Refresh HiveGrid Cloud reference snapshot
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@@ -38,9 +38,13 @@ eventHash_n = HMAC-SHA-256(AUDIT_CHAIN_SECRET, eventHash_{n-1} || canonicalJSON(
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`canonicalJSON` is the JSON encoding produced by
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`canonicalizeAuditPayload` in
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`packages/db/src/audit-hash.ts`: object keys sorted recursively,
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`undefined` dropped, arrays preserve order. Without
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`AUDIT_CHAIN_SECRET` the helper falls back to plain SHA-256 — still
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tamper-evident for read-only attackers but trivially forgeable.
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`undefined` dropped, arrays preserve order. Production fails closed unless
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`AUDIT_CHAIN_SECRET` contains at least 32 UTF-8 bytes. Local development and
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tests may use the explicit SHA-256 fallback, but it is never an accepted
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production configuration. New `v2:` hashes bind the persisted event ID and
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creation timestamp; the verifier retains dual compatibility with unversioned
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legacy hashes. Concurrent writers serialize through a per-chain PostgreSQL
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advisory transaction lock and an HMAC-authenticated O(1) chain-head row.
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`verifyAuditChain(events, { secret })` walks the chain oldest → newest
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and returns the first break with one of:
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@@ -116,15 +120,14 @@ join with `|`; JSON metadata is stringified.
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`apps/worker/src/jobs/audit-retention.ts` exposes `runAuditRetentionJob`
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which the worker host wires to a daily cron.
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Plan-based defaults (`resolveAuditRetentionPolicy`):
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The retention window is fixed at ten calendar years for every tenant chain and
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the platform chain. Tenant discovery uses one aggregate query. Deletes run in
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bounded, keyset-ordered batches; before each batch is deleted, the same
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transaction writes an append-only HMAC-authenticated checkpoint that binds the
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last removed event hash and the previous checkpoint MAC. Verifiers and exports
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authenticate this checkpoint before accepting the retained suffix.
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| Regulatory scope on tenant events | Retention |
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| --------------------------------- | --------- |
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| `soc2` or `hipaa` | 7 years |
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| `gdpr` | 6 years |
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| none | 1 year |
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Every non-empty sweep emits a meta-audit (`audit.retention.swept`) so
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Every non-empty sweep emits a meta-audit (`audit.retention.pruned`) so
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the cleanup itself is traceable.
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## Operator Procedures
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@@ -134,8 +137,8 @@ the cleanup itself is traceable.
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1. Generate a secret: `openssl rand -base64 32`.
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2. Set `AUDIT_CHAIN_SECRET=<value>` in Coolify (platform-wide, never
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per-tenant).
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3. Apply the Prisma migration
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`20260517180000_10_audit_event_compliance`.
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3. Apply the migration that creates `AuditChainHead` and
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`AuditChainCheckpoint` before deploying the new writers.
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### Self-service export (tenant admin)
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