Refresh HiveGrid Cloud reference snapshot

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david committed 2026-08-03 15:31:14 +02:00
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@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
# Container Image Signing (cosign)
> **Offener Security-Nachzug:** Signing ist noch optional und wird vor Promote
> nicht fail-closed verifiziert. Status und Abnahmekriterien stehen unter
> [`SECURITY-FOLLOWUP-COSIGN`](./SECURITY-AUDIT-2026-07-22.md#security-followup-cosign).
The Gitea deploy workflow (`.gitea/workflows/deploy.yml`) attempts to sign every
container image it publishes to the Gitea Package Registry using
[cosign](https://docs.sigstore.dev/cosign/overview/) with a long-lived keypair.
@@ -17,6 +21,9 @@ full-SHA tag:
- `{registry}/{namespace}/web:<sha>`
- `{registry}/{namespace}/api:<sha>`
- `{registry}/{namespace}/worker:<sha>`
- `{registry}/{namespace}/mcp:<sha>`
- `{registry}/{namespace}/hocuspocus:<sha>`
- `{registry}/{namespace}/portal-domain-controller:<sha>`
Because cosign signatures are bound to the manifest digest (not the tag), the
`:staging` and `:main` aliases that are later created via
@@ -41,8 +48,9 @@ cosign generate-key-pair
# emits cosign.key (private, set as COSIGN_PRIVATE_KEY) and cosign.pub (public)
```
Commit the resulting `cosign.pub` to the repository root (optional but
recommended) so downstream verifiers can fetch it directly from Git.
The public key is not currently committed. Adding `cosign.pub` to the
repository root and making signing plus verification fail-closed are explicit
acceptance criteria in the linked security follow-up.
## Verifying an image