
|
||||
keyVersion Int @default(1)
|
||||
|
||||
@@index([tenantId])
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user