Refresh HiveGrid Cloud reference snapshot

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david committed 2026-08-03 15:31:14 +02:00
1 parent 5e99e14772
commit 7f88026f79
5955 files changed
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@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ describeIfDb("Apps-Engine RLS tenant isolation gate proof (DataConnection, AppSy
await admin.connect();
await admin.query(fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql"), "utf8"));
// Production credentials are intentionally not part of the rollout SQL.
// Set a disposable password only inside this throwaway integration database.
await admin.query(`ALTER ROLE ${APP_ROLE} PASSWORD '${APP_PASSWORD}'`);
await admin.query(fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/apps-engine-isolation.sql"), "utf8"));
await admin.query(`GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE ${new URL(ADMIN_URL!).pathname.slice(1)} TO ${APP_ROLE}`);
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
// @vitest-environment node
import { readFileSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs";
import path from "node:path";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
const repoRoot = path.resolve(process.cwd());
const rlsDirectory = path.join(repoRoot, "prisma", "rls");
function executableSql(relativePath: string): string {
return readFileSync(path.join(rlsDirectory, relativePath), "utf8").replace(/--.*$/gm, "");
}
describe("RLS rollout artifacts", () => {
it("never provisions a reusable database password from repository SQL", () => {
const violations = readdirSync(rlsDirectory)
.filter((file) => file.endsWith(".sql"))
.filter((file) => /\b(?:CREATE|ALTER)\s+(?:ROLE|USER)\b[^;]*\bPASSWORD\b/is.test(executableSql(file)));
expect(violations).toEqual([]);
});
it("uses the canonical transaction-local tenant context name in every isolation policy", () => {
const isolationFiles = readdirSync(rlsDirectory).filter((file) => file.endsWith("-isolation.sql"));
const violations = isolationFiles.filter((file) => {
const sql = executableSql(file);
return !sql.includes("app.tenant_id") || sql.includes("app.current_tenant_id");
});
expect(violations).toEqual([]);
});
it("keeps global automation templates read-only for the tenant runtime role", () => {
const sql = executableSql("automation-isolation.sql");
const selectPolicy = /CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_automation_template_select"[\s\S]*?;/i.exec(sql)?.[0];
const mutablePolicies = [...sql.matchAll(/CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_automation_template_(?:insert|update|delete)"[\s\S]*?;/gi)].map(
(match) => match[0],
);
expect(selectPolicy).toContain('"tenantId" IS NULL OR');
expect(mutablePolicies).toHaveLength(3);
for (const policy of mutablePolicies) {
expect(policy).toContain("current_setting('app.tenant_id', true)");
expect(policy).not.toContain('"tenantId" IS NULL');
}
});
});
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ describeIfDb("Email-inbox RLS tenant isolation gate proof (EmailIntegrationMailb
// 1) Base RLS mechanic + restricted role (creates hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS).
const baseSql = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
await admin.query(baseSql);
// Production credentials are intentionally not part of the rollout SQL.
// Set a disposable password only inside this throwaway integration database.
await admin.query(`ALTER ROLE ${APP_ROLE} PASSWORD '${APP_PASSWORD}'`);
// 2) Email-inbox RLS block: ENABLE/FORCE + tenant_isolation policy + GRANTs
// on the four VA-P23 tables (the deferred P5 activation artifact).
const emailInboxRlsSql = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/email-inbox-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ describeIfDb("File RLS tenant isolation gate proof (File, FileEntityLink)", () =
// 1) Base RLS mechanic + restricted role (creates hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS).
const baseSql = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
await admin.query(baseSql);
// Production credentials are intentionally not part of the rollout SQL.
// Set a disposable password only inside this throwaway integration database.
await admin.query(`ALTER ROLE ${APP_ROLE} PASSWORD '${APP_PASSWORD}'`);
// 2) File RLS block: ENABLE/FORCE + tenant_isolation policy + GRANTs on the
// four Files tables (the deferred P5 activation artifact, applied here).
const fileRlsSql = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/file-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..
// AK-P17a — HR RLS GATE PROOF. Companion to the task/file/tenant isolation tests:
// proves that once the HR RLS block (prisma/rls/hr-isolation.sql) is applied, the
// restricted hivegrid_app role (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS) is confined to its own
// tenant's HR rows (here: HrEmployeeProfile + EmployeePasswordSafeEntry), sees
// tenant's HR rows (including all three password-safe tables), sees
// nothing without a tenant context, and is blocked by WITH CHECK from writing
// cross-tenant rows. This is what makes the P5 activation a pure switch: the
// wrapped hr*Service helpers already set the GUC, so flipping RLS on cannot break
@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ describeIfDb("HR RLS tenant isolation gate proof (HrEmployeeProfile, EmployeePas
// 1) Base RLS mechanic + restricted role (creates hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS).
const baseSql = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
await admin.query(baseSql);
// Production credentials are intentionally not part of the rollout SQL.
// Set a disposable password only inside this throwaway integration database.
await admin.query(`ALTER ROLE ${APP_ROLE} PASSWORD '${APP_PASSWORD}'`);
// 2) HR RLS block: ENABLE/FORCE + tenant_isolation policy + GRANTs on the HR
// tables (the deferred P5 activation artifact, applied here).
const hrRlsSql = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/hr-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
@@ -74,6 +77,18 @@ describeIfDb("HR RLS tenant isolation gate proof (HrEmployeeProfile, EmployeePas
('rls_entryA',now(),'rls_tenantA','rls_vaultA','Entry A'),
('rls_entryB',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_vaultB','Entry B')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "EmployeePasswordSafeAccess"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","vaultId","userId","permissionLevel","grantedByUserId") VALUES
('rls_accessA',now(),'rls_tenantA','rls_vaultA','rls_userA','admin','rls_userA'),
('rls_accessB',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_vaultB','rls_userB','admin','rls_userB')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "HrAnnouncement"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","authorUserId",title,body,"audienceKind","audienceRef") VALUES
('rls_announcementA',now(),'rls_tenantA','rls_userA','Team A','Body A','team','team-A'),
('rls_announcementB',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_userB','Team B','Body B','team','team-B')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "HrSurvey"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","authorUserId",title,"audienceKind","audienceRef") VALUES
('rls_surveyA',now(),'rls_tenantA','rls_userA','Survey A','location','location-A'),
('rls_surveyB',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_userB','Survey B','location','location-B')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
app = new pg.Client({ connectionString: appUrlFrom(ADMIN_URL!) });
await app.connect();
@@ -112,6 +127,23 @@ describeIfDb("HR RLS tenant isolation gate proof (HrEmployeeProfile, EmployeePas
expect(count).toBe(0);
});
it("isolates audience-targeted announcements and surveys before object gates run", async () => {
const visible = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => {
const announcements = (
await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "HrAnnouncement" ORDER BY id`)
).rows.map((row) => row.id);
const surveys = (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "HrSurvey" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map(
(row) => row.id,
);
return { announcements, surveys };
});
expect(visible).toEqual({
announcements: ["rls_announcementA"],
surveys: ["rls_surveyA"],
});
});
it("sees no HR rows at all when no tenant context is set", async () => {
const count = (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "HrEmployeeProfile"`)).rows[0].c;
expect(count).toBe(0);
@@ -131,4 +163,56 @@ describeIfDb("HR RLS tenant isolation gate proof (HrEmployeeProfile, EmployeePas
const crossCount = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "EmployeePasswordSafeEntry" WHERE "tenantId" = 'rls_tenantB'`)).rows[0].c);
expect(crossCount).toBe(0);
});
it("forces RLS on vault, entry and access rows for the restricted app role", async () => {
const { rows } = await admin.query(`
SELECT relname, relrowsecurity, relforcerowsecurity
FROM pg_class
WHERE relnamespace = 'public'::regnamespace
AND relname IN ('EmployeePasswordSafeAccess', 'EmployeePasswordSafeEntry', 'EmployeePasswordSafeVault')
ORDER BY relname
`);
expect(rows).toHaveLength(3);
expect(rows.every((row) => row.relrowsecurity && row.relforcerowsecurity)).toBe(true);
});
it("isolates vault grants and blocks cross-tenant IDOR writes", async () => {
const visible = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => {
const vaults = (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "EmployeePasswordSafeVault" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map((row) => row.id);
const access = (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "EmployeePasswordSafeAccess" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map((row) => row.id);
return { vaults, access };
});
expect(visible).toEqual({ vaults: ["rls_vaultA"], access: ["rls_accessA"] });
await expect(
underTenant("rls_tenantA", () =>
app.query(`INSERT INTO "EmployeePasswordSafeAccess"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","vaultId","userId","permissionLevel","grantedByUserId")
VALUES ('rls_accessX',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_vaultB','rls_userA','read','rls_userA')`)
)
).rejects.toThrow(/row-level security/i);
});
it("returns no vault, entry or access metadata without a bound tenant", async () => {
for (const table of ["EmployeePasswordSafeVault", "EmployeePasswordSafeEntry", "EmployeePasswordSafeAccess"]) {
const count = (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "${table}"`)).rows[0].c;
expect(count, table).toBe(0);
}
});
it("forces RLS and returns no audience metadata without a bound tenant", async () => {
for (const table of ["HrAnnouncement", "HrSurvey"]) {
const count = (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "${table}"`)).rows[0].c;
expect(count, table).toBe(0);
}
const { rows } = await admin.query(`
SELECT relname, relrowsecurity, relforcerowsecurity
FROM pg_class
WHERE relnamespace = 'public'::regnamespace
AND relname IN ('HrAnnouncement', 'HrSurvey')
ORDER BY relname
`);
expect(rows).toHaveLength(2);
expect(rows.every((row) => row.relrowsecurity && row.relforcerowsecurity)).toBe(true);
});
});
@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ describeIfDb("Task RLS tenant isolation gate proof (Task, TaskWatcher, EntityLin
// 1) Base RLS mechanic + restricted role (creates hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS).
const baseSql = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
await admin.query(baseSql);
// Production credentials are intentionally not part of the rollout SQL.
// Set a disposable password only inside this throwaway integration database.
await admin.query(`ALTER ROLE ${APP_ROLE} PASSWORD '${APP_PASSWORD}'`);
// 2) Task RLS block: ENABLE/FORCE + tenant_isolation policy + GRANTs on the
// three Task tables (the deferred P5 activation artifact, applied here).
const taskRlsSql = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/task-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ describeIfDb("RLS tenant isolation gate proof (TenantUser)", () => {
// 1) RLS-Mechanik + restricted Rolle + Policy aus dem committeten SQL anwenden (idempotent).
const rlsSql = fs.readFileSync(path.resolve(process.cwd(), "prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
await admin.query(rlsSql);
// Production credentials are intentionally not part of the rollout SQL.
// Set a disposable password only inside this throwaway integration database.
await admin.query(`ALTER ROLE ${APP_ROLE} PASSWORD '${APP_PASSWORD}'`);
await admin.query(`GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE ${new URL(ADMIN_URL!).pathname.slice(1)} TO ${APP_ROLE}`);
// 2) Zwei Tenants + User + Memberships seeden (als Superuser -> bypasst RLS).
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
import type { Prisma } from "@hivegrid/db/prisma-browser";
import { runWithRlsContext } from "@hivegrid/db/rls-context.server";
import { db } from "~/utils/db.server";
@@ -18,8 +19,10 @@ export async function withTenantRLS<T>(tenantId: string, callback: (tx: TenantRl
if (!tenantId) {
throw new Error("withTenantRLS requires a non-empty tenantId");
}
return db.$transaction(async (tx: TenantRlsClient) => {
await tx.$executeRaw`SELECT set_config('app.tenant_id', ${tenantId}, true)`;
return callback(tx);
});
return runWithRlsContext({ tenantId }, () =>
db.$transaction(async (tx: TenantRlsClient) => {
await tx.$executeRaw`SELECT set_config('app.tenant_id', ${tenantId}, true)`;
return callback(tx);
}),
);
}