Track HiveGrid Cloud planning reference
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// @vitest-environment node
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import fs from "node:fs";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
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import pg from "pg";
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import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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// Resolve the repo root from this file's location so the SQL artifacts load
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// regardless of the cwd vitest runs under (root vs the @toolctrl/web package dir).
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// This file lives at apps/web/app/utils/db/.server/ → six segments below root.
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const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../../../../../..");
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// AK-P4a — FILE RLS GATE PROOF. Companion to R-P2b's rls-tenant-isolation
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// integration test: proves that once the File RLS block
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// (local/AK-P4a-merge-migration.sql) is applied, the restricted hivegrid_app role
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// (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS) is confined to its own tenant's File / FileEntityLink
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// rows, sees nothing without a tenant context, and is blocked by WITH CHECK from
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// writing cross-tenant rows. This is what makes the P5 activation a pure switch:
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// the wrapped fileService.server.ts / worker write-backs already set the GUC, so
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// flipping RLS on cannot break Files.
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//
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// Runs ONLY when RLS_TEST_DATABASE_URL is set (a SUPERUSER connection to a
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// throwaway DB with the schema pushed). Without it the block is skipped so the
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// normal unit suite stays green without a DB.
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//
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// Setup:
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// docker run -d --name hg-rls-pg -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=postgres -e POSTGRES_DB=hivegrid -p 5433:5432 pgvector/pgvector:pg16
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// DIRECT_URL=postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5433/hivegrid pnpm exec prisma db push
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// RLS_TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5433/hivegrid pnpm vitest run rls-file-isolation
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const ADMIN_URL = process.env.RLS_TEST_DATABASE_URL;
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const APP_ROLE = "hivegrid_app";
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const APP_PASSWORD = "hivegrid_app_pw";
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function appUrlFrom(adminUrl: string): string {
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const url = new URL(adminUrl);
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url.username = APP_ROLE;
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url.password = APP_PASSWORD;
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return url.toString();
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}
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const describeIfDb = ADMIN_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
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describeIfDb("File RLS tenant isolation gate proof (File, FileEntityLink)", () => {
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let admin: pg.Client;
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let app: pg.Client;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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admin = new pg.Client({ connectionString: ADMIN_URL });
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await admin.connect();
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// 1) Base RLS mechanic + restricted role (creates hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS).
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const baseSql = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
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await admin.query(baseSql);
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// 2) File RLS block: ENABLE/FORCE + tenant_isolation policy + GRANTs on the
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// four Files tables (the deferred P5 activation artifact, applied here).
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const fileRlsSql = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/file-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
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await admin.query(fileRlsSql);
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await admin.query(`GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE ${new URL(ADMIN_URL!).pathname.slice(1)} TO ${APP_ROLE}`);
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// 3) Seed two tenants' files + links as superuser (bypasses RLS). File has no
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// FK on tenantId/createdByUserId, so no User/Tenant rows are required.
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await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "File"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","createdByUserId","displayName","mimeType","sizeBytes","storageKey") VALUES
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('rls_fileA',now(),'rls_tenantA','rls_userA','a.txt','text/plain',1,'tenants/rls_tenantA/files/rls_fileA/original'),
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('rls_fileB',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_userB','b.txt','text/plain',1,'tenants/rls_tenantB/files/rls_fileB/original')
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ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
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await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "FileEntityLink"(id,"tenantId","createdByUserId","fileId","entityType","entityId") VALUES
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('rls_linkA','rls_tenantA','rls_userA','rls_fileA','contact','rls_c1'),
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('rls_linkB','rls_tenantB','rls_userB','rls_fileB','contact','rls_c2')
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ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
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app = new pg.Client({ connectionString: appUrlFrom(ADMIN_URL!) });
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await app.connect();
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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await app?.end();
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await admin?.end();
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});
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async function underTenant<T>(tenantId: string, run: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
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await app.query("BEGIN");
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try {
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await app.query("SELECT set_config('app.tenant_id', $1, true)", [tenantId]);
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const result = await run();
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await app.query("COMMIT");
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return result;
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} catch (error) {
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await app.query("ROLLBACK");
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throw error;
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}
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}
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it("confirms the app role is neither superuser nor BYPASSRLS", async () => {
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const { rows } = await admin.query(`SELECT rolsuper, rolbypassrls FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = $1`, [APP_ROLE]);
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expect(rows[0]).toMatchObject({ rolsuper: false, rolbypassrls: false });
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});
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it("under tenant A context, only tenant A files are visible", async () => {
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const ids = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "File" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map((r) => r.id));
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expect(ids).toEqual(["rls_fileA"]);
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});
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it("cannot read another tenant's file even with an explicit WHERE filter", async () => {
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const count = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "File" WHERE "tenantId" = 'rls_tenantB'`)).rows[0].c);
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expect(count).toBe(0);
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});
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it("sees no files at all when no tenant context is set", async () => {
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const count = (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "File"`)).rows[0].c;
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expect(count).toBe(0);
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});
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it("WITH CHECK blocks inserting a file for a foreign tenant", async () => {
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await expect(
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underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () =>
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app.query(
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`INSERT INTO "File"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","createdByUserId","displayName","mimeType","sizeBytes","storageKey")
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VALUES ('rls_fileX',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_userB','x.txt','text/plain',1,'tenants/rls_tenantB/files/rls_fileX/original')`,
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),
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),
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).rejects.toThrow(/row-level security/i);
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});
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it("allows inserting and reading a file for the active tenant", async () => {
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await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => {
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await app.query(
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`INSERT INTO "File"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","createdByUserId","displayName","mimeType","sizeBytes","storageKey")
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VALUES ('rls_fileA2',now(),'rls_tenantA','rls_userA','a2.txt','text/plain',1,'tenants/rls_tenantA/files/rls_fileA2/original')
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ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`,
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);
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const ids = (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "File" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map((r) => r.id);
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expect(ids).toContain("rls_fileA2");
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expect(ids).not.toContain("rls_fileB");
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});
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});
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it("isolates FileEntityLink rows by tenant as well", async () => {
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const ids = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "FileEntityLink" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map((r) => r.id));
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expect(ids).toEqual(["rls_linkA"]);
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const crossCount = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "FileEntityLink" WHERE "tenantId" = 'rls_tenantB'`)).rows[0].c);
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expect(crossCount).toBe(0);
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});
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});
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