Refresh HiveGrid Cloud reference snapshot
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import { getRlsExecutionContext } from "@hivegrid/db/rls-context.server";
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import { notify, type NotificationClient } from "@hivegrid/foundation";
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import { describe, expect, test } from "vitest";
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import { notifyWithTenantRlsContext } from "./notify-rls.js";
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// Emulates the FORCE RLS policy on NotificationDelivery (hg_NotificationDelivery_insert):
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// a tenant-scoped write only passes WITH CHECK when the bound context carries the
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// row's tenant. Mocking the client without the policy would prove nothing about
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// RLS (AGENTS.md §RLS), so the fake rejects exactly like Postgres does for the
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// worker role without a tenant GUC.
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function createPolicyEnforcingClient(rows: Array<{ tenantId: string | null; userId: string | null; op: string }>): NotificationClient {
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const assertPolicy = (tenantId: string | null) => {
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const boundTenantId = getRlsExecutionContext()?.tenantId ?? null;
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if (tenantId !== null && boundTenantId !== tenantId) {
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throw new Error('new row violates row-level security policy for table "NotificationDelivery"');
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}
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};
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return {
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notificationDelivery: {
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async create({ data }) {
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assertPolicy(data.tenantId);
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rows.push({ tenantId: data.tenantId, userId: data.userId, op: "create" });
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return data;
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},
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async upsert({ create }) {
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assertPolicy(create.tenantId);
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rows.push({ tenantId: create.tenantId, userId: create.userId, op: "upsert" });
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return create;
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},
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},
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};
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}
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describe("notifyWithTenantRlsContext", () => {
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test("regression: a plain worker-side notify() without bound context fails the policy", async () => {
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// This is the exact failure mode behind "tasks.reminder.notify-failed" after
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// the 2026-07-13 app-wide RLS cutover: the sweep called notify() outside any
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// tenant context, so the FORCE RLS insert was rejected and delivery silently
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// stopped. The wrapper below exists to close this hole — if this expectation
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// ever flips, the policy emulation is broken, not fixed.
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const rows: Array<{ tenantId: string | null; userId: string | null; op: string }> = [];
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const client = createPolicyEnforcingClient(rows);
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await expect(
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notify({ tenantId: "tenant-a", userId: "user-1", messageKey: "tasks.reminder.before", sourceKey: "task-reminder-t1-before" }, client)
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).rejects.toThrow(/row-level security/);
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expect(rows).toEqual([]);
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});
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test("binds the row's tenant for the deduped upsert path", async () => {
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const rows: Array<{ tenantId: string | null; userId: string | null; op: string }> = [];
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const client = createPolicyEnforcingClient(rows);
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await notifyWithTenantRlsContext(
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{ tenantId: "tenant-a", userId: "user-1", messageKey: "tasks.reminder.before", sourceKey: "task-reminder-t1-before" },
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client
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);
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expect(rows).toEqual([{ tenantId: "tenant-a", userId: "user-1", op: "upsert" }]);
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// The binding is scoped to the write; the sweep loop stays context-free.
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expect(getRlsExecutionContext()).toBeNull();
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});
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test("binds the row's tenant for the create path (no recipient user)", async () => {
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// email-domain-probe notifies without a userId -> notify() falls back to create.
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const rows: Array<{ tenantId: string | null; userId: string | null; op: string }> = [];
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const client = createPolicyEnforcingClient(rows);
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await notifyWithTenantRlsContext(
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{ tenantId: "tenant-b", messageKey: "email.domain.notify.verified", sourceKey: "email-domain-verified:d1" },
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client
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);
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expect(rows).toEqual([{ tenantId: "tenant-b", userId: null, op: "create" }]);
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expect(getRlsExecutionContext()).toBeNull();
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});
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test("keeps concurrent tenant notifications isolated", async () => {
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const rows: Array<{ tenantId: string | null; userId: string | null; op: string }> = [];
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const client = createPolicyEnforcingClient(rows);
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await Promise.all([
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notifyWithTenantRlsContext({ tenantId: "tenant-a", userId: "user-a", messageKey: "hr.notify.reminder.due", sourceKey: "hr-reminder:r1" }, client),
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notifyWithTenantRlsContext({ tenantId: "tenant-b", userId: "user-b", messageKey: "hr.notify.reminder.due", sourceKey: "hr-reminder:r2" }, client),
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]);
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expect(rows.map((row) => row.tenantId).sort()).toEqual(["tenant-a", "tenant-b"]);
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expect(getRlsExecutionContext()).toBeNull();
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});
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});
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