Track HiveGrid Cloud planning reference
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// @vitest-environment node
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import fs from "node:fs";
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import path from "node:path";
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import pg from "pg";
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import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
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// R-P2b — RLS-GATE-BEWEIS (AD-1): belegt gegen eine echte Postgres, dass mandantenuebergreifender
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// Zugriff DB-seitig verhindert ist. Laeuft NUR, wenn RLS_TEST_DATABASE_URL gesetzt ist (Superuser-
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// Verbindung zu einer Wegwerf-DB mit dem gepushten Schema). Ohne die Variable wird der Block
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// uebersprungen, damit die normale Unit-Suite ohne DB gruen bleibt.
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//
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// Setup:
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// docker run -d --name hg-rls-pg -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=postgres -e POSTGRES_DB=hivegrid -p 5433:5432 pgvector/pgvector:pg16
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// DIRECT_URL=postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5433/hivegrid pnpm exec prisma db push
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// RLS_TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5433/hivegrid pnpm vitest run rls-tenant-isolation
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const ADMIN_URL = process.env.RLS_TEST_DATABASE_URL;
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const APP_ROLE = "hivegrid_app";
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const APP_PASSWORD = "hivegrid_app_pw";
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function appUrlFrom(adminUrl: string): string {
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const url = new URL(adminUrl);
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url.username = APP_ROLE;
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url.password = APP_PASSWORD;
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return url.toString();
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}
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const describeIfDb = ADMIN_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
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describeIfDb("RLS tenant isolation gate proof (TenantUser)", () => {
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let admin: pg.Client;
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let app: pg.Client;
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beforeAll(async () => {
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admin = new pg.Client({ connectionString: ADMIN_URL });
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await admin.connect();
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// 1) RLS-Mechanik + restricted Rolle + Policy aus dem committeten SQL anwenden (idempotent).
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const rlsSql = fs.readFileSync(path.resolve(process.cwd(), "prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
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await admin.query(rlsSql);
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await admin.query(`GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE ${new URL(ADMIN_URL!).pathname.slice(1)} TO ${APP_ROLE}`);
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// 2) Zwei Tenants + User + Memberships seeden (als Superuser -> bypasst RLS).
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await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "Tenant"(id,"updatedAt",slug,name) VALUES
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('rls_tenantA',now(),'rls-a','A'),('rls_tenantB',now(),'rls-b','B') ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
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await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "User"(id,"updatedAt",email,"firstName","lastName") VALUES
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('rls_userA',now(),'rls-a@example.test','A','A'),('rls_userB',now(),'rls-b@example.test','B','B') ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
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await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "TenantUser"(id,"tenantId","userId",type,joined,status) VALUES
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('rls_tuA','rls_tenantA','rls_userA',0,0,0),('rls_tuB','rls_tenantB','rls_userB',0,0,0) ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
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app = new pg.Client({ connectionString: appUrlFrom(ADMIN_URL!) });
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await app.connect();
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});
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afterAll(async () => {
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await app?.end();
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await admin?.end();
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});
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async function underTenant<T>(tenantId: string, run: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
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await app.query("BEGIN");
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try {
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await app.query("SELECT set_config('app.tenant_id', $1, true)", [tenantId]);
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const result = await run();
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await app.query("COMMIT");
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return result;
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} catch (error) {
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await app.query("ROLLBACK");
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throw error;
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}
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}
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it("confirms the app role is neither superuser nor BYPASSRLS", async () => {
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const { rows } = await admin.query(`SELECT rolsuper, rolbypassrls FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = $1`, [APP_ROLE]);
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expect(rows[0]).toMatchObject({ rolsuper: false, rolbypassrls: false });
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});
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it("under tenant A context, only tenant A rows are visible", async () => {
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const ids = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "TenantUser" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map((r) => r.id));
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expect(ids).toEqual(["rls_tuA"]);
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});
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it("cannot read another tenant's rows even with an explicit WHERE filter", async () => {
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const count = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "TenantUser" WHERE "tenantId" = 'rls_tenantB'`)).rows[0].c);
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expect(count).toBe(0);
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});
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it("sees no rows at all when no tenant context is set", async () => {
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const count = (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "TenantUser"`)).rows[0].c;
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expect(count).toBe(0);
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});
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it("WITH CHECK blocks inserting a row for a foreign tenant", async () => {
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await expect(
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underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () =>
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app.query(`INSERT INTO "TenantUser"(id,"tenantId","userId",type,joined,status) VALUES ('rls_tuX','rls_tenantB','rls_userB',0,0,0)`)
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)
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).rejects.toThrow(/row-level security/i);
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});
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it("allows inserting and reading a row for the active tenant", async () => {
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await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => {
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await app.query(`INSERT INTO "TenantUser"(id,"tenantId","userId",type,joined,status) VALUES ('rls_tuA2','rls_tenantA','rls_userA',0,0,0) ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
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const ids = (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "TenantUser" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map((r) => r.id);
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expect(ids).toContain("rls_tuA2");
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expect(ids).not.toContain("rls_tuB");
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});
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});
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});
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