Refresh HiveGrid Cloud reference snapshot
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
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# BRAND_LEGAL_IMPRINT_URL=https://acme.example/imprint
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# BRAND_LEGAL_PRIVACY_URL=https://acme.example/privacy
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# BRAND_LEGAL_TERMS_URL=https://acme.example/terms
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# BRAND_LOGO_URL=/android-chrome-512x512.png
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# BRAND_LOGO_URL=https://hivegrid.de/hivegrid-logo.png
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# BRAND_FAVICON_URL=/favicon.ico
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# BRAND_MAIL_PRIMARY=#2563eb
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# BRAND_MAIL_PRIMARY_TEXT=#ffffff
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@@ -16,15 +16,40 @@
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# Core
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APP_NAME=HiveGrid
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# DATABASE_URL: pooled connection for application traffic. Point at PgBouncer
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# on port 6432 in environments where the pooler is deployed and append
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# `?pgbouncer=true&connection_limit=10` so Prisma disables prepared-statement
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# caching (transaction-mode pooling cannot keep them). DIRECT_URL (below) is
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# the unpooled connection used by `prisma migrate`. See docs/ops/pgbouncer.md.
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DATABASE_URL="postgres://user:pass@localhost:6432/hivegrid?pgbouncer=true&connection_limit=10"
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# on port 6432 in environments where the pooler is deployed (staging/prod).
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# PrismaPg uses an explicit node-postgres pool; URL query parameters such as
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# `connection_limit` do not configure it. DIRECT_URL (below) remains unpooled
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# for migrations.
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# The default below is the LOCAL one: `pnpm dev:services` starts Postgres on
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# 5432 with these credentials and no pooler in front of it, so dev points
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# straight at the database. 127.0.0.1 rather than localhost on purpose — on
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# Windows localhost resolves to ::1 first, while the container publishes on
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# IPv4 only.
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DATABASE_URL="postgres://hivegrid:hivegrid@127.0.0.1:5432/hivegrid"
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# Hard per-process limits for both primary and read-replica pools.
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DATABASE_POOL_MAX=10
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DATABASE_POOL_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS=10000
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DATABASE_POOL_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT_MS=5000
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# Local development can run before the RLS cutover migration. Production
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# defaults to `required` even when this value is omitted.
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RLS_RUNTIME_MODE=off
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# Enabled worker processes default their readiness check to hivegrid_worker.
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DATABASE_RUNTIME_ROLE=hivegrid_app
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# The web image defaults to the core surface in local development. Set this
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# explicitly on deployed web resources; the portal container uses `portal`.
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# WEB_RUNTIME_SURFACE=core
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# SESSION_SECRET signs the session cookie. Min 32 bytes of entropy recommended (openssl rand -hex 32).
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SESSION_SECRET=
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# CRYPTO_SECRET is the AES key for stored workflow credentials. Use a SEPARATE secret from SESSION_SECRET.
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# The portal runtime owns a separate cookie-signing boundary. Never configure
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# this key on the core web resource.
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# PORTAL_SESSION_SECRET=
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# AUDIT_CHAIN_SECRET authenticates AuditEvent hashes and retention checkpoints. Min 32 bytes; never rotate without a documented chain transition.
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AUDIT_CHAIN_SECRET=
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# CRYPTO_SECRET is the shared tenant-envelope AES key used by web/API and worker-mail. Use a SEPARATE secret from SESSION_SECRET and the exact same value on hivegrid-web and worker-mail.
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CRYPTO_SECRET=
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# Dedicated platform-admin integration envelope key. Use different random values
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# in staging and production; never reuse CRYPTO_SECRET or SESSION_SECRET.
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ADMIN_CONNECTION_MASTER_KEY=
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# Local dev: include the vite port so cross-host redirects (login -> app/admin host)
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# keep :3000 — routing derives app.localhost:3000 etc. and hostMatches tolerates it.
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APP_BASE_DOMAIN=localhost:3000
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@@ -33,6 +58,7 @@ WEB_APP_HOST=app.localhost:3000
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# APP_URL=http://app.localhost:3000
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ADMIN_APP_HOST=admin.localhost:3000
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API_HOST=api.localhost:3000
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PORTAL_APP_HOST=portal.localhost:3000
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# MCP runs as its own public connector host, not below app/api.
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MCP_HOST=0.0.0.0
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MCP_PORT=8080
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@@ -62,11 +88,40 @@ API_KEY_HASH_SECRET=
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# SEED_DEMO_DATA=true
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# DEMO_USER is read only when NODE_ENV=development.
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# DEMO_USER=admin@email.com:password
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# `pnpm dev:local` enforces this exact local-only admin fallback allowlist.
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# ADMIN_FALLBACK_LOGIN_ENABLED=true
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# ADMIN_FALLBACK_LOGIN_EMAILS=admin@email.com
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# Production seed bootstrap credentials. Required for `NODE_ENV=production pnpm seed`.
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# They never override the canonical local credentials.
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# SEED_ADMIN_EMAIL=admin@example.com
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# SEED_ADMIN_PASSWORD=replace-with-production-bootstrap-password
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# WEBHOOKS_URL=https://...ngrok-free.app
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# Aircall Technology Partner OAuth (optional). Use the fixed public app callback
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# and API webhook URL registered for the same staging/production environment.
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# AIRCALL_CLIENT_ID=
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# AIRCALL_CLIENT_SECRET=
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# AIRCALL_REDIRECT_URI=http://app.localhost:3000/integrations/aircall/oauth/callback
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# AIRCALL_WEBHOOK_URL=https://...ngrok-free.app/v1/webhooks/telephony/aircall
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# HALLOPETRA_WEBHOOK_URL=https://...ngrok-free.app/v1/webhooks/telephony/hallopetra
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# KWP OAuth2/PKCE (optional). The callback URI is derived from APP_PROTOCOL and
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# WEB_APP_HOST; do not configure a separate redirect key.
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# KWP_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=
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# KWP_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=
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# KWP_OAUTH_SCOPES=
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# KWP_CUSTOMER_CODE=
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# KWP_OIDC_ISSUER=
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# KWP_HIVEGRID_TENANT_ID=
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# Deprecated and ignored by new connections; choose the bnWin mandant in the setup flow.
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# KWP_MANDANT=
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# Web Push (VAPID). Production web requires the public key and worker-webhook
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# requires the complete stable pair; never copy the private key into browser code.
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# WEB_PUSH_VAPID_SUBJECT=mailto:ops@hivegrid.de
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# WEB_PUSH_VAPID_PUBLIC_KEY=
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# WEB_PUSH_VAPID_PRIVATE_KEY=
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# S3-compatible storage. HiveGrid prod/staging nutzt Hetzner Object Storage (ADR-009),
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# Endpoint-Format z.B. https://nbg1.your-objectstorage.com (S3-API identisch; ebenso nutzbar: Wasabi, Backblaze B2, MinIO, AWS S3).
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# Werte gehoeren in die Coolify-Secrets je Umgebung, nicht ins Repo. Leave STORAGE_ENDPOINT empty to use local filesystem (STORAGE_LOCAL_ROOT).
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@@ -77,6 +132,20 @@ STORAGE_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
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STORAGE_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=
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STORAGE_SESSION_TOKEN=
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STORAGE_PUBLIC_BASE_URL=
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# The staging Compose reference maps runtime STORAGE_* keys from isolated
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# host-side credentials. Never point these three groups at the same principal.
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# WEB_STORAGE_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
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# WEB_STORAGE_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=
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# WEB_STORAGE_SESSION_TOKEN=
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# WORKER_GENERAL_STORAGE_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
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# WORKER_GENERAL_STORAGE_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=
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# WORKER_GENERAL_STORAGE_SESSION_TOKEN=
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# WORKER_IMPORT_STORAGE_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
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# WORKER_IMPORT_STORAGE_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=
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# WORKER_IMPORT_STORAGE_SESSION_TOKEN=
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# Server-only SSE-C key for portal/privacy GDPR exports: `openssl rand -base64 32`.
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# Configure the same value on both web surfaces and the dedicated GDPR export worker.
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GDPR_EXPORT_SSE_C_KEY_BASE64=
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# Set to true for providers that require path-style bucket addressing (MinIO, some Wasabi regions).
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# Leave false for AWS S3 default virtual-hosted style.
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STORAGE_FORCE_PATH_STYLE=false
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@@ -92,6 +161,8 @@ LAGO_TIMEOUT_MS=10000
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MOLLIE_API_KEY=
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MOLLIE_PROFILE_ID=
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MOLLIE_TIMEOUT_MS=10000
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# General worker only. Use staging-api.hivegrid.de in staging and api.hivegrid.de in production.
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BILLING_MOLLIE_WEBHOOK_URL=
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# Worker delivery credentials for queued transactional email (hivegrid.email -> Mailjet)
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MAILJET_API_KEY=
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@@ -113,7 +184,8 @@ ANALYTICS_TOKEN=
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# Self-hosted captcha. mCaptcha remains the compatibility default; set
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# CAPTCHA_PROVIDER=cap to use Cap Standalone (see infra/cap/README.md).
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# Public bits (instance URL + per-surface sitekeys) are safe to expose; secrets
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# are server-only. Verification fails open by default (CAPTCHA_FAIL_OPEN).
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# are server-only. Deployed runtimes always fail closed; local development/test
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# may explicitly set CAPTCHA_FAIL_OPEN=true when provider availability is not required.
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CAPTCHA_PROVIDER=mcaptcha
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CAP_INSTANCE_URL=
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CAP_SITE_SECRET=
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@@ -128,7 +200,7 @@ MCAPTCHA_ACCOUNT_SECRET=
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MCAPTCHA_SITEKEY_LOGIN=
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MCAPTCHA_SITEKEY_FORMS=
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MCAPTCHA_SITEKEY_BOOKING=
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CAPTCHA_FAIL_OPEN=true
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CAPTCHA_FAIL_OPEN=false
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AUTH_MAGIC_LINK_ENABLED=false
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AUTH_MAGIC_LINK_TOKEN_TTL_MINUTES=15
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@@ -162,6 +234,10 @@ WORKER_ENABLED=false
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# WORKER_CONCURRENCY_IMPORT=1
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# WORKER_CONCURRENCY_WEBHOOK=20
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# WORKER_CONCURRENCY_PLUGIN=5
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# Nested active-tenant maintenance sweeps share one process-wide budget. Keep
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# this below DATABASE_POOL_MAX so queue jobs and health probes retain headroom.
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# Default 2, hard-capped at 4.
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# WORKER_TENANT_SWEEP_CONCURRENCY=2
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# Health HTTP port for /healthz and /readyz (per-worker). Defaults to 9100;
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# the five-service worker layout uses 9101-9105.
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# WORKER_HEALTH_PORT=9100
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@@ -171,6 +247,9 @@ WORKER_ENABLED=false
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# WORKER_REDIS_POOL_SIZE=
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EXPORT_RETENTION_QUEUE_ENABLED=false
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IMPORT_QUEUE_ENABLED=false
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# Internal worker-import fallback: consume only hivegrid.exports for portal/privacy GDPR exports.
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# Keep false unless both IMPORT_QUEUE_* gates are unset/false and complete STORAGE_* wiring is present.
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PORTAL_GDPR_EXPORT_QUEUE_ENABLED=false
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# Outbox dispatcher (transactional outbox pattern; see docs/architecture/outbox-pattern.md).
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# Defaults: off in dev so workers without Redis can still boot. Set true on staging+prod.
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OUTBOX_DISPATCHER_ENABLED=false
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@@ -182,8 +261,18 @@ OUTBOX_MAX_RETRIES=6
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# Daily worker-general maintenance that purges DONE outbox rows after the replay/debug window.
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OUTBOX_DONE_RETENTION_HOURS=720
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OUTBOX_DONE_RETENTION_BATCH_SIZE=1000
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BULLMQ_REDIS_URL=redis://localhost:6379/0
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# REDIS_URL is a fallback only when BULLMQ_REDIS_URL is absent; keep it commented if a platform injects it.
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BULLMQ_REDIS_URL=redis://127.0.0.1:6379/0
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# Central ClamAV INSTREAM endpoint. Production uses the mesh-only estate
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# service; inside the compose network the host is `clamav`.
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# Uploads are fail-closed: without a reachable clamd, every malware-gated
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# upload (profile picture, HR documents) is rejected. `pnpm dev:services`
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# starts it — the first boot pulls ~250MB of signatures before it goes healthy.
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CLAMD_HOST=127.0.0.1
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CLAMD_PORT=3310
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CLAMD_TIMEOUT_MS=30000
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SCAN_QUEUE_ENABLED=true
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# REDIS_URL is required by MCP in production; queue runtimes safely fall back to it
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# (using the shared-store's separate logical DB and namespace) when it is absent.
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# REDIS_URL=redis://localhost:6379/0
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# Two-tier cache pub/sub invalidation (subscription + tenant; entitlements piggy-back on subscription).
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# Set CACHE_INVALIDATION_ENABLED=false to disable cross-replica pub/sub (emergency switch — L1 TTL becomes
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@@ -204,8 +293,6 @@ BROWSER_SESSION_TIMEOUT_MS=60000
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IPSTACK_API_KEY=
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# ipapi.is — alternative provider with similar response shape; free tier available.
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IPAPIIS_API_KEY=
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PORTAL_SERVER_URL=
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PORTAL_SERVER_FLY_TOKEN=
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# Meilisearch — full-text search engine consumed by packages/search and the
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# search-indexer worker job. MEILI_API_KEY is the SaaS-scoped client key the app
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@@ -213,7 +300,7 @@ PORTAL_SERVER_FLY_TOKEN=
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# Local dev uses the docker-compose meilisearch service whose master key defaults
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# to `devkey`, so the app key is `devkey` too. Production injects a scoped key
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# (infra STANDARDS §4 / docs/deploy/meilisearch.md, docs/features/search.md).
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MEILI_URL=http://localhost:7700
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MEILI_URL=http://127.0.0.1:7700
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MEILI_API_KEY=devkey
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# MEILI_ENV=development
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# Toggle search backend hot-path strategy. `meilisearch` (default) goes
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@@ -248,6 +335,10 @@ MEILI_API_KEY=devkey
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# SENTRY_DSN_API=https://public-api@sentry.example/3
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# SENTRY_DSN_WORKER=https://public-worker@sentry.example/4
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# SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=production
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# Runtime-selectable product locales. New review locales are enabled on staging
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# one at a time and remain rejected in production until their review manifest is approved.
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I18N_ENABLED_LOCALES=de,en
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# SENTRY_RELEASE=
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# SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE=0.1
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# SENTRY_PROFILES_SAMPLE_RATE=0.0
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@@ -273,7 +364,7 @@ MEILI_API_KEY=devkey
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# VITE_SENTRY_REPLAYS_SESSION_SAMPLE_RATE=0.1
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# VITE_SENTRY_REPLAYS_ON_ERROR_SAMPLE_RATE=1.0
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# Sentry source-map upload + release tagging (CI-only; never commit the auth token).
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# Required by .github/workflows/_sentry-release.yml and the @sentry/vite-plugin step.
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# Required by .gitea/workflows/_sentry-release.yml and the @sentry/vite-plugin step.
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# SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN=
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# SENTRY_ORG=
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# SENTRY_PROJECT=hivegrid-web
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@@ -341,17 +432,21 @@ MEILI_API_KEY=devkey
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# `form-widget-turnstile` feature flag. See docs/features/form-widget.md.
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# FORM_WIDGET_CDN_URL=https://forms.example.com
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# Marketing-funnel (Phase 05 #78 — apps/web/public/embed/marketing.js).
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# MARKETING_ALLOWED_ORIGINS is a CSV of origins (with `*.host` wildcards
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# allowed) from which the public `/api/leads/capture` endpoint accepts
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# submissions. Fail-closed: empty list rejects all browser submissions.
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# MARKETING_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN is the per-IP submission limit (default 5).
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# Captcha is the shared self-hosted captcha provider; flag is gated via
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# the `marketing-funnel-turnstile` feature flag.
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# Retired browser lead-capture compatibility (R-LEADS).
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# `/api/leads/capture` now returns 410 and the old marketing.js SDK is removed.
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# MARKETING_ALLOWED_ORIGINS only controls CORS headers on that drain response.
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# MARKETING_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN is deprecated and ignored; it remains listed
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# temporarily so existing environment inventories can be cleaned up safely.
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# See docs/features/marketing-funnel.md.
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# MARKETING_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://marketing.example.com,https://*.example.com
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# MARKETING_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN=5
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# Native platform-lead intake (R-LEADS). Enabled by default; set false on the
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# API runtime to stop POST /v1/platform/leads before authentication or writes.
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# Admin navigation/routes are controlled separately by the global database
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# feature flag `platform_admin_leads`.
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# PLATFORM_LEADS_INGRESS_ENABLED=true
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# Marketing-funnel Phase 2 (Phase 05 #79 — self-service conversion +
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# outbound webhooks + attribution reports).
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# LEAD_CONVERSION_SECRET is the HMAC key (min 32 bytes) signing the
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@@ -383,6 +478,13 @@ MEILI_API_KEY=devkey
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# MARKETING_TOKEN_SECRET=
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# MARKETING_SEQUENCES_ENABLED=false
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# Provider-neutral normalized delivery/bounce webhook for Admin Sales email.
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# ADMIN_EMAIL_EVENT_WEBHOOK_SECRET=
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# Signed, rotatable BCC logging capabilities. The domain defaults to
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# bcc.<APP_BASE_DOMAIN> and needs a dedicated provider catch-all/MX.
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# ADMIN_EMAIL_BCC_CAPABILITY_SECRET=
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# ADMIN_EMAIL_BCC_INBOUND_DOMAIN=
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# Realtime collaboration (Phase 05 #59 — apps/hocuspocus + Novel-Editor).
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# HOCUSPOCUS_AUTH_SECRET signs the 15-min JWTs the web app issues via
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# `/api/collab/token`. The Hocuspocus container verifies them in
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@@ -403,6 +505,10 @@ MEILI_API_KEY=devkey
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# HOCUSPOCUS_HOST=0.0.0.0
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# HOCUSPOCUS_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES=10485760
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# Team Chat WebSocket identity tokens. Shared by web (issuer) and API
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# (`/ws/chat` verifier), but never shared with Hocuspocus. Min 32 bytes.
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# CHAT_GATEWAY_AUTH_SECRET=
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Admin-Panel SSO via Authentik (Phase 09 #82 — apps/web/app/modules/admin-sso)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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@@ -413,6 +519,9 @@ MEILI_API_KEY=devkey
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# (`hivegrid-admin-panel` per infra/authentik/bootstrap/blueprints/03-*).
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# AUTHENTIK_ADMIN_CLIENT_SECRET is fetched from the Authentik admin UI
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# after the blueprint applies; rotate via Authentik then redeploy.
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# AUTHENTIK_ADMIN_JIT_DATABASE_URL uses the separately provisioned
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# hivegrid_authentik_jit login. That role can execute only the verified
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# callback's JIT function and owns no table privileges.
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# AUTHENTIK_ADMIN_REDIRECT_URI is the exact callback URI registered with
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# the Authentik provider — must match the deployed admin host.
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# AUTHENTIK_ADMIN_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI is the URI Authentik redirects
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@@ -429,6 +538,7 @@ MEILI_API_KEY=devkey
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# AUTHENTIK_ISSUER_URL=https://auth.example.com/application/o/hivegrid-admin-panel/
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# AUTHENTIK_ADMIN_CLIENT_ID=hivegrid-admin-panel
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# AUTHENTIK_ADMIN_CLIENT_SECRET=
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# AUTHENTIK_ADMIN_JIT_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://hivegrid_authentik_jit:<PASSWORD>@localhost:5432/hivegrid
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# AUTHENTIK_ADMIN_REDIRECT_URI=https://admin.example.com/auth/admin/callback
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# AUTHENTIK_ADMIN_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URI=https://admin.example.com/login?logged_out=1
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# ADMIN_FALLBACK_LOGIN_ENABLED=false
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@@ -481,4 +591,3 @@ PLUGIN_REQUIRE_CAPABILITY_CONSENT=true
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PLUGIN_INSTALL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN=5
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PLUGIN_SETTINGS_WRITE_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN=60
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PLUGIN_SETTINGS_FRAME_VIOLATION_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN=120
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PLUGIN_RATE_LIMIT_FAIL_OPEN=false
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Reference in new issue
Block a user