Refresh HiveGrid Cloud reference snapshot

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david committed 2026-08-03 15:31:14 +02:00
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@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Severity scale here: **Critical** = production-blocker, **High** = remediate bef
| F-008 | Medium | A-06 | **closed 2026-05-19** | `validatePluginMigration` now caps statement count at `DEFAULT_MAX_STATEMENTS_PER_MIGRATION` (32); per-call `maxStatements` override available. Code `too_many_statements` on `PluginMigrationError`. 3 new tests. |
| F-009 | Medium | A-07 | **closed 2026-05-19** | `installPlugin` now rejects when the tenant has reached `PLUGIN_MAX_INSTALLS_PER_TENANT` (default 50; set to 0 to disable). New code `tenant_install_limit_exceeded` → HTTP 429. 3 new tests. |
| F-010 | Low | A-08 | closed (test landed 2026-05-19, commit `bf639ac7`) | CSRF body-consumption regression — verified safe when `x-csrf-token` header is set; install route documents this contract. Negative-path test confirms a clean error (not the opaque undici `TypeError: unusable`) when callers omit the header. |
| F-011 | Medium | A-08 | **closed 2026-05-19** | Install route now runs a SharedStore sliding-window rate limiter (`createSlidingWindowRateLimiter`) keyed on `tenant:<id>`. Default `PLUGIN_INSTALL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN=5`; over-limit returns 429 + `Retry-After: 60`. Production fails closed on infra errors unless `PLUGIN_RATE_LIMIT_FAIL_OPEN=true` is explicitly configured; non-production remains fail-open for operator ergonomics. 3 new tests cover allowed/denied/infra-error paths. |
| F-011 | Medium | A-08 | **hardened 2026-07-12** | Install route now runs a SharedStore sliding-window limiter with HMAC-pseudonymized tenant/client buckets. Default `PLUGIN_INSTALL_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MIN=5`; over-limit returns 429 + `Retry-After: 60`. Infrastructure failures return 503 in every environment; no fail-open escape hatch remains. Regression tests cover allowed, denied and infrastructure-error paths. |
| F-012 | Medium | A-09 | **closed 2026-05-26** | Plugin hook fanout is now wired: `plugin.hook.*` outbox events route to `outbox.plugin-hook`, the general worker's `plugin-hook-fanout` consumer scopes enabled-plugin lookup by `tenantId`, filters manifest-declared hooks, and enqueues one idempotent `hivegrid.plugin-invoke` job per subscriber. Sandbox execution remains isolated on `WORKER_QUEUE_GROUP=plugin`. The fanout path is tenant-scoped and does not cross tenant boundaries. |
| F-013 | Low | A-10 | **accepted-residual 2026-05-19** | A tenant user with control over plugin input can drive their own plugin to auto-disable. Confirmed not a privilege escalation: the threat-model invariant is that disabling a plugin for one's own tenant is not a security boundary. Documented in plugin-threat-model.md A-10 "Elevation" row. |
| F-014 | Medium | A-12 | **closed 2026-05-19** | `sanitizePluginOutput` now carries a total-bytes budget across the walk (default 1 MiB, env override `PLUGIN_SANITIZE_TOTAL_BUDGET_BYTES`). Once exhausted further string leaves become `[SIZE_LIMIT]` markers. The output-size budget is closed; the remaining caveat is regex-based sanitization for encoded secrets. 4 new tests cover budget exhaustion in objects + arrays, default-fits cases, and invalid-env fallback. |