Refresh HiveGrid Cloud reference snapshot

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david committed 2026-08-03 15:31:14 +02:00
1 parent 5e99e14772
commit 7f88026f79
5955 files changed
+1177325 -188362

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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
--
-- IMPORTANT: `App` is a GLOBAL catalog table (no tenantId) → NO policy, NO RLS.
-- Only the tenant-scoped rows are isolated: DataConnection, AppSyncRun,
-- AppSyncRunLog, AppSyncItem.
-- AppSyncRunLog, AppSyncItem, AppEntityBinding.
--
-- WHY DEFERRED: with RLS + FORCE on, any query WITHOUT `app.tenant_id` returns
-- ZERO rows. The dataConnection/appSync services always scope by
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ DO $$
DECLARE
tbl text;
BEGIN
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY['DataConnection', 'AppSyncRun', 'AppSyncRunLog', 'AppSyncItem']
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY['DataConnection', 'AppSyncRun', 'AppSyncRunLog', 'AppSyncItem', 'AppEntityBinding']
LOOP
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
-- R-P12a Automation isolation artifact.
-- Companion to prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql. Enable during the merge
-- migration once the schema lands and the automation service has shipped.
-- Global template catalog writes must run through a separately privileged
-- deploy/seed path. The tenant runtime may read global templates, but may only
-- create, update, or delete rows belonging to its active tenant.
--
-- Verification:
-- psql "$DIRECT_URL" -f prisma/rls/automation-isolation.sql
@@ -49,9 +52,27 @@ ALTER TABLE "AutomationTemplate" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE "AutomationTemplate" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_automation_template" ON "AutomationTemplate";
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_automation_template" ON "AutomationTemplate"
USING ("tenantId" IS NULL OR "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" IS NULL OR "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_automation_template_select" ON "AutomationTemplate";
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_automation_template_insert" ON "AutomationTemplate";
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_automation_template_update" ON "AutomationTemplate";
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_automation_template_delete" ON "AutomationTemplate";
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_automation_template_select" ON "AutomationTemplate"
FOR SELECT
USING ("tenantId" IS NULL OR "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_automation_template_insert" ON "AutomationTemplate"
FOR INSERT
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_automation_template_update" ON "AutomationTemplate"
FOR UPDATE
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_automation_template_delete" ON "AutomationTemplate"
FOR DELETE
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
ALTER TABLE "AutomationTriggerMeter" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE "AutomationTriggerMeter" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
@@ -60,3 +81,17 @@ DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_automation_trigger_meter" ON "Automation
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_automation_trigger_meter" ON "AutomationTriggerMeter"
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "AutomationRule" TO hivegrid_app;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "AutomationRuleStep" TO hivegrid_app;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "AutomationExecution" TO hivegrid_app;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "AutomationStepExecution" TO hivegrid_app;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "AutomationCredential" TO hivegrid_app;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "AutomationTemplate" TO hivegrid_app;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "AutomationTriggerMeter" TO hivegrid_app;
-- Inverse per table:
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<table>" FROM hivegrid_app;
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<policy>" ON "<table>";
-- ALTER TABLE "<table>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
-- ALTER TABLE "<table>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
@@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
-- AK-P16b · P16 Booking — HARD DOUBLE-BOOKING GUARD (deferred, NOT in the Prisma schema)
-- AK-P16b · P16 Booking — HARD DOUBLE-BOOKING GUARD (NOT in the Prisma schema)
-- =============================================================================
-- SHIPPED: since 20260717090000_ak_p16b_booking_overlap_constraint this
-- constraint is part of the tracked migration chain (that migration is the
-- authoritative copy, incl. a pre-flight overlap check). This file remains the
-- feature-branch template for `psql -f` on db-push-only databases.
--
-- The race-protection backstop for DoD 2: a PostgreSQL EXCLUDE USING gist
-- constraint that makes it physically impossible to persist two OVERLAPPING active
-- appointments for the SAME provider. This cannot be expressed in the Prisma schema
-- (Prisma has no exclusion-constraint primitive), so — like the RLS block — it
-- ships out-of-band: `psql -f` on the feature branch, folded into the merge
-- migration at main-merge (AD-21).
-- appointments for the SAME provider WITHIN A TENANT (tenant-scoped like the
-- slot engine; tenant-agnostic would leak cross-tenant busy state). This cannot be expressed in the Prisma schema
-- (Prisma has no exclusion-constraint primitive), so it stays raw SQL.
--
-- This is the second layer. The first layer is the application Serializable
-- transaction in BookingSubmitService that re-checks slot availability and returns
@@ -24,7 +28,7 @@
-- -- (leave btree_gist installed; other modules may rely on it)
-- =============================================================================
-- gist over a scalar (providerUserId) + a range (tstzrange) needs the btree_gist
-- gist over a scalar (providerUserId) + a range (tsrange) needs the btree_gist
-- extension to put the equality column into the same gist index.
CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS btree_gist;
@@ -40,8 +44,9 @@ BEGIN
ALTER TABLE "Appointment"
ADD CONSTRAINT appointment_no_overlap
EXCLUDE USING gist (
"tenantId" WITH =,
"providerUserId" WITH =,
tstzrange("startAt", "endAt", ''[)'') WITH &&
tsrange("startAt", "endAt", ''[)'') WITH &&
)
WHERE (status IN (''scheduled'', ''held''))
';
@@ -28,3 +28,13 @@ DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_widget_instance" ON "WidgetInstance";
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_widget_instance" ON "WidgetInstance"
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "Dashboard" TO hivegrid_app;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "DashboardLayout" TO hivegrid_app;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "WidgetInstance" TO hivegrid_app;
-- Inverse per table:
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<table>" FROM hivegrid_app;
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<policy>" ON "<table>";
-- ALTER TABLE "<table>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
-- ALTER TABLE "<table>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
-- VR-P32b/VR-P32d · KWP inbound capability — RLS companion artifact.
--
-- Forward-only. Inverse per table:
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app, hivegrid_worker;
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
DO $$
DECLARE
tbl text;
BEGIN
FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
'KwpApiContractSnapshot',
'KwpCapabilityState',
'KwpErrorReport',
'KwpProjectRouting',
'KwpMaterialPosition'
]
LOOP
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
IF NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
AND tablename = tbl
AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
) THEN
EXECUTE format(
'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
);
END IF;
EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app, hivegrid_worker;', tbl);
END LOOP;
END
$$;
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
-- VA-P26b merge input: internal-user and PortalUser actor invariants.
--
-- Prisma models the nullable foreign-key columns but cannot express these
-- cross-column CHECK contracts. This artifact must be embedded after the
-- approved merge migration's audited legacy backfill. Constraints are first
-- installed NOT VALID (so new writes are protected immediately) and then
-- validated in the same transaction. Any unresolved legacy actor fails closed.
BEGIN;
DO $$
BEGIN
IF NOT current_setting('is_superuser')::boolean
AND NOT pg_has_role(current_user, 'hivegrid_rls_definer', 'MEMBER') THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'Actor-contract installer must be superuser or a member of hivegrid_rls_definer';
END IF;
END$$;
GRANT SELECT ON "Form" TO hivegrid_rls_definer;
GRANT CREATE ON SCHEMA public TO hivegrid_rls_definer;
SET LOCAL ROLE hivegrid_rls_definer;
-- FormSubmission cannot reference Form.subtype directly from a plain CHECK.
-- This stable, fail-closed predicate binds the submission to the exact tenant
-- form: authenticated portal_form rows require one actor; standard/public and
-- legacy rows may remain anonymous but may never carry two actors.
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.hivegrid_form_submission_actor_contract(
p_form_id text,
p_tenant_id text,
p_internal_user_id text,
p_portal_user_id text
)
RETURNS boolean
LANGUAGE sql
STABLE
SECURITY DEFINER
SET search_path = pg_catalog, public
SET row_security = off
AS $function$
SELECT COALESCE((
SELECT CASE
-- Compare through text so this reviewed contract can be installed in
-- the same outer transaction that adds the portal_form enum value.
WHEN form."subtype"::text = 'portal_form'
THEN pg_catalog.num_nonnulls(p_internal_user_id, p_portal_user_id) = 1
ELSE pg_catalog.num_nonnulls(p_internal_user_id, p_portal_user_id) <= 1
END
FROM public."Form" AS form
WHERE form."id" = p_form_id
AND form."tenantId" = p_tenant_id
), false)
$function$;
ALTER FUNCTION public.hivegrid_form_submission_actor_contract(text,text,text,text) OWNER TO hivegrid_rls_definer;
REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.hivegrid_form_submission_actor_contract(text,text,text,text)
FROM PUBLIC, hivegrid_portal, hivegrid_authentik_jit;
GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.hivegrid_form_submission_actor_contract(text,text,text,text)
TO hivegrid_migrator, hivegrid_app, hivegrid_worker;
RESET ROLE;
REVOKE CREATE ON SCHEMA public FROM hivegrid_rls_definer;
DO $$
BEGIN
IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_constraint WHERE conname = 'File_actor_exactly_one_check' AND conrelid = '"File"'::regclass) THEN
ALTER TABLE "File"
ADD CONSTRAINT "File_actor_exactly_one_check"
CHECK (pg_catalog.num_nonnulls("createdByUserId", "createdByPortalUserId") = 1) NOT VALID;
END IF;
IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_constraint WHERE conname = 'FileUpload_actor_exactly_one_check' AND conrelid = '"FileUpload"'::regclass) THEN
ALTER TABLE "FileUpload"
ADD CONSTRAINT "FileUpload_actor_exactly_one_check"
CHECK (pg_catalog.num_nonnulls("createdByUserId", "createdByPortalUserId") = 1) NOT VALID;
END IF;
IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_constraint WHERE conname = 'FileEntityLink_actor_exactly_one_check' AND conrelid = '"FileEntityLink"'::regclass) THEN
ALTER TABLE "FileEntityLink"
ADD CONSTRAINT "FileEntityLink_actor_exactly_one_check"
CHECK (pg_catalog.num_nonnulls("createdByUserId", "createdByPortalUserId") = 1) NOT VALID;
END IF;
IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_constraint WHERE conname = 'FormSubmission_actor_contract_check' AND conrelid = '"FormSubmission"'::regclass) THEN
ALTER TABLE "FormSubmission"
ADD CONSTRAINT "FormSubmission_actor_contract_check"
CHECK (public.hivegrid_form_submission_actor_contract("formId", "tenantId", "createdByUserId", "createdByPortalUserId")) NOT VALID;
END IF;
END$$;
ALTER TABLE "File" VALIDATE CONSTRAINT "File_actor_exactly_one_check";
ALTER TABLE "FileUpload" VALIDATE CONSTRAINT "FileUpload_actor_exactly_one_check";
ALTER TABLE "FileEntityLink" VALIDATE CONSTRAINT "FileEntityLink_actor_exactly_one_check";
ALTER TABLE "FormSubmission" VALIDATE CONSTRAINT "FormSubmission_actor_contract_check";
-- The migrator needs EXECUTE only while PostgreSQL validates the CHECK. It is
-- revoked before the outer transaction can commit.
SET LOCAL ROLE hivegrid_rls_definer;
REVOKE EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.hivegrid_form_submission_actor_contract(text,text,text,text)
FROM hivegrid_migrator;
RESET ROLE;
COMMIT;
-- Inverse merge SQL (execute only during an approved rollback):
-- ALTER TABLE "FormSubmission" DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS "FormSubmission_actor_contract_check";
-- ALTER TABLE "FileEntityLink" DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS "FileEntityLink_actor_exactly_one_check";
-- ALTER TABLE "FileUpload" DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS "FileUpload_actor_exactly_one_check";
-- ALTER TABLE "File" DROP CONSTRAINT IF EXISTS "File_actor_exactly_one_check";
-- DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS public.hivegrid_form_submission_actor_contract(text,text,text,text);
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
-- VA-P26a feature-branch helper only. This is deliberately NOT a migration.
--
-- The frozen 20260713190000_appwide_rls_cutover migration installs policies
-- whose expressions join the old per-PortalUser commerce tables. Prisma cannot
-- drop those referenced tables during `db push` while the policies still
-- exist. Remove only the seven reviewed policies before syncing a disposable
-- local/CI database to the feature schema.
--
-- PortalUserRegistration is an eighth removed legacy table, but its policy
-- does not reference the commerce tables and therefore is deliberately not
-- part of this narrowly scoped db-push unblocker. Merge migration contract
-- (AD-21): the eventual forward-only migration must contain these exact seven
-- commerce-policy drops plus the separately reviewed PortalUserRegistration
-- policy/table drop before child-first DROP TABLE statements.
-- Its Inverse-SQL comment must recreate the tables, indexes, foreign keys and
-- policies in parent-first order and explicitly state that deleted row data is
-- not recoverable from DDL alone. Do not copy this helper in place of a merge
-- migration and do not edit the historical cutover migration.
BEGIN;
DO $va_p26a_portal_legacy_commerce_recut$
DECLARE
legacy_tables CONSTANT text[] := ARRAY[
'PortalCheckoutSessionStatus',
'PortalSubscriptionFeature',
'PortalSubscriptionPrice',
'PortalSubscriptionProduct',
'PortalUserSubscription',
'PortalUserSubscriptionProduct',
'PortalUserSubscriptionProductPrice'
];
legacy_policies CONSTANT text[] := ARRAY[
'hg_PortalCheckoutSessionStatus_all',
'hg_PortalSubscriptionFeature_all',
'hg_PortalSubscriptionPrice_all',
'hg_PortalSubscriptionProduct_all',
'hg_PortalUserSubscription_all',
'hg_PortalUserSubscriptionProduct_all',
'hg_PortalUserSubscriptionProductPrice_all'
];
legacy record;
remaining_policies text[];
BEGIN
IF cardinality(legacy_tables) <> cardinality(legacy_policies) THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'VA-P26a legacy commerce recut allowlist is malformed';
END IF;
FOR legacy IN
SELECT *
FROM unnest(legacy_tables, legacy_policies)
AS allowlist(table_name, policy_name)
LOOP
IF to_regclass(format('%I.%I', 'public', legacy.table_name)) IS NULL THEN
CONTINUE;
END IF;
EXECUTE format(
'DROP POLICY IF EXISTS %I ON %I.%I',
legacy.policy_name,
'public',
legacy.table_name
);
END LOOP;
-- Unknown policies are not removed implicitly. Failing here keeps the whole
-- transaction atomic and exposes a new dependency for explicit review.
SELECT array_agg(
format('%I.%I', relation.relname, policy.polname)
ORDER BY relation.relname, policy.polname
)
INTO remaining_policies
FROM pg_policy AS policy
JOIN pg_class AS relation ON relation.oid = policy.polrelid
JOIN pg_namespace AS namespace ON namespace.oid = relation.relnamespace
WHERE namespace.nspname = 'public'
AND relation.relname = ANY (legacy_tables);
IF remaining_policies IS NOT NULL THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION
'VA-P26a legacy commerce recut found non-allowlisted policies: %',
remaining_policies;
END IF;
END
$va_p26a_portal_legacy_commerce_recut$;
COMMIT;
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ BEGIN
'Projekt',
'ProjektStageChange',
'PipelineAggregateSnapshot',
'ProjektKontakt'
'ProjektKontakt',
'ProjektAdressDetail'
]
LOOP
EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-- R-P11a Global Search isolation artifact.
-- R-P11a Global Search isolation rollout artifact.
-- Companion to prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql. These tables are tenant-scoped
-- metadata around Meilisearch documents and recent searches. Enable during the
-- merge migration once the schema lands.
-- metadata around Meilisearch documents and recent searches. Activate only once
-- every runtime access uses withTenantRLS() and therefore sets app.tenant_id.
--
-- Verification:
-- psql "$DIRECT_URL" -f prisma/rls/search-isolation.sql
@@ -11,13 +11,24 @@ ALTER TABLE "SearchIndexEntry" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_search_index_entry" ON "SearchIndexEntry";
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_search_index_entry" ON "SearchIndexEntry"
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.current_tenant_id', true))
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.current_tenant_id', true));
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
ALTER TABLE "RecentSearch" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE "RecentSearch" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_recent_search" ON "RecentSearch";
CREATE POLICY "tenant_isolation_recent_search" ON "RecentSearch"
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.current_tenant_id', true))
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.current_tenant_id', true));
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "SearchIndexEntry", "RecentSearch" TO hivegrid_app;
-- Inverse SQL (coordinated rollback):
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "SearchIndexEntry", "RecentSearch" FROM hivegrid_app;
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_search_index_entry" ON "SearchIndexEntry";
-- ALTER TABLE "SearchIndexEntry" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
-- ALTER TABLE "SearchIndexEntry" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "tenant_isolation_recent_search" ON "RecentSearch";
-- ALTER TABLE "RecentSearch" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
-- ALTER TABLE "RecentSearch" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
@@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ ALTER TABLE "SignatureProviderConnection" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE "ProjektSignatureDocument" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE "ProjektSignatureSigner" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE "SignatureEvent" ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE "SignatureProviderConnection" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE "ProjektSignatureDocument" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE "ProjektSignatureSigner" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE "SignatureEvent" FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
DROP POLICY IF EXISTS signature_provider_connection_tenant_isolation ON "SignatureProviderConnection";
CREATE POLICY signature_provider_connection_tenant_isolation ON "SignatureProviderConnection"
@@ -26,3 +30,14 @@ DROP POLICY IF EXISTS signature_event_tenant_isolation ON "SignatureEvent";
CREATE POLICY signature_event_tenant_isolation ON "SignatureEvent"
USING ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true))
WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true));
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "SignatureProviderConnection" TO hivegrid_app;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "ProjektSignatureDocument" TO hivegrid_app;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "ProjektSignatureSigner" TO hivegrid_app;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "SignatureEvent" TO hivegrid_app;
-- Inverse per table:
-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<table>" FROM hivegrid_app;
-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<policy>" ON "<table>";
-- ALTER TABLE "<table>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
-- ALTER TABLE "<table>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
@@ -9,12 +9,14 @@
--
-- Idempotent. Inverse-SQL (DoD 28) am Dateiende.
-- 1) Restricted Application-Rolle: NICHT Superuser, NICHT BYPASSRLS, NICHT Tabellen-Owner
-- -> RLS-Policies greifen fuer diese Rolle (Superuser/Owner wuerden sonst bypassen).
-- 1) Restricted application role: not a superuser, not BYPASSRLS, and not the
-- table owner, so policies apply. Authentication credentials are provisioned
-- separately by the deployment secret workflow; this artifact must never
-- contain a reusable database password.
DO $$
BEGIN
IF NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'hivegrid_app') THEN
CREATE ROLE hivegrid_app LOGIN PASSWORD 'hivegrid_app_pw' NOSUPERUSER NOCREATEDB NOCREATEROLE NOBYPASSRLS;
CREATE ROLE hivegrid_app LOGIN NOSUPERUSER NOCREATEDB NOCREATEROLE NOBYPASSRLS;
ELSE
ALTER ROLE hivegrid_app NOSUPERUSER NOBYPASSRLS;
END IF;