Refresh HiveGrid Cloud reference snapshot
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@@ -135,21 +135,70 @@ Trust boundary: caller → loader (plugin manifest signature). Boundary: sandbox
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```mermaid
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flowchart LR
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Admin["Tenant admin / DPO"]
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Web["/admin/users/:id/export"]
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API["API export endpoint"]
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Worker["Worker exports.run"]
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User["Tenant user / PortalUser"]
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Web["Authenticated privacy / portal download route"]
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Queue["hivegrid.exports"]
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Writer["worker-import<br/>privacy + portal writers"]
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Sweeper["worker-general<br/>15 min retention sweep"]
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Storage[("Encrypted S3 bucket")]
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Audit[("AuditEvent<br/>hash-chained")]
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Admin --> Web
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Web --> API
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API -- "enqueue exports.run (CRITICAL priority)" -.-> Worker
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Worker -- "stream user data (row-cap by plan)" --> Storage
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Worker -- "append audit entry" --> Audit
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Worker -- "signed URL (15 min)" --> Admin
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User --> Web
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Web -- "request bounded export" --> Queue
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Queue -.-> Writer
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Writer -- "SSE-C PUT (16/32 MiB cap)" --> Storage
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Writer -- "append audit entry" --> Audit
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Storage -- "SSE-C GET" --> Web
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Web -- "authorized checked 200 attachment" --> User
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Sweeper -- "DeleteObject after 24/72 h expiry" --> Storage
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```
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Trust boundary: admin → web (`admin.users.export` permission). Boundary: worker → storage (per-tenant prefix, server-side encryption). Boundary: audit chain (forensics; see `docs/security/incident-response.md`).
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Trust boundary: user/PortalUser → the Core-Privacy- beziehungsweise
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Customer-Portal-Route (Session, Tenant-/PortalUser-Ownership und Permission).
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Boundary: Runtime → Storage. `worker-import` darf in die beiden deterministischen
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GDPR-Prefixe schreiben, Core und Portal dürfen jeweils nur ihr eigenes Prefix
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lesen, `worker-general` darf die beiden Export-Prefixe und den bestehenden
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Tenant-Hard-Delete-Prefix nur eng begrenzt listen und löschen. Jede Runtime hat ein
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eigenes Access-Key-Paar; nur Writer und Reader teilen den serverseitigen
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32-Byte-SSE-C-Customer-Key. Dieser Key wird weder an den Browser noch in eine URL
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gegeben. Exporte tragen keine benutzerdefinierten S3-Metadaten, weil Hetzner bei
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SSE-C nur den Objektinhalt, nicht solche Metadaten verschlüsselt.
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Der export-first Keyspace trennt
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`gdpr-exports/privacy/tenants/{tenantId}/{exportJobId}/{attemptId}.zip` von
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`gdpr-exports/portal/tenants/{tenantId}/{exportJobId}/{attemptId}.json`. Die
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zufällige beziehungsweise deterministisch versuchsspezifische `attemptId`
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verhindert, dass ein verlorener Retry ein bereits veröffentlichtes Artefakt
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überschreibt. Die Portal-Objektadresse enthält keine PortalUser-ID.
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Downloads prüfen Header, erwartete Länge und Obergrenze vor der Response; die
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Byte-Obergrenze und exakte Endlänge werden während des begrenzten Streamings erneut
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erzwungen. Download-Zähler und Audit dokumentieren deshalb den autorisierten
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Download-Start, nicht den vollständig konsumierten Browser-Body. Es gibt keine
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Presigned URL und keinen direkten Browserzugriff auf den Bucket. Privacy ist
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ab 72 Stunden, Portal ab 24 Stunden nicht mehr abrufbar. Der 15-minütige Scheduler
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löscht im ersten erfolgreichen Sweep nach Ablauf; Provider-/Queue-Ausfälle können
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die physische Löschung verlängern und müssen deshalb bis zum erfolgreichen Retry
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alarmieren. Die Zugriffssperre der App bleibt davon unabhängig sofort wirksam.
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Bei deaktiviertem Versioning und Object Lock löscht eine auf `gdpr-exports/`
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begrenzte dreitägige Provider-Lifecycle-Regel verwaiste Attempts als letzte
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Rückfallebene. Sie darf keine anderen Bucket-Prefixe erfassen und ersetzt weder
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den 15-Minuten-Sweep noch dessen Alarmierung; Provider-Lifecycle-Ausführung ist
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asynchron und deshalb kein minutengenauer Retention-Nachweis.
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Repository-Tests und Deploy-Preflight belegen diese Code- und Env-Grenzen, aber
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nicht die tatsächlich aktive Hetzner-Bucket-Policy oder Provider-Semantik. Der
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verbindliche Positiv-/Negativ-Proof ist daher der redigierte Staging-Operator-
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Checkpoint in
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[`docs/deploy/customer-portal.md`](../deploy/customer-portal.md#operator-checkpoint-provider-vertrag).
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Der legacy Pfad `apps/worker/src/jobs/dsgvo-export.ts` und generische Presigned-URL-
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Storage-Tests sind kein Nachweis für diesen GDPR-Vertrag. Boundary: Audit-Kette
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(Forensik; siehe `docs/security/incident-response.md`).
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Beim SSE-C-Cutover müssen die früheren Klartext-Keyspaces
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`tenants/*/gdpr/*.zip` und `tenants/*/portal-gdpr/*/*.json` inventarisiert,
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gelöscht und ihre DB-Referenzen abgelaufen beziehungsweise entfernt werden. Der
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neue Reader bleibt für diese Legacy-Objekte fail-closed; es gibt keinen
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Klartext-Fallback.
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## STRIDE matrices per component
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@@ -181,7 +230,7 @@ Each table follows the same shape: **Threat** (the STRIDE category and concrete
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| **R** — Repudiated admin API call | Every `/v1/admin/*` request emits AuditEvent with request-id linkage | `apps/api/src/openapi.test.ts`, `verify:permission-matrix` | None known. |
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| **I** — OpenAPI exposes admin route | OpenAPI guard rejects routes without explicit auth class | `apps/api/src/openapi.test.ts`, `verify:openapi-security` | None known. |
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| **I** — Error envelope leak | Structured `{error: {code, messageKey}}` envelope; no raw `err.message` in mutating routes | `apps/api/src/error-envelope.test.ts` | B5 follow-up: a small number of legacy loaders still return string bodies. |
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| **D** — Unauthenticated analytics flood | `ANALYTICS_TOKEN` gate + per-token rate-limit | `apps/api/src/route-access-inventory.test.ts` (`public-analytics-token`) | None known. |
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| **D** — Unauthenticated analytics flood | Browser ingest capability plus per-IP and bounded anonymous-visitor rate limits; identity fields are rejected and writes run in an isolated tenantless RLS context | `apps/api/src/route-access-inventory.test.ts` (`public-analytics-token`) | The browser capability is intentionally public; infrastructure/WAF limits remain defense in depth. |
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| **D** — Auth burst | Login rate-limit returns structured 429 | `apps/api/src/app.ts` rate-limit branch; `apps/api/src/auth.test.ts` | Distributed bursts handled by infra-level WAF. |
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| **E** — Permission bypass via parameter tampering | Permission matrix loaded once at boot; every `/v1/*` handler asserts `assertCan(actor, action, resource)` | `verify:permission-matrix` | None known. |
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@@ -195,20 +244,20 @@ Each table follows the same shape: **Threat** (the STRIDE category and concrete
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| **R** — Side-effect replay without audit | Outbox is the only path to external side-effects in critical flows; receivers wrap with `withOutboxIdempotency` | `apps/worker/src/jobs/outbox-dispatcher.test.ts` | Legacy direct producers still exist; migration tracked in #42 follow-ups. |
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| **I** — Job payload leak | PII-redaction at enqueue (`@hivegrid/logger` redact rules); SBOM excludes payload | `packages/logger/src/redact.test.ts` | Operator must verify Sentry breadcrumb scrubbers. |
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| **D** — Queue starvation | Per-group queue separation (`general`, `mail`, `import`, `webhook`) + concurrency caps + job-priority | `apps/worker/src/queues.test.ts`, `docs/architecture/job-priority.md` | Operator must size per group; see runbook. |
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| **E** — Worker → DB privilege escalation | Worker connects with role limited to required tables; no admin DDL grants | `infra/postgres/init.sql` + Coolify role provisioning | Mis-grant by operator → audited via [`docs/operations/database-rollback.md`](../operations/database-rollback.md). |
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| **E** — Worker → DB privilege escalation | Worker connects as `hivegrid_worker`: `NOBYPASSRLS`, no role memberships, no DDL authority; job context may set only the trusted tenant identity | `scripts/provision-rls-roles.mjs`, `apps/worker/src/rls-context.ts`, `packages/db/src/rls-runtime-readiness.server.ts`, `verify:rls-live` | The production role/Coolify state still has to be verified during rollout; a mis-grant is a release blocker. |
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### 4. Database (Postgres + PgBouncer + replicas)
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| Threat | Mitigation | Evidence / Gate | Residual risk |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| **S** — Forged connection | mTLS to PgBouncer in production; per-app credentials in `userlist.txt` | `infra/pgbouncer/pgbouncer.ini`, `docs/ops/pgbouncer.md` | Operator must rotate per release. |
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| **S** — Forged connection | PgBouncer is non-public, uses SCRAM-SHA-256, and carries separate credentials for `hivegrid_app`, `hivegrid_worker`, callback-only `hivegrid_authentik_jit`, and its admin probe | `infra/pgbouncer/pgbouncer.ini`, `docs/ops/pgbouncer.md`, `scripts/provision-rls-roles.mjs` | Transport/network controls and credential rotation remain operator-owned and must be verified in the target environment. |
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| **T** — SQL injection | Prisma parameterized queries only; `$queryRaw` requires tagged template + lint rule | ESLint custom rule + grep guard in CI | `$executeRawUnsafe` banned in app code (allowed in CLI for migrations). |
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| **T** — Backup tampering | Backups encrypted with age; SHA256 manifest signed at write | `docs/ops/backup-cli.md`, `packages/cli/src/backup/*.test.ts` | Encryption key custody: operator-owned. |
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| **R** — Direct DB write without audit | Per-tenant write happens through Prisma + AuditEvent emission; direct `psql` writes flagged by `pg_stat_statements` review | [`docs/operations/database-rollback.md`](../operations/database-rollback.md) | Operator runbook. |
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| **I** — Cross-tenant read | Every model query carries tenantId; static inventory snapshot enforced by test | `verify:tenant-isolation-report` | RLS not yet enforced; runtime integration test still pending (C3). |
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| **I** — Replica leak | Read replicas configured with `hot_standby=on`, `default_transaction_read_only=on`; `DATABASE_READ_URL` user has SELECT only | `docs/architecture/rw-split.md`, `infra/postgres/replica.sql` | Operator must verify replica grants per release. |
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| **I** — Cross-tenant read/write | Every Prisma model is explicitly classified; all 264 RLS definitions are generated from a reviewed policy contract, tenant tables use `ENABLE` + `FORCE RLS`, and runtime GUCs are transaction-local | `verify:tenant-policy-contract`, `verify:rls-release-readiness`, `verify:rls-live`, `prisma/migrations/20260713190000_appwide_rls_cutover/migration.sql` | Repository and ephemeral PostgreSQL proof do not prove the production cutover. Existing production data, roles, PgBouncer, replicas, and Coolify env must pass the rollout checks before traffic is enabled. |
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| **I** — Replica leak | The read client is probed against the same restricted runtime-role, forced-RLS, policy, definer-allowlist, and empty-GUC contract as the write client | `packages/db/src/rls-runtime-readiness.server.ts`, `docs/architecture/rw-split.md` | Actual replica role/grant and migration lag must pass readiness in the target environment before it receives traffic. |
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| **D** — Connection exhaustion | PgBouncer transaction pooling + per-app `max_client_conn` | `docs/ops/pgbouncer.md` | Long transactions block pool; mitigated by `statement_timeout`. |
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| **E** — Privilege escalation in DB | Per-app role with least privilege; `pgcrypto` and `vector` extensions granted to migrator only | `infra/postgres/init.sql` | Operator must audit role grants per release. |
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| **E** — Privilege escalation in DB | `hivegrid_app`, `hivegrid_worker`, and `hivegrid_authentik_jit` are `LOGIN NOBYPASSRLS` without memberships; the JIT login has no table/sequence privileges and can execute exactly one callback capability. `hivegrid_migrator` is non-superuser and may only `SET ROLE` to the `NOLOGIN BYPASSRLS` owner of an exact allow-list of narrow `SECURITY DEFINER` functions | `scripts/provision-rls-roles.mjs`, `packages/db/src/rls-runtime-readiness.server.ts`, `verify:rls-live` | The definer allow-list and grants must be reviewed whenever a new pre-tenant/platform capability is introduced; production grant drift fails readiness. |
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### 5. Two-tier cache (Redis L2 + in-memory L1)
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@@ -233,11 +282,11 @@ Each table follows the same shape: **Threat** (the STRIDE category and concrete
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| Threat | Mitigation | Evidence / Gate | Residual risk |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| **S** — Spoofed presigned URL | Server-side signing with provider IAM credentials; client never holds long-lived keys | `packages/storage/src/s3.test.ts` | None known. |
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| **S** — Spoofed presigned URL | Server-side signing with provider IAM credentials; client never holds long-lived keys; GDPR exports use no presigned URL | `packages/storage/src/s3-client.test.ts`, `packages/storage/src/sse-c.test.ts` | GDPR provider policy remains an operator checkpoint. |
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| **T** — Upload of malicious file | AV scanner layer 1 (magic-bytes) + layer 2 (ClamAV planned) | `packages/storage/src/av-scan.test.ts`, `docs/ops/asset-cdn.md` | Layer 2 (ClamAV) container provisioning is operator step. |
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| **I** — Public bucket exposure | Buckets default to private; ACL test enforces | `packages/storage/src/bucket-policy.test.ts` (operator-run) | Operator must verify per environment. |
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| **D** — Egress cost burn | Per-tenant rate-limit on signed-URL issuance | `packages/storage/src/rate-limit.test.ts` | Operator-side WAF + Bunny CDN absorb large bursts. |
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| **E** — Cross-tenant object read | Object key prefixed with `tenant:{tenantId}/...`; loader verifies prefix matches actor's tenant | `packages/storage/src/key-scope.test.ts` | None known. |
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| **I** — Public bucket exposure | Buckets default to private; runtime keys remain action/prefix scoped | `packages/storage/src/s3-client.test.ts`, operator checkpoint in `docs/deploy/customer-portal.md` | Operator must verify per environment. |
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| **D** — Egress cost burn | Distributed principal/artifact gate and bounded streaming on authenticated GDPR proxy; bounded signed-URL issuance elsewhere | `apps/web/app/utils/privacy/gdprExportDownloadGate.server.test.ts`, `packages/storage/src/sse-c.test.ts` | Operator-side WAF absorbs larger public bursts. |
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| **E** — Cross-tenant object read | Tenant-bound key guards plus action/prefix-scoped runtime credentials | `packages/storage/src/access/index.test.ts`, `packages/storage/src/paths/index.test.ts`, `packages/storage/src/sse-c.test.ts` | Provider policy remains an operator checkpoint. |
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### 8. Mail (`packages/mail`)
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@@ -316,15 +365,16 @@ Each table follows the same shape: **Threat** (the STRIDE category and concrete
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| **I** — Payload exfiltration | Outbound payload built from typed event schema; PII redacted before send | `packages/webhooks/src/payload.test.ts` | Operator must vet customer-configured destinations. |
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| **D** — Slow-loris destination | Per-destination concurrency cap + timeout; circuit-breaker after consecutive failures | `apps/worker/src/jobs/webhook-delivery.test.ts` | None known. |
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### 16. Form widget + lead capture
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### 16. Form widget + native platform-lead intake
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| Threat | Mitigation | Evidence / Gate | Residual risk |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| **S** — Forged embed origin | Origin allow-list per form (tenant-configured); `MARKETING_ALLOWED_ORIGINS` for global | `apps/web/app/routes/api.leads.capture.test.ts` | Operator must keep allow-list current. |
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| **T** — Submission tampering | Server validates schema; honeypot field; Turnstile gate when enabled | `apps/web/app/routes/api.embed.forms.submit.test.ts` | Sophisticated bots may still pass Turnstile; rate-limit caps damage. |
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| **S** — Forged platform source | Source-specific hashed Bearer credential; source identity comes only from that credential | `apps/api/src/routes/platform-lead-routes.test.ts` | Credential compromise requires immediate rotation/revoke. |
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| **T** — Submission tampering/replay | Strict schema/body limit plus mandatory source-partitioned idempotency hash | `apps/api/src/routes/platform-lead-routes.test.ts`, `packages/db/src/platform-leads.rls.integration.test.ts` | A producer must reuse its submission ID until acknowledgement. |
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| **T** — Embed-snippet tampering | SRI hash on `widget.js` (planned per form-widget detail-md follow-up) | `docs/features/form-widget.md` | Until SRI ships, customer must serve widget over HTTPS. |
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| **I** — Lead PII exposure | Submissions stored per-tenant; admin inbox requires `marketing.leads.read` | `apps/web/app/routes/admin.marketing-leads.test.tsx` | None known. |
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| **D** — Spam flood | Sliding-window rate-limit (5/min IP, 1/min email); Turnstile when enabled | `apps/web/app/routes/api.leads.capture.test.ts` | Distributed bots may evade IP limit. |
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| **I** — Platform-lead PII exposure | Operator RLS + `read_own`/`read_all`; PII-free audit/outbox/queue payloads | `packages/db/src/platform-leads.rls.integration.test.ts`, `apps/worker/src/jobs/platform-notification-outbox.test.ts` | Privileged operators still require normal access review. |
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| **D** — Spam/credential probing | Pre-auth IP limit plus source-specific rate limit; disabled ingress returns neutral 404 | `apps/api/src/public-ingress-rate-limit.test.ts`, `apps/api/src/routes/platform-lead-routes.test.ts` | Distributed probing remains observable via ingress metrics. |
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| **R** — Stale browser writer | Legacy `/api/leads/capture` is write-free and returns 410; `marketing.js` removed | `apps/web/app/routes/api.leads.capture.test.ts` | Keep drain monitoring until all stale clients disappear. |
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### 17. Feature flags + targeting
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@@ -381,7 +431,8 @@ Each table follows the same shape: **Threat** (the STRIDE category and concrete
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## Cross-cutting controls
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- **Secret handling** — secrets never read from UI code; `@hivegrid/config` exposes typed loaders. `.env.test` allow-listed; `.env` git-ignored. See `docs/env-access-inventory.md`.
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- **Branding / infra parametrization** — `BRAND_*` env vars and `scripts/infra-config.mjs` give forks override knobs without removing the verify-gate contract — see `docs/deployment-porting.md`.
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- **Branding / infra parametrization** — `BRAND_*` env vars and `scripts/infra-config.mjs` keep
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runtime configuration explicit; see `docs/deployment.md`.
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- **Migrations** — structural Prisma diff verified via `verify:db-migrate-status`; rollback procedure documented in `docs/operations/database-rollback.md`.
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- **Audit chain** — every privileged mutation emits an AuditEvent; the planned HiveGrid hash-chain verifier is the canonical forensics source referenced by [`incident-response.md`](./incident-response.md) once it lands.
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- **SBOM** — generated per build; see [`sbom.md`](./sbom.md).
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