Refresh HiveGrid Cloud reference snapshot

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david committed 2026-08-03 15:31:14 +02:00
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import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
type TokenRow = {
clientId: string;
tenantId: string;
userId: string;
revokedAt: Date | null;
scopes: string[];
createdAt: Date;
expiresAt: Date;
client: { clientName: string };
};
const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
accessRows: [] as TokenRow[],
refreshRows: [] as TokenRow[],
audit: vi.fn(),
boundTenantIds: [] as string[],
}));
/**
* The fake transaction mirrors the policy instead of answering every query:
* a mock that returns rows regardless of the bound tenant/user would hide
* exactly the cross-tenant bug this suite is here to catch (AGENTS.md, RLS).
*/
function matches(row: TokenRow, where: Record<string, unknown>, boundTenantId: string): boolean {
if (row.tenantId !== boundTenantId) return false;
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(where)) {
if (key === "revokedAt") {
if (value === null && row.revokedAt !== null) return false;
continue;
}
if ((row as unknown as Record<string, unknown>)[key] !== value) return false;
}
return true;
}
vi.mock("~/utils/db/.server/tenantRls.server", () => ({
withTenantRLS: (tenantId: string, callback: (tx: unknown) => unknown) => {
mocks.boundTenantIds.push(tenantId);
const model = (rows: TokenRow[]) => ({
findMany: async ({ where }: { where: Record<string, unknown> }) => rows.filter((row) => matches(row, where, tenantId)),
count: async ({ where }: { where: Record<string, unknown> }) => rows.filter((row) => matches(row, where, tenantId)).length,
updateMany: async ({ where, data }: { where: Record<string, unknown>; data: { revokedAt: Date } }) => {
const hits = rows.filter((row) => matches(row, where, tenantId));
for (const row of hits) row.revokedAt = data.revokedAt;
return { count: hits.length };
},
});
return callback({
mcpOAuthAccessToken: model(mocks.accessRows),
mcpOAuthRefreshToken: model(mocks.refreshRows),
tenant: { findUnique: async () => ({ name: "Acme", slug: "acme" }) },
});
},
}));
vi.mock("@hivegrid/db/audit-events.server", () => ({
createAuditEventInExistingTransaction: (input: unknown) => {
mocks.audit(input);
return Promise.resolve({});
},
}));
vi.mock("~/services/mcp/oauth.server", () => ({
getMcpOAuthPublicUrls: () => ({ resource: "https://staging-mcp.hivegrid.de" }),
}));
vi.mock("~/utils/connector/tenantConnector.server", () => ({ tenantHasModule: vi.fn() }));
vi.mock("~/utils/loaders.middleware", () => ({ requireAuth: vi.fn() }));
vi.mock("~/utils/services/.server/urlService", () => ({ getTenantIdFromUrl: vi.fn() }));
vi.mock("~/utils/session.server", () => ({ getUserInfo: vi.fn() }));
import { loadMcpConnectVM, revokeMcpConnection } from "./connect.server";
const CTX = { tenantId: "tenant-1", tenantSlug: "acme", tenantName: "Acme", userId: "user-1" };
function row(overrides: Partial<TokenRow> = {}): TokenRow {
return {
clientId: "client-1",
tenantId: "tenant-1",
userId: "user-1",
revokedAt: null,
scopes: ["mcp:read"],
createdAt: new Date("2026-07-20T08:00:00.000Z"),
expiresAt: new Date("2026-07-28T18:00:00.000Z"),
client: { clientName: "Claude" },
...overrides,
};
}
beforeEach(() => {
mocks.accessRows = [];
mocks.refreshRows = [];
mocks.boundTenantIds = [];
mocks.audit.mockClear();
});
describe("loadMcpConnectVM", () => {
it("lists the current user's own connections only", async () => {
mocks.accessRows = [row(), row({ clientId: "client-2", userId: "user-2", client: { clientName: "Fremd" } })];
const vm = await loadMcpConnectVM(CTX, new Date("2026-07-28T12:00:00.000Z"));
expect(vm.status).toBe("ready");
expect(vm.data?.connections.map((connection) => connection.id)).toEqual(["client-1"]);
});
it("reads inside the tenant's RLS context", async () => {
await loadMcpConnectVM(CTX, new Date("2026-07-28T12:00:00.000Z"));
expect(mocks.boundTenantIds).toEqual(["tenant-1"]);
});
it("hands the environment connector URL to the view-model", async () => {
const vm = await loadMcpConnectVM(CTX, new Date("2026-07-28T12:00:00.000Z"));
expect(vm.data?.connectorUrl).toBe("https://staging-mcp.hivegrid.de");
});
});
describe("revokeMcpConnection", () => {
it("cuts access and refresh tokens together", async () => {
mocks.accessRows = [row()];
mocks.refreshRows = [row()];
const result = await revokeMcpConnection(CTX, "client-1", new Date("2026-07-28T12:00:00.000Z"));
expect(result.revokedTokens).toBe(1);
// A live refresh token would mint a new access token minutes later.
expect(mocks.refreshRows[0]?.revokedAt).not.toBeNull();
});
it("refuses to revoke another user's connection", async () => {
mocks.accessRows = [row({ userId: "user-2" })];
await expect(revokeMcpConnection(CTX, "client-1")).rejects.toMatchObject({ name: "CatalogError" });
expect(mocks.accessRows[0]?.revokedAt).toBeNull();
});
it("refuses an unknown client id", async () => {
await expect(revokeMcpConnection(CTX, "does-not-exist")).rejects.toMatchObject({ name: "CatalogError" });
});
it("writes the audit record in the same transaction", async () => {
mocks.accessRows = [row()];
await revokeMcpConnection(CTX, "client-1");
expect(mocks.audit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ action: "mcp.connection.revoke", actorId: "user-1", targetId: "client-1" }));
});
});
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import { CatalogError, foundationErrors } from "@hivegrid/foundation";
import { loadRequiredWebConfig } from "@hivegrid/config";
import { createAuditEventInExistingTransaction } from "@hivegrid/db/audit-events.server";
import { featureKeys } from "@hivegrid/entitlements";
import { buildMcpConnectVM, type McpConnectTokenInput, type McpConnectVM } from "@hivegrid/view-models";
import type { Params } from "react-router";
import { getMcpOAuthPublicUrls } from "~/services/mcp/oauth.server";
import { tenantHasModule } from "~/utils/connector/tenantConnector.server";
import { withTenantRLS } from "~/utils/db/.server/tenantRls.server";
import { requireAuth } from "~/utils/loaders.middleware";
import { getTenantIdFromUrl } from "~/utils/services/.server/urlService";
import { getUserInfo } from "~/utils/session.server";
/**
* Server side of the app-shell "Mit KI verbinden" dialog.
*
* The MCP runtime lives in its own container on its own host and speaks OAuth
* 2.1 with dynamic client registration, so a client (Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor)
* onboards itself: it discovers the metadata, registers, and sends the user
* through our consent screen. This service therefore never mints credentials —
* it hands out the connector URL, lists what the current user already
* connected, and lets them cut a connection.
*/
export const MCP_MODULE_KEY = featureKeys.mcp;
export type McpConnectContext = {
readonly tenantId: string;
readonly tenantSlug: string;
readonly tenantName: string;
readonly userId: string;
};
export async function loadMcpConnectContext({ request, params }: { request: Request; params: Params }): Promise<McpConnectContext> {
await requireAuth({ request, params });
const [tenantId, userInfo] = await Promise.all([getTenantIdFromUrl(params), getUserInfo(request)]);
if (!tenantId || !userInfo.userId) {
throw new CatalogError(foundationErrors.notFound);
}
// A tenant without the MCP module must not even learn that the connector
// exists — 404, not 403 (Bauprinzip A.5.3).
if (!(await tenantHasModule({ tenantId, userId: userInfo.userId, moduleKey: MCP_MODULE_KEY }))) {
throw new CatalogError(foundationErrors.notFound, { module: MCP_MODULE_KEY });
}
const tenant = await withTenantRLS(tenantId, (tx) => tx.tenant.findUnique({ where: { id: tenantId }, select: { name: true, slug: true } }));
if (!tenant) {
throw new CatalogError(foundationErrors.notFound);
}
return { tenantId, tenantSlug: tenant.slug, tenantName: tenant.name, userId: userInfo.userId };
}
export async function loadMcpConnectVM(ctx: McpConnectContext, now: Date = new Date()): Promise<McpConnectVM> {
const tokens = await withTenantRLS(ctx.tenantId, (tx) =>
tx.mcpOAuthAccessToken.findMany({
// Own connections only: an access token is bound to the user who walked
// through consent, so nobody inspects a colleague's AI clients here.
where: { tenantId: ctx.tenantId, userId: ctx.userId, revokedAt: null },
select: { clientId: true, scopes: true, createdAt: true, expiresAt: true, client: { select: { clientName: true } } },
orderBy: { createdAt: "desc" },
take: 200,
})
);
return buildMcpConnectVM({
connectorUrl: getMcpOAuthPublicUrls().resource,
tenantName: ctx.tenantName,
appName: loadRequiredWebConfig().appName,
docsHref: null,
canRevoke: true,
nowIso: now.toISOString(),
tokens: tokens.map(
(token): McpConnectTokenInput => ({
clientId: token.clientId,
clientName: token.client?.clientName ?? "",
scopes: normalizeScopeJson(token.scopes),
createdAtIso: token.createdAt.toISOString(),
expiresAtIso: token.expiresAt.toISOString(),
revoked: false,
})
),
});
}
export type RevokeMcpConnectionResult = { readonly revokedTokens: number };
/**
* Cutting a connection revokes both halves: leaving the refresh token alive
* would let the client mint a fresh access token minutes later.
*/
export async function revokeMcpConnection(ctx: McpConnectContext, clientId: string, now: Date = new Date()): Promise<RevokeMcpConnectionResult> {
const trimmed = clientId.trim();
if (!trimmed) {
throw new CatalogError(foundationErrors.notFound);
}
return withTenantRLS(ctx.tenantId, async (tx) => {
const scope = { clientId: trimmed, tenantId: ctx.tenantId, userId: ctx.userId, revokedAt: null } as const;
const owned = await tx.mcpOAuthAccessToken.count({ where: scope });
const ownedRefresh = await tx.mcpOAuthRefreshToken.count({ where: scope });
if (owned === 0 && ownedRefresh === 0) {
throw new CatalogError(foundationErrors.notFound);
}
const [access] = await Promise.all([
tx.mcpOAuthAccessToken.updateMany({ where: scope, data: { revokedAt: now } }),
tx.mcpOAuthRefreshToken.updateMany({ where: scope, data: { revokedAt: now } }),
]);
// Same transaction as the revoke itself: a connection must never appear cut
// without the audit record that says who cut it.
await createAuditEventInExistingTransaction(
{
tenantId: ctx.tenantId,
actorId: ctx.userId,
actorType: "user",
action: "mcp.connection.revoke",
targetType: "McpOAuthClient",
targetId: trimmed,
sourceModule: "mcp",
outcome: "success",
dataSensitivity: "internal",
metadata: { revokedAccessTokens: access.count },
},
// Same structural cast the other in-transaction audit writers use: the
// Prisma transaction client is wider than the writer's minimal contract.
tx as unknown as Parameters<typeof createAuditEventInExistingTransaction>[1]
);
return { revokedTokens: access.count };
});
}
function normalizeScopeJson(value: unknown): string[] {
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
return value.filter((entry): entry is string => typeof entry === "string");
}
if (typeof value === "string") {
return value.split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean);
}
return [];
}
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// @vitest-environment node
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
const mocks = vi.hoisted(() => ({
checkAuthRateLimit: vi.fn(),
consumeMcpOAuthAuthorizationCodeWithRlsBootstrap: vi.fn(),
consumeMcpOAuthRefreshTokenWithRlsBootstrap: vi.fn(),
createMcpOAuthAuthorizationCode: vi.fn(),
findMcpOAuthClient: vi.fn(),
issueMcpOAuthTokenPair: vi.fn(),
registerMcpOAuthClient: vi.fn(),
revokeMcpOAuthTokenWithRlsBootstrap: vi.fn(),
getAuthUserWithoutPasswordById: vi.fn(),
getTenantByIdOrSlug: vi.fn(),
getTenantMembershipByIds: vi.fn(),
getTenantsForUser: vi.fn(),
}));
vi.mock("~/services/auth/auth-rate-limit.server", () => ({
checkAuthRateLimit: mocks.checkAuthRateLimit,
}));
vi.mock("@hivegrid/db/mcp-oauth.server", () => ({
consumeMcpOAuthAuthorizationCodeWithRlsBootstrap: mocks.consumeMcpOAuthAuthorizationCodeWithRlsBootstrap,
consumeMcpOAuthRefreshTokenWithRlsBootstrap: mocks.consumeMcpOAuthRefreshTokenWithRlsBootstrap,
createMcpOAuthAuthorizationCode: mocks.createMcpOAuthAuthorizationCode,
findMcpOAuthClient: mocks.findMcpOAuthClient,
issueMcpOAuthTokenPair: mocks.issueMcpOAuthTokenPair,
registerMcpOAuthClient: mocks.registerMcpOAuthClient,
revokeMcpOAuthTokenWithRlsBootstrap: mocks.revokeMcpOAuthTokenWithRlsBootstrap,
}));
vi.mock("@hivegrid/db/auth-boundary.server", () => ({
getAuthUserWithoutPasswordById: mocks.getAuthUserWithoutPasswordById,
getTenantByIdOrSlug: mocks.getTenantByIdOrSlug,
getTenantMembershipByIds: mocks.getTenantMembershipByIds,
getTenantsForUser: mocks.getTenantsForUser,
}));
vi.mock("@hivegrid/config", () => ({
loadRequiredWebConfig: () => ({
routing: {
protocol: "https",
webAppHost: "app.example.test",
appBaseDomain: "example.test",
},
}),
}));
const {
MCP_OAUTH_SUPPORTED_SCOPES,
McpOAuthError,
approveAuthorizeRequest,
oauthAuthorizationServerMetadata,
registerOAuthClientFromRequest,
resolveAuthorizeRequest,
resolveMcpOAuthTokenHashSecret,
revokeEndpointFromRequest,
tokenEndpointFromRequest,
} = await import("./oauth.server");
function registrationRequest(body: Record<string, unknown>) {
return new Request("https://app.example.test/oauth/register", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/json", "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.10" },
body: JSON.stringify(body),
});
}
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
delete process.env.MCP_OAUTH_TOKEN_HASH_SECRET;
delete process.env.API_KEY_HASH_SECRET;
mocks.checkAuthRateLimit.mockResolvedValue({ allowed: true });
mocks.registerMcpOAuthClient.mockResolvedValue({
id: "client_row_1",
clientId: "hgomc_client_1",
clientName: "Safe Client",
redirectUris: ["https://client.example/callback"],
scopes: ["mcp:read"],
active: true,
});
});
afterEach(() => {
vi.unstubAllEnvs();
});
describe("MCP OAuth dynamic client registration hardening", () => {
it("rate-limits before parsing or persisting registration metadata", async () => {
mocks.checkAuthRateLimit.mockResolvedValue({ allowed: false, retryAfterSeconds: 120 });
const response = await registerOAuthClientFromRequest(registrationRequest({ redirect_uris: ["https://client.example/callback"] }));
expect(response.status).toBe(429);
expect(response.headers.get("Retry-After")).toBe("120");
expect(response.headers.get("Cache-Control")).toBe("no-store");
expect(mocks.registerMcpOAuthClient).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("persists only bounded normalized metadata", async () => {
const response = await registerOAuthClientFromRequest(
registrationRequest({
client_name: " Safe Client ",
redirect_uris: ["https://client.example/callback"],
scope: "mcp:read",
grant_types: ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
contacts: ["ops@example.com"],
client_uri: "https://client.example",
attacker_nested_blob: { value: "must-not-be-persisted" },
})
);
expect(response.status).toBe(201);
expect(mocks.checkAuthRateLimit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ action: "oauth-register" }));
expect(mocks.registerMcpOAuthClient).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
clientName: "Safe Client",
contacts: ["ops@example.com"],
metadata: expect.objectContaining({ client_name: "Safe Client", client_uri: "https://client.example" }),
})
);
const input = mocks.registerMcpOAuthClient.mock.calls[0]?.[0];
expect(JSON.stringify(input.metadata)).not.toContain("attacker_nested_blob");
});
it.each([
[{ client_name: "x".repeat(201), redirect_uris: ["https://client.example/callback"] }, "invalid_client_metadata", "client_name"],
[{ redirect_uris: Array.from({ length: 11 }, (_, index) => `https://client${index}.example/callback`) }, "invalid_client_metadata", "redirect_uris"],
[{ redirect_uris: ["https://user:pass@client.example/callback"] }, "invalid_redirect_uri", "credentials"],
[{ redirect_uris: ["https://client.example/callback#fragment"] }, "invalid_redirect_uri", "fragment"],
[
{ redirect_uris: ["https://client.example/callback"], contacts: Array.from({ length: 11 }, () => "ops@example.com") },
"invalid_client_metadata",
"contacts",
],
[{ redirect_uris: ["https://client.example/callback"], scope: "x".repeat(1_025) }, "invalid_client_metadata", "scope"],
[{ redirect_uris: ["https://client.example/callback"], grant_types: ["password"] }, "invalid_client_metadata", "unsupported"],
])("rejects oversized or ambiguous registration metadata", async (body, expectedError, expectedMessage) => {
await expect(registerOAuthClientFromRequest(registrationRequest(body))).rejects.toMatchObject({
name: McpOAuthError.name,
error: expectedError,
message: expect.stringContaining(expectedMessage),
});
expect(mocks.registerMcpOAuthClient).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe("MCP OAuth public endpoint throttling", () => {
it.each([
["token", tokenEndpointFromRequest, "oauth-token"],
["revoke", revokeEndpointFromRequest, "oauth-revoke"],
] as const)("rate-limits the %s endpoint before parsing or querying tokens", async (_name, handler, action) => {
mocks.checkAuthRateLimit.mockResolvedValueOnce({ allowed: false, retryAfterSeconds: 45 });
const request = new Request(`https://app.example.test/oauth/${_name}`, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "cf-connecting-ip": "203.0.113.10" },
body: "token=attacker-controlled&grant_type=refresh_token",
});
const response = await handler(request);
expect(response.status).toBe(429);
expect(response.headers.get("Retry-After")).toBe("45");
expect(response.headers.get("Cache-Control")).toBe("no-store");
expect(mocks.checkAuthRateLimit).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({ action }));
expect(mocks.revokeMcpOAuthTokenWithRlsBootstrap).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe("MCP OAuth token-secret boundary", () => {
it("accepts only an explicitly configured secret of at least 32 UTF-8 bytes", () => {
expect(() => resolveMcpOAuthTokenHashSecret({ MCP_OAUTH_TOKEN_HASH_SECRET: "short" })).toThrow(
expect.objectContaining({ error: "server_error", status: 503 })
);
expect(resolveMcpOAuthTokenHashSecret({ MCP_OAUTH_TOKEN_HASH_SECRET: "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef" })).toBe("0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef");
});
it.each([
["authorization_code", "code=code_1&client_id=client_1&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example%2Fcb&code_verifier=verifier"],
["refresh_token", "refresh_token=refresh_1&client_id=client_1"],
])("fails the %s token flow before any token lookup when the secret is weak", async (grantType, fields) => {
process.env.MCP_OAUTH_TOKEN_HASH_SECRET = "too-short";
const request = new Request("https://app.example.test/oauth/token", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: `grant_type=${grantType}&${fields}`,
});
await expect(tokenEndpointFromRequest(request)).rejects.toMatchObject({ error: "server_error", status: 503 });
expect(mocks.consumeMcpOAuthAuthorizationCodeWithRlsBootstrap).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mocks.consumeMcpOAuthRefreshTokenWithRlsBootstrap).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mocks.issueMcpOAuthTokenPair).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("fails authorization approval and revocation before code/token persistence when the secret is absent", async () => {
const approval = new Request("https://app.example.test/oauth/authorize/approve", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: "decision=approve",
});
const revocation = new Request("https://app.example.test/oauth/revoke", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: "token=access_1",
});
await expect(approveAuthorizeRequest(approval, "user_1")).rejects.toMatchObject({ error: "server_error", status: 503 });
await expect(revokeEndpointFromRequest(revocation)).rejects.toMatchObject({ error: "server_error", status: 503 });
expect(mocks.findMcpOAuthClient).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mocks.createMcpOAuthAuthorizationCode).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
expect(mocks.revokeMcpOAuthTokenWithRlsBootstrap).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
});
});
describe("MCP OAuth metadata", () => {
it("advertises the complete supported scope contract", () => {
vi.stubEnv("MCP_AUTHORIZATION_SERVER_URL", "https://auth.example.test");
vi.stubEnv("MCP_RESOURCE_URL", "https://mcp.example.test");
const expectedScopes = [
"mcp:read",
"mcp:write",
"mcp:lead:read",
"mcp:lead:create",
"mcp:contact:read",
"mcp:project:read",
"mcp:project:write",
"mcp:pipeline:read",
"mcp:activity:read",
"mcp:activity:write",
"mcp:task:read",
"mcp:task:write",
];
expect(MCP_OAUTH_SUPPORTED_SCOPES).toEqual(expectedScopes);
expect(oauthAuthorizationServerMetadata()).toMatchObject({
issuer: "https://auth.example.test",
scopes_supported: expectedScopes,
});
});
});
describe("MCP OAuth tenant resolution", () => {
const TENANTS = [
{ id: "tenant-a", slug: "acme", name: "Acme" },
{ id: "tenant-b", slug: "globex", name: "Globex" },
];
function authorizeUrl(extra: Record<string, string> = {}): URL {
const url = new URL("https://app.example.test/oauth/authorize");
const params: Record<string, string> = {
response_type: "code",
client_id: "hgomc_client_1",
redirect_uri: "https://client.example/callback",
code_challenge: "challenge",
code_challenge_method: "S256",
scope: "mcp:read",
...extra,
};
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params)) url.searchParams.set(key, value);
return url;
}
beforeEach(() => {
mocks.findMcpOAuthClient.mockResolvedValue({
id: "client_row_1",
clientId: "hgomc_client_1",
clientName: "Claude",
redirectUris: ["https://client.example/callback"],
scopes: ["mcp:read"],
active: true,
});
mocks.getTenantsForUser.mockResolvedValue(TENANTS);
mocks.getAuthUserWithoutPasswordById.mockResolvedValue({ defaultTenantId: null });
});
it("connects the tenant the user is currently working in, not the first membership", async () => {
mocks.getAuthUserWithoutPasswordById.mockResolvedValue({ defaultTenantId: "tenant-b" });
const resolved = await resolveAuthorizeRequest(authorizeUrl(), "user-1");
expect(resolved.tenant).toEqual({ id: "tenant-b", slug: "globex", name: "Globex" });
});
it("falls back to the first membership when no active tenant is known", async () => {
const resolved = await resolveAuthorizeRequest(authorizeUrl(), "user-1");
expect(resolved.tenant.id).toBe("tenant-a");
});
it("ignores an active tenant the user is no longer a member of", async () => {
mocks.getAuthUserWithoutPasswordById.mockResolvedValue({ defaultTenantId: "tenant-gone" });
const resolved = await resolveAuthorizeRequest(authorizeUrl(), "user-1");
expect(resolved.tenant.id).toBe("tenant-a");
});
it("still honours an explicit tenant parameter over the active tenant", async () => {
mocks.getAuthUserWithoutPasswordById.mockResolvedValue({ defaultTenantId: "tenant-b" });
mocks.getTenantByIdOrSlug.mockResolvedValue({ id: "tenant-a", slug: "acme", name: "Acme" });
mocks.getTenantMembershipByIds.mockResolvedValue({ id: "membership-1" });
const resolved = await resolveAuthorizeRequest(authorizeUrl({ tenant: "acme" }), "user-1");
expect(resolved.tenant.id).toBe("tenant-a");
});
});
@@ -1,18 +1,19 @@
import { redirect } from "react-router";
import {
consumeMcpOAuthAuthorizationCode,
consumeMcpOAuthRefreshToken,
consumeMcpOAuthAuthorizationCodeWithRlsBootstrap,
consumeMcpOAuthRefreshTokenWithRlsBootstrap,
createMcpOAuthAuthorizationCode,
findMcpOAuthClient,
issueMcpOAuthTokenPair,
registerMcpOAuthClient,
revokeMcpOAuthToken,
verifyMcpOAuthPkceS256,
revokeMcpOAuthTokenWithRlsBootstrap,
type McpOAuthClientSummary,
} from "@hivegrid/db/mcp-oauth.server";
import { runWithRlsContext } from "@hivegrid/db/rls-context.server";
import type { Prisma } from "@hivegrid/db/prisma-browser";
import { getTenantByIdOrSlug, getTenantMembershipByIds, getTenantsForUser } from "@hivegrid/db/auth-boundary.server";
import { getAuthUserWithoutPasswordById, getTenantByIdOrSlug, getTenantMembershipByIds, getTenantsForUser } from "@hivegrid/db/auth-boundary.server";
import { loadRequiredWebConfig } from "@hivegrid/config";
import { checkAuthRateLimit } from "~/services/auth/auth-rate-limit.server";
export const MCP_OAUTH_SUPPORTED_SCOPES = [
"mcp:read",
@@ -23,11 +24,28 @@ export const MCP_OAUTH_SUPPORTED_SCOPES = [
"mcp:project:read",
"mcp:project:write",
"mcp:pipeline:read",
"mcp:activity:read",
"mcp:activity:write",
"mcp:task:read",
"mcp:task:write",
] as const;
const DEFAULT_SCOPE = "mcp:read";
const SUPPORTED_SCOPE_SET = new Set<string>(MCP_OAUTH_SUPPORTED_SCOPES);
const OAUTH_REGISTRATION_RATE_LIMIT = 60;
const OAUTH_REGISTRATION_RATE_WINDOW_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000;
const OAUTH_TOKEN_RATE_LIMIT = 120;
const OAUTH_TOKEN_RATE_WINDOW_MS = 60 * 1000;
const OAUTH_REVOKE_RATE_LIMIT = 120;
const OAUTH_REVOKE_RATE_WINDOW_MS = 60 * 1000;
const OAUTH_CLIENT_NAME_MAX_LENGTH = 200;
const OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI_MAX_COUNT = 10;
const OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI_MAX_LENGTH = 2_048;
const OAUTH_CONTACT_MAX_COUNT = 10;
const OAUTH_CONTACT_MAX_LENGTH = 320;
const OAUTH_SCOPE_MAX_LENGTH = 1_024;
const OAUTH_METADATA_STRING_MAX_LENGTH = 2_048;
const OAUTH_METADATA_STRING_KEYS = ["client_uri", "logo_uri", "tos_uri", "policy_uri", "software_id", "software_version"] as const;
export type McpOAuthAuthorizeRequest = {
responseType: "code";
@@ -141,6 +159,7 @@ export async function resolveAuthorizeRequest(url: URL, userId: string): Promise
}
export async function approveAuthorizeRequest(request: Request, userId: string): Promise<Response> {
const tokenHashSecret = resolveMcpOAuthTokenHashSecret();
const form = await request.formData();
const url = new URL("/oauth/authorize", request.url);
for (const key of ["response_type", "client_id", "redirect_uri", "scope", "state", "code_challenge", "code_challenge_method", "resource", "tenant"]) {
@@ -154,35 +173,64 @@ export async function approveAuthorizeRequest(request: Request, userId: string):
throw redirect(withOAuthRedirectParams(resolved.redirectUri, { error: "access_denied", state: resolved.state }));
}
const { code } = await createMcpOAuthAuthorizationCode({
clientId: resolved.client.id,
userId,
tenantId: resolved.tenant.id,
tenantSlug: resolved.tenant.slug,
redirectUri: resolved.redirectUri,
scopes: resolved.scopes,
resource: resolved.resource,
codeChallenge: resolved.codeChallenge,
codeChallengeMethod: "S256",
secret: getMcpOAuthTokenHashSecret(),
});
const { code } = await runWithRlsContext({ tenantId: resolved.tenant.id, userId }, () =>
createMcpOAuthAuthorizationCode({
clientId: resolved.client.id,
userId,
tenantId: resolved.tenant.id,
tenantSlug: resolved.tenant.slug,
redirectUri: resolved.redirectUri,
scopes: resolved.scopes,
resource: resolved.resource,
codeChallenge: resolved.codeChallenge,
codeChallengeMethod: "S256",
secret: tokenHashSecret,
})
);
throw redirect(withOAuthRedirectParams(resolved.redirectUri, { code, state: resolved.state }));
}
export async function registerOAuthClientFromRequest(request: Request): Promise<Response> {
const rateLimit = await checkAuthRateLimit({
request,
action: "oauth-register",
limit: OAUTH_REGISTRATION_RATE_LIMIT,
windowMs: OAUTH_REGISTRATION_RATE_WINDOW_MS,
});
if (!rateLimit.allowed) {
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: "rate_limited", error_description: "OAuth client registration rate limit exceeded." }), {
status: 429,
headers: {
"Cache-Control": "no-store",
"Content-Type": "application/json; charset=utf-8",
"Retry-After": String(rateLimit.retryAfterSeconds),
},
});
}
const body = await readJson(request);
const redirectUris = normalizeRedirectUris(body.redirect_uris);
const scopes = parseScopes(typeof body.scope === "string" ? body.scope : undefined);
const rawScope = optionalBoundedString(body.scope, "scope", OAUTH_SCOPE_MAX_LENGTH);
const scopes = parseScopes(rawScope);
assertScopesSupported(scopes);
const grantTypes = normalizeGrantTypes(body.grant_types);
const clientName = normalizeClientName(body.client_name);
const contacts = normalizeContacts(body.contacts);
const metadata = normalizeClientMetadata(body, {
clientName,
contacts,
grantTypes,
redirectUris,
scopes,
});
const client = await registerMcpOAuthClient({
clientName: typeof body.client_name === "string" && body.client_name.trim() ? body.client_name.trim() : "MCP Client",
clientName,
redirectUris,
scopes,
grantTypes,
contacts: Array.isArray(body.contacts) ? body.contacts.filter((item): item is string => typeof item === "string") : undefined,
metadata: body as Prisma.InputJsonObject,
contacts,
metadata,
});
return json(
{
@@ -195,27 +243,49 @@ export async function registerOAuthClientFromRequest(request: Request): Promise<
token_endpoint_auth_method: "none",
scope: client.scopes.join(" "),
},
201,
201
);
}
export async function tokenEndpointFromRequest(request: Request): Promise<Response> {
const rateLimit = await checkAuthRateLimit({
request,
action: "oauth-token",
limit: OAUTH_TOKEN_RATE_LIMIT,
windowMs: OAUTH_TOKEN_RATE_WINDOW_MS,
});
if (!rateLimit.allowed) {
return oauthRateLimitedResponse(rateLimit.retryAfterSeconds);
}
const tokenHashSecret = resolveMcpOAuthTokenHashSecret();
const form = await request.formData();
const grantType = stringFormValue(form, "grant_type");
if (grantType === "authorization_code") {
return exchangeAuthorizationCode(form);
return exchangeAuthorizationCode(form, tokenHashSecret);
}
if (grantType === "refresh_token") {
return exchangeRefreshToken(form);
return exchangeRefreshToken(form, tokenHashSecret);
}
return oauthJsonError("unsupported_grant_type", "Unsupported grant_type.", 400);
}
export async function revokeEndpointFromRequest(request: Request): Promise<Response> {
const rateLimit = await checkAuthRateLimit({
request,
action: "oauth-revoke",
limit: OAUTH_REVOKE_RATE_LIMIT,
windowMs: OAUTH_REVOKE_RATE_WINDOW_MS,
});
if (!rateLimit.allowed) {
return oauthRateLimitedResponse(rateLimit.retryAfterSeconds);
}
const tokenHashSecret = resolveMcpOAuthTokenHashSecret();
const form = await request.formData();
const token = stringFormValue(form, "token");
if (token) {
await revokeMcpOAuthToken(token, getMcpOAuthTokenHashSecret());
await revokeMcpOAuthTokenWithRlsBootstrap(token, tokenHashSecret);
}
return new Response(null, { status: 200 });
}
@@ -224,52 +294,69 @@ export function oauthJsonError(error: string, description: string, status = 400)
return json({ error, error_description: description }, status);
}
async function exchangeAuthorizationCode(form: FormData): Promise<Response> {
function oauthRateLimitedResponse(retryAfterSeconds: number): Response {
const response = oauthJsonError("rate_limited", "OAuth endpoint rate limit exceeded.", 429);
response.headers.set("Retry-After", String(retryAfterSeconds));
return response;
}
async function exchangeAuthorizationCode(form: FormData, tokenHashSecret: string): Promise<Response> {
const code = requiredFormValue(form, "code");
const clientId = requiredFormValue(form, "client_id");
const redirectUri = requiredFormValue(form, "redirect_uri");
const codeVerifier = requiredFormValue(form, "code_verifier");
const consumed = await consumeMcpOAuthAuthorizationCode(code, getMcpOAuthTokenHashSecret());
if (!consumed || consumed.client.clientId !== clientId || consumed.redirectUri !== redirectUri) {
const consumed = await consumeMcpOAuthAuthorizationCodeWithRlsBootstrap({
code,
secret: tokenHashSecret,
clientId,
redirectUri,
codeVerifier,
});
if (!consumed) {
return oauthJsonError("invalid_grant", "Authorization code is invalid, expired, or already used.", 400);
}
if (!verifyMcpOAuthPkceS256(codeVerifier, consumed.codeChallenge)) {
return oauthJsonError("invalid_grant", "PKCE verification failed.", 400);
}
const pair = await issueMcpOAuthTokenPair({
clientId: consumed.client.id,
userId: consumed.userId,
tenantId: consumed.tenantId,
tenantSlug: consumed.tenantSlug,
scopes: consumed.scopes,
resource: consumed.resource,
secret: getMcpOAuthTokenHashSecret(),
});
const pair = await runWithRlsContext({ tenantId: consumed.tenantId, userId: consumed.userId }, () =>
issueMcpOAuthTokenPair({
clientId: consumed.client.id,
userId: consumed.userId,
tenantId: consumed.tenantId,
tenantSlug: consumed.tenantSlug,
scopes: consumed.scopes,
resource: consumed.resource,
secret: tokenHashSecret,
})
);
return tokenResponse(pair.accessToken, pair.refreshToken, pair.accessTokenExpiresIn, consumed.scopes, consumed.resource);
}
async function exchangeRefreshToken(form: FormData): Promise<Response> {
async function exchangeRefreshToken(form: FormData, tokenHashSecret: string): Promise<Response> {
const refreshToken = requiredFormValue(form, "refresh_token");
const clientId = requiredFormValue(form, "client_id");
const consumed = await consumeMcpOAuthRefreshToken(refreshToken, getMcpOAuthTokenHashSecret());
if (!consumed || consumed.client.clientId !== clientId) {
const consumed = await consumeMcpOAuthRefreshTokenWithRlsBootstrap({
token: refreshToken,
secret: tokenHashSecret,
clientId,
});
if (!consumed) {
return oauthJsonError("invalid_grant", "Refresh token is invalid, expired, or already rotated.", 400);
}
// A deactivated tenant is an operator kill-switch — do not let a rotating
// refresh token keep minting fresh access tokens for it indefinitely.
const tenant = await getTenantByIdOrSlug(consumed.tenantId);
const tenant = await runWithRlsContext({ tenantId: consumed.tenantId, userId: consumed.userId }, () => getTenantByIdOrSlug(consumed.tenantId));
if (!tenant || tenant.deactivatedReason) {
return oauthJsonError("invalid_grant", "Tenant is deactivated.", 400);
}
const pair = await issueMcpOAuthTokenPair({
clientId: consumed.client.id,
userId: consumed.userId,
tenantId: consumed.tenantId,
tenantSlug: consumed.tenantSlug,
scopes: consumed.scopes,
resource: consumed.resource,
secret: getMcpOAuthTokenHashSecret(),
});
const pair = await runWithRlsContext({ tenantId: consumed.tenantId, userId: consumed.userId }, () =>
issueMcpOAuthTokenPair({
clientId: consumed.client.id,
userId: consumed.userId,
tenantId: consumed.tenantId,
tenantSlug: consumed.tenantSlug,
scopes: consumed.scopes,
resource: consumed.resource,
secret: tokenHashSecret,
})
);
return tokenResponse(pair.accessToken, pair.refreshToken, pair.accessTokenExpiresIn, consumed.scopes, consumed.resource);
}
@@ -284,8 +371,14 @@ function tokenResponse(accessToken: string, refreshToken: string, expiresIn: num
});
}
function getMcpOAuthTokenHashSecret(): string | undefined {
return process.env.MCP_OAUTH_TOKEN_HASH_SECRET ?? process.env.API_KEY_HASH_SECRET;
export function resolveMcpOAuthTokenHashSecret(
env: Partial<Record<"MCP_OAUTH_TOKEN_HASH_SECRET" | "API_KEY_HASH_SECRET", string | undefined>> = process.env
): string {
const secret = (env.MCP_OAUTH_TOKEN_HASH_SECRET ?? env.API_KEY_HASH_SECRET)?.trim();
if (!secret || Buffer.byteLength(secret, "utf8") < 32) {
throw new McpOAuthError("server_error", "OAuth token protection is unavailable.", 503);
}
return secret;
}
async function resolveAuthorizeTenant(tenantParam: string | null, userId: string): Promise<{ id: string; slug: string; name: string }> {
@@ -301,8 +394,19 @@ async function resolveAuthorizeTenant(tenantParam: string | null, userId: string
return { id: tenant.id, slug: tenant.slug, name: tenant.name };
}
// Claude, ChatGPT and Cursor build the authorize URL from discovery metadata,
// so they never send a `tenant`. Falling back to the first membership would
// silently connect a multi-tenant user to the wrong workspace, so prefer the
// tenant they are actually working in: `User.defaultTenantId` is rewritten on
// every tenant page view (see `app.$tenant.tsx`) and is the closest thing to
// "where the user is right now". Membership is re-checked either way.
const tenants = await getTenantsForUser(userId);
const tenant = tenants[0];
if (tenants.length === 0) {
throw new McpOAuthError("access_denied", "Current user has no active tenant.", 403);
}
const activeTenantId = (await getAuthUserWithoutPasswordById(userId))?.defaultTenantId ?? null;
const tenant = tenants.find((candidate) => candidate.id === activeTenantId) ?? tenants[0];
if (!tenant) {
throw new McpOAuthError("access_denied", "Current user has no active tenant.", 403);
}
@@ -336,7 +440,10 @@ function normalizeRedirectUris(value: unknown): string[] {
if (!Array.isArray(value)) {
throw new McpOAuthError("invalid_client_metadata", "redirect_uris must be an array.");
}
const redirectUris = value.filter((item): item is string => typeof item === "string").map((item) => item.trim()).filter(Boolean);
if (value.length > OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI_MAX_COUNT || value.some((item) => typeof item !== "string")) {
throw new McpOAuthError("invalid_client_metadata", `redirect_uris must contain at most ${OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI_MAX_COUNT} strings.`);
}
const redirectUris = value.map((item) => (item as string).trim()).filter(Boolean);
if (redirectUris.length === 0) {
throw new McpOAuthError("invalid_client_metadata", "At least one redirect_uri is required.");
}
@@ -347,17 +454,24 @@ function normalizeRedirectUris(value: unknown): string[] {
}
function assertAllowedRedirectUri(uri: string) {
if (uri.length > OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI_MAX_LENGTH) {
throw new McpOAuthError("invalid_redirect_uri", `redirect_uri must not exceed ${OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI_MAX_LENGTH} characters.`);
}
let parsed: URL;
try {
const parsed = new URL(uri);
if (parsed.protocol === "https:") {
return;
}
if (parsed.protocol === "http:" && ["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"].includes(parsed.hostname)) {
return;
}
parsed = new URL(uri);
} catch {
throw new McpOAuthError("invalid_redirect_uri", "redirect_uri must be an absolute URL.");
}
if (parsed.username || parsed.password || parsed.hash) {
throw new McpOAuthError("invalid_redirect_uri", "redirect_uri must not contain credentials or a fragment.");
}
if (parsed.protocol === "https:") {
return;
}
if (parsed.protocol === "http:" && ["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1", "[::1]"].includes(parsed.hostname)) {
return;
}
throw new McpOAuthError("invalid_redirect_uri", "redirect_uri must use https or localhost http.");
}
@@ -365,11 +479,77 @@ function normalizeGrantTypes(value: unknown): string[] {
if (!Array.isArray(value)) {
return ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"];
}
const requested = value.filter((item): item is string => typeof item === "string");
if (value.length > 2 || value.some((item) => typeof item !== "string")) {
throw new McpOAuthError("invalid_client_metadata", "grant_types must contain at most two strings.");
}
const requested = value as string[];
if (requested.some((item) => item !== "authorization_code" && item !== "refresh_token")) {
throw new McpOAuthError("invalid_client_metadata", "grant_types contains an unsupported grant.");
}
const allowed = requested.filter((item) => item === "authorization_code" || item === "refresh_token");
return allowed.includes("authorization_code") ? [...new Set(allowed)] : ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"];
}
function normalizeClientName(value: unknown): string {
if (value === undefined || value === null || value === "") return "MCP Client";
if (typeof value !== "string") {
throw new McpOAuthError("invalid_client_metadata", "client_name must be a string.");
}
const name = value.trim();
if (!name || name.length > OAUTH_CLIENT_NAME_MAX_LENGTH || /[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/u.test(name)) {
throw new McpOAuthError("invalid_client_metadata", `client_name must contain 1-${OAUTH_CLIENT_NAME_MAX_LENGTH} printable characters.`);
}
return name;
}
function normalizeContacts(value: unknown): string[] | undefined {
if (value === undefined) return undefined;
if (!Array.isArray(value) || value.length > OAUTH_CONTACT_MAX_COUNT || value.some((item) => typeof item !== "string")) {
throw new McpOAuthError("invalid_client_metadata", `contacts must contain at most ${OAUTH_CONTACT_MAX_COUNT} strings.`);
}
const contacts = value.map((item) => (item as string).trim()).filter(Boolean);
if (contacts.some((contact) => contact.length > OAUTH_CONTACT_MAX_LENGTH || /[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/u.test(contact))) {
throw new McpOAuthError("invalid_client_metadata", `contacts entries must not exceed ${OAUTH_CONTACT_MAX_LENGTH} printable characters.`);
}
return [...new Set(contacts)];
}
function optionalBoundedString(value: unknown, field: string, maxLength: number): string | undefined {
if (value === undefined || value === null || value === "") return undefined;
if (typeof value !== "string" || value.length > maxLength || /[\u0000-\u001f\u007f]/u.test(value)) {
throw new McpOAuthError("invalid_client_metadata", `${field} must be a printable string of at most ${maxLength} characters.`);
}
return value;
}
function normalizeClientMetadata(
body: Record<string, unknown>,
normalized: {
clientName: string;
contacts?: string[];
grantTypes: string[];
redirectUris: string[];
scopes: string[];
}
): Prisma.InputJsonObject {
const optionalMetadata = Object.fromEntries(
OAUTH_METADATA_STRING_KEYS.flatMap((key) => {
const value = optionalBoundedString(body[key], key, OAUTH_METADATA_STRING_MAX_LENGTH);
return value === undefined ? [] : [[key, value]];
})
) as Prisma.InputJsonObject;
return {
client_name: normalized.clientName,
redirect_uris: normalized.redirectUris,
scope: normalized.scopes.join(" "),
grant_types: normalized.grantTypes,
response_types: ["code"],
token_endpoint_auth_method: "none",
...(normalized.contacts ? { contacts: normalized.contacts } : {}),
...optionalMetadata,
};
}
function requiredParam(url: URL, name: string): string {
const value = url.searchParams.get(name)?.trim();
if (!value) {