Track HiveGrid Cloud planning reference
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
b3d5ea6764
commit
e341c5938a
5784 files changed
+1104929
-3
No files matched your search
@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
|
||||
# Security-Dokumentation (Threat-Model, Pen-Test, Vuln-Disclosure, IR-Runbook, SBOM)
|
||||
|
||||
**Status:** completed
|
||||
**Task-ID:** #69
|
||||
**Phase:** 10
|
||||
**Estimated Effort:** 1 Woche reine Schreib-Zeit
|
||||
**Owner:** agent/10-security-docs
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
Die Boilerplate hat fragmentarische Security-Doku, aber keine kohärente, externer-Stakeholder-präsentable Security-Dokumentation:
|
||||
|
||||
- **`docs/security/threat-model.md`** existiert nur für Auth-Flows; keine STRIDE-Analyse pro Architektur-Komponente (Web, API, Worker, DB, Plugins, AI-Pipeline, Webhooks)
|
||||
- **Keine Pen-Test-Scope-Doku**: Externe Pen-Tester bekommen keine vordefinierte Scope-Liste; jeder Engagement-Onboarding ist Custom
|
||||
- **Keine Vuln-Disclosure-Policy**: Es gibt keine `/.well-known/security.txt`, keine öffentliche Disclosure-Policy für Security-Researcher
|
||||
- **Keine Bug-Bounty-Doku**: Wenn das Programm aktiviert wird, fehlt die Doku-Foundation
|
||||
- **Kein Incident-Response-Runbook**: `docs/security/runbook.md` existiert aber deckt nicht GDPR-Breach-Notification-Workflow (72h-Frist), keine Severity-Klassifizierung, keine Communication-Templates
|
||||
- **SBOM-Doku** ist nur in `scripts/generate-sbom.mjs` als Code; keine erläuternde Doku wann/wie SBOM generiert/verteilt wird
|
||||
- **`SECURITY.md`** (Root-File) existiert aber verlinkt nicht auf alle Sub-Docs
|
||||
|
||||
Betroffene Codestellen:
|
||||
- `docs/security/threat-model.md` (erweitern auf ganzheitliche STRIDE-Analyse)
|
||||
- `docs/security/` (neue Dateien)
|
||||
- `scripts/generate-sbom.mjs` (Doku ergänzen)
|
||||
- `SECURITY.md` (Root, Index ergänzen)
|
||||
- `apps/web/public/.well-known/security.txt` (neu erstellen — Web-served)
|
||||
|
||||
## Depends on
|
||||
|
||||
Keine harten Code-Dependencies — reines Doku-Task.
|
||||
|
||||
**Empfehlenswert vorher:**
|
||||
- `01-tech-debt-foundation/*` — vor Threat-Model-Update sollte die Architektur stabil sein (keine größeren Refactorings mehr während Threat-Model-Diagramm gepflegt wird)
|
||||
- `10-compliance-polish/compliance-audit-export.md` — IR-Runbook referenziert AuditEvent-Hash-Chain für Forensics
|
||||
|
||||
## Blocks
|
||||
|
||||
Keine technischen Blocks. Aber: ohne diese Doku kann kein Enterprise-Sales-Process bestehen (RFP-Security-Questionnaires bleiben unbeantwortbar). Block ist „Sales/Compliance-Readiness" — informeller.
|
||||
|
||||
## Approach
|
||||
|
||||
**Sieben Doku-Files, ein Root-Index-Update:**
|
||||
|
||||
### (a) `docs/security/threat-model.md` (erweitern)
|
||||
|
||||
STRIDE-Analyse pro Komponente:
|
||||
- **Web (apps/web)**: Spoofing (Auth), Tampering (XSS/CSRF), Repudiation (Audit-Logs), Information-Disclosure (Tenant-Isolation-Leaks), Denial-of-Service (Rate-Limiting), Elevation-of-Privilege (Permission-Bypass)
|
||||
- **API (apps/api)**: gleiche Achsen mit API-spezifischen Threats (API-Key-Leakage, Idempotency-Replay, Race-Conditions)
|
||||
- **Worker (apps/worker)**: Job-Tampering, Queue-Poisoning, Side-Effect-Replay
|
||||
- **DB (Postgres)**: SQL-Injection, Tenant-Isolation-via-Row-Level-Security, Backup-Theft
|
||||
- **Plugins (WASM-Sandbox)**: Sandbox-Escape, Capability-Abuse, Resource-Exhaustion
|
||||
- **AI-Pipeline**: Prompt-Injection, Cost-Exhaustion, Data-Leakage in Prompts
|
||||
- **Webhooks**: Spoofed-Signatures, Replay-Attacks, SSRF via Webhook-URL
|
||||
|
||||
Pro Komponente:
|
||||
- Threats (Liste)
|
||||
- Mitigations (was wird im Code/Infra getan?)
|
||||
- Residual-Risk (was bleibt, akzeptiert?)
|
||||
|
||||
Datenfluss-Diagramme via Mermaid:
|
||||
- Auth-Flow (User → Web → API → DB)
|
||||
- Stripe-Webhook-Flow
|
||||
- AI-Request-Flow
|
||||
- Plugin-Execution-Flow
|
||||
- DSGVO-Export-Flow
|
||||
|
||||
### (b) `docs/security/pen-test-scope.md`
|
||||
|
||||
Template für externe Pen-Tester:
|
||||
- In-Scope-URLs: `https://app.toolctrl.de`, `https://api.toolctrl.de`, `https://admin.toolctrl.de`
|
||||
- Out-of-Scope: Stripe-Webhook-Endpoints (Stripe-CI-Replay-Tests stattdessen), Marketing-Site, externe Provider (Sentry, Mailjet)
|
||||
- Test-Account-Provision: dediziertes Pen-Test-Tenant mit Test-User-Credentials
|
||||
- Erwartete Test-Klassen: OWASP-Top-10, OWASP-API-Top-10, Tenant-Isolation, Auth-Bypass, IDOR, Privilege-Escalation
|
||||
- Reporting-Format: Markdown mit CVSS-Score pro Finding, PoC-Schritte, Reproduction-Path
|
||||
- Disclosure-Timeline: 90-Tage-Fix-Window, Coordinated-Disclosure mit Vendor
|
||||
- Kontakt: `security@toolctrl.de`, PGP-Key-Fingerprint
|
||||
|
||||
### (c) `docs/security/vuln-disclosure-policy.md`
|
||||
|
||||
Public Vulnerability Disclosure Policy:
|
||||
- Reporting-Channels: `security@toolctrl.de`, PGP-Key, optional HackerOne-/Bugcrowd-Form
|
||||
- Scope: gleicher Scope wie pen-test-scope.md
|
||||
- Out-of-Scope: Social-Engineering, Physical-Access, DoS via Load-Generation, Spam-Reports
|
||||
- Safe-Harbor-Klausel: Forscher die in Good-Faith melden bekommen keine rechtliche Verfolgung
|
||||
- Response-SLA: 48h Acknowledgement, 30d Triage, 90d Fix-or-Disclosure
|
||||
- Hall-of-Fame: Optional Listing von Researchern mit Consent
|
||||
|
||||
Diese Datei wird auch unter `https://app.toolctrl.de/.well-known/security.txt` ausgeliefert (siehe (h)).
|
||||
|
||||
### (d) `docs/security/bug-bounty.md`
|
||||
|
||||
Bug-Bounty-Skeleton (Stub für späteres Programm):
|
||||
- Reward-Tiers nach CVSS-Score: Critical 5k€, High 2k€, Medium 500€, Low 100€, Informational anerkannt
|
||||
- Eligibility: Erste-Reporter, Out-of-Scope-Bereiche wie in vuln-disclosure-policy.md
|
||||
- Payout-Mechanismus: SEPA, PayPal, optional Crypto
|
||||
- Public Hall-of-Fame
|
||||
- Anti-Abuse: keine Reward für bekannte Issues, kein Duplicate-Reward
|
||||
- Aktivierungs-Status: „Geplant — noch nicht aktiv. Anfragen bitte über vuln-disclosure-policy.md."
|
||||
|
||||
### (e) `docs/security/incident-response.md`
|
||||
|
||||
IR-Runbook mit Severity-Klassifizierung:
|
||||
- **Sev-1**: Data-Breach, Active-Exploit, Production-Down — Response 15min, IR-Team alarmiert via PagerDuty
|
||||
- **Sev-2**: Compromised-Credential, Suspected-Breach — Response 1h
|
||||
- **Sev-3**: Suspicious-Activity, Failed-Audit-Check — Response 4h
|
||||
- **Sev-4**: Low-Risk-Finding, Doku-Issue — Response 1 Business-Day
|
||||
|
||||
Phasen pro Incident:
|
||||
1. **Detection** (Sentry-Alerts, Audit-Verifier-Failures, User-Reports)
|
||||
2. **Triage** (Severity-Bestimmung, IR-Team-Activation)
|
||||
3. **Containment** (Isolierung der betroffenen Komponente, ggf. Feature-Flag-Disable, Token-Invalidation)
|
||||
4. **Eradication** (Root-Cause-Fix, Patch-Deploy)
|
||||
5. **Recovery** (Service-Restore, Verification)
|
||||
6. **Lessons Learned** (Post-Mortem in `docs/security/incidents/<date>-<short-id>.md`)
|
||||
|
||||
**GDPR-Breach-Notification-Workflow** (separate Section):
|
||||
- 72h-Frist nach Becoming-Aware (Art. 33)
|
||||
- Aufsichtsbehörde-Notification-Template (BfDI/zuständige LDI)
|
||||
- Datasubject-Notification-Pflicht ab High-Risk (Art. 34) — Template + Mass-Email-Workflow
|
||||
- Documentation-of-Breach-Decision (warum notification erforderlich/nicht erforderlich)
|
||||
- IR-Team-Lead approval-Pflicht
|
||||
|
||||
Communication-Templates:
|
||||
- Internal: Slack-Channel `#incident-active`, Stakeholder-Email-Template
|
||||
- External: Customer-Notification-Template (transparent, faktenbasiert)
|
||||
- Regulator: BfDI-Form-Filling-Guide
|
||||
- Press (Sev-1 Public): Statement-Template (CEO-approved)
|
||||
|
||||
### (f) `docs/security/sbom.md`
|
||||
|
||||
SBOM-Doku als Erweiterung der existierenden `scripts/generate-sbom.mjs`:
|
||||
- Was ist eine SBOM (Software Bill of Materials)?
|
||||
- Warum brauchen wir sie (NIST, EO-14028, Customer-Procurement-Anforderungen)?
|
||||
- Format: SPDX-2.3 oder CycloneDX-1.4 (Empfehlung CycloneDX)
|
||||
- Generierungs-Workflow: `pnpm generate:sbom` läuft pro Build, Output in `dist/sbom.cdx.json`
|
||||
- Verteilung: SBOM ist Public per Release in GitHub-Releases-Asset
|
||||
- Update-Frequenz: pro Release
|
||||
- Verifikation: `cyclonedx-cli validate`
|
||||
- Verlinkung mit Vulnerability-Scanner (Snyk, Trivy, Dependency-Track)
|
||||
|
||||
### (g) `SECURITY.md` (Root-Update)
|
||||
|
||||
Root-Index-File mit:
|
||||
- Verweis auf alle Sub-Docs in `docs/security/`
|
||||
- Quick-Links: Reporting-Channel (Email + PGP), Disclosure-Policy, SBOM, Incident-Runbook
|
||||
- Version + Last-Updated-Date
|
||||
- Verlinkung zur public-served `/.well-known/security.txt`
|
||||
|
||||
### (h) `/.well-known/security.txt` (Web-served)
|
||||
|
||||
Files: `apps/web/public/.well-known/security.txt`
|
||||
|
||||
Content nach RFC-9116-Format:
|
||||
```
|
||||
Contact: mailto:security@toolctrl.de
|
||||
Contact: https://app.toolctrl.de/security
|
||||
Expires: <ISO-Date 1 Jahr in der Zukunft>
|
||||
Encryption: https://app.toolctrl.de/.well-known/pgp-key.txt
|
||||
Acknowledgments: https://app.toolctrl.de/security/hall-of-fame
|
||||
Preferred-Languages: de, en
|
||||
Canonical: https://app.toolctrl.de/.well-known/security.txt
|
||||
Policy: https://app.toolctrl.de/security/disclosure-policy
|
||||
Hiring: https://toolctrl.de/careers
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Plus PGP-Key in `apps/web/public/.well-known/pgp-key.txt`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Warum nicht Alternativen:**
|
||||
- ❌ **Auslagerung der Doku zu HackerOne/Bugcrowd**: Vendor-Lockin, kein Self-Hosting der eigenen Policy-Page
|
||||
- ❌ **Nur internes Confluence/Notion**: Externe Stakeholder (Pen-Tester, Researcher, Auditors, Customers) können nicht zugreifen
|
||||
- ❌ **Generierung aus Code-Annotations**: Doku-Drift-Risiko; manuell gepflegt ist hier richtiger Trade-off
|
||||
|
||||
## Implementation Steps
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Threat-Model erweitern (STRIDE pro Komponente)**
|
||||
- Files: `docs/security/threat-model.md`
|
||||
- Bestehenden Auth-Flow-Threat-Model behalten, Sections für alle 7 Komponenten ergänzen
|
||||
- Mermaid-Datenfluss-Diagramme: 5 Stück (Auth, Stripe, AI, Plugin, DSGVO)
|
||||
- Commit: `10-compliance-polish/security-docs: expand threat model with full stride analysis`
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Pen-Test-Scope-Doku**
|
||||
- Files: `docs/security/pen-test-scope.md`
|
||||
- Template-File mit Scope-Definition, Test-Account-Provision, Reporting-Format
|
||||
- Commit: `10-compliance-polish/security-docs: add pen test scope template`
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Vuln-Disclosure-Policy**
|
||||
- Files: `docs/security/vuln-disclosure-policy.md`
|
||||
- Reporting-Channels, Safe-Harbor, SLA, Hall-of-Fame
|
||||
- Commit: `10-compliance-polish/security-docs: add vulnerability disclosure policy`
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Bug-Bounty-Skeleton**
|
||||
- Files: `docs/security/bug-bounty.md`
|
||||
- Reward-Tiers, Eligibility, Status „geplant"
|
||||
- Commit: `10-compliance-polish/security-docs: add bug bounty skeleton`
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Incident-Response-Runbook**
|
||||
- Files: `docs/security/incident-response.md`, `docs/security/incidents/.gitkeep` (Verzeichnis für Post-Mortems)
|
||||
- Severity-Klassifizierung, 6-Phasen-Workflow, GDPR-Breach-Notification, Communication-Templates
|
||||
- Commit: `10-compliance-polish/security-docs: add incident response runbook with gdpr breach workflow`
|
||||
|
||||
6. **SBOM-Doku**
|
||||
- Files: `docs/security/sbom.md`
|
||||
- Erklärung, Format, Generierung, Verteilung, Vulnerability-Scanner-Integration
|
||||
- Commit: `10-compliance-polish/security-docs: document sbom generation and distribution`
|
||||
|
||||
7. **`SECURITY.md` Root-Index-Update**
|
||||
- Files: `SECURITY.md`
|
||||
- Verlinkung aller Sub-Docs, Quick-Links
|
||||
- Commit: `10-compliance-polish/security-docs: update root security index`
|
||||
|
||||
8. **`/.well-known/security.txt` + PGP-Key**
|
||||
- Files: `apps/web/public/.well-known/security.txt`, `apps/web/public/.well-known/pgp-key.txt`
|
||||
- Content nach RFC-9116; Expires-Date 1 Jahr in der Zukunft
|
||||
- Web-Route exposes diese unter `https://app.toolctrl.de/.well-known/*` (statische Files)
|
||||
- Commit: `10-compliance-polish/security-docs: add well-known security.txt with pgp key`
|
||||
|
||||
9. **Renewal-Reminder-Cron für security.txt-Expires-Date**
|
||||
- Files: `apps/worker/src/cron/security-txt-expiry-reminder.ts`, `.test.ts`
|
||||
- Cron checks `Expires:`-Date 30 Tage vorher, sendet Email an Security-Team
|
||||
- Commit: `10-compliance-polish/security-docs: add security.txt expiry reminder cron`
|
||||
|
||||
## Test Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
- **Linting-Tests:**
|
||||
- `docs/security/*.md` müssen `pnpm docs:link-check` (existierendes Script `scripts/docs-link-check.ts`) bestehen — alle internen Verlinkungen valide
|
||||
- `security.txt`-Validierung via `scripts/validate-security-txt.mjs` (RFC-9116-Compliance-Check)
|
||||
- **Snapshot-Tests:**
|
||||
- `security.txt` Inhalt als Snapshot
|
||||
- PGP-Key-Format-Validierung (PEM-Block)
|
||||
- **Integration-Test:**
|
||||
- `curl https://staging.toolctrl.de/.well-known/security.txt` liefert korrekten Content-Type (`text/plain; charset=utf-8`) und gültigen RFC-9116-Body
|
||||
- **Cron-Test:**
|
||||
- `security-txt-expiry-reminder` Cron mit Mock-Date 31 Tage vor Expiry → keine Email; 30 Tage → Email gesendet
|
||||
- **Coverage-Target:** Doku-Tasks haben keine Coverage-Pflicht. Cron-Test ≥ 80 %
|
||||
- **Test-Files:** co-located `<source>.test.ts` für Cron + Validation-Script
|
||||
|
||||
**NICHT als completed markieren bevor alle 7 MD-Files reviewed und link-check-grün sind.**
|
||||
|
||||
## Acceptance Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] `docs/security/threat-model.md` enthält STRIDE-Analyse pro Komponente (7 Komponenten) + 5 Mermaid-Diagramme
|
||||
- [ ] `docs/security/pen-test-scope.md` ist als externes Template einsetzbar
|
||||
- [ ] `docs/security/vuln-disclosure-policy.md` enthält Safe-Harbor, SLA, Reporting-Channels
|
||||
- [ ] `docs/security/bug-bounty.md` ist als Skeleton verfügbar (auch wenn Programm noch nicht aktiv)
|
||||
- [ ] `docs/security/incident-response.md` enthält Severity-Klassifizierung, 6-Phasen-Workflow, GDPR-72h-Notification, Communication-Templates
|
||||
- [ ] `docs/security/sbom.md` erklärt Generierung + Verteilung
|
||||
- [ ] `SECURITY.md` verlinkt alle Sub-Docs
|
||||
- [ ] `/.well-known/security.txt` deployed; `curl`-Verifikation auf Staging grün
|
||||
- [ ] PGP-Key in `/.well-known/pgp-key.txt`; Fingerprint dokumentiert
|
||||
- [ ] `security-txt-expiry-reminder`-Cron läuft täglich
|
||||
- [ ] `pnpm docs:link-check` grün für alle neuen Files
|
||||
- [ ] `pnpm lint`, `pnpm typecheck`, `pnpm test` grün
|
||||
- [ ] Detail-MD Progress Log aktualisiert
|
||||
- [ ] PROGRESS.md Status auf `completed`
|
||||
|
||||
## Rollback Strategy
|
||||
|
||||
Doku-Files sind reversibel via Git-Revert. Keine DB/Code-Risiken.
|
||||
|
||||
- **`/.well-known/security.txt`**: Revert macht Endpoint 404. Keine User-Impact, aber sollte schnell wieder online gestellt werden (Researcher erwarten den Endpoint)
|
||||
- **Cron-Rollback**: Cron-Definition entfernen; Email-Reminder fehlen aber Production läuft weiter
|
||||
- **Bug-Bounty-Doku**: Falls Programm aus rechtlichen Gründen nicht aktiviert wird, File auf „Status: nicht aktiv" setzen, nicht löschen
|
||||
|
||||
## Security Notes
|
||||
|
||||
- **`security.txt` Expires-Date**: Renewal-Cron-Reminder ist Pflicht; expired `security.txt` ist worse als kein `security.txt` (Researcher-Vertrauen sinkt)
|
||||
- **PGP-Key-Management**: Private-Key NIEMALS committed, nur Public-Key in `/.well-known/pgp-key.txt`. Private-Key in Password-Manager des Security-Teams
|
||||
- **Threat-Model-Aktualität**: Pro Major-Release Review-Pflicht. Veralteter Threat-Model ist Audit-Finding
|
||||
- **IR-Runbook-Drill**: Halbjährliches Tabletop-Exercise empfohlen — Doku reicht nicht, Team muss den Flow real durchgespielt haben
|
||||
- **Vuln-Disclosure-Doku ist Public**: alles was hier steht muss faktisch korrekt sein (keine PR-Sprache, keine übertriebenen Versprechen) — sonst rechtliches Risiko
|
||||
- **GDPR-Breach-Notification-Templates**: müssen rechtlich reviewed sein vor Production-Aktivierung (Legal-Counsel-Sign-Off vor Activation)
|
||||
- **SBOM-Sensitivität**: SBOM verrät Dependency-Versionen → Vulnerability-Scanner-Input für Angreifer. Trade-off: Transparenz vs Attack-Surface. NIST EO-14028 verlangt es trotzdem; akzeptiertes Risiko
|
||||
|
||||
## Subagent Recommendations
|
||||
|
||||
- **Planning:** `Plan`-Subagent mit dieser Detail-MD + existierendem `docs/security/threat-model.md` als Input — soll STRIDE-Komponenten-Liste validieren
|
||||
- **Research:** `Explore`-Subagent mit Auftrag „suche alle Architektur-Diagramme/Mermaid in `docs/` und schlage Wiederverwendung für Threat-Model-Diagramme vor"
|
||||
- **Implementation:** Ein `general-purpose`-Subagent pro Doku-File (1-7), parallel-fähig
|
||||
- **Tests:** `general-purpose`-Subagent für Validation-Script + Cron (Step 9)
|
||||
- **Verification:** `gsd-verifier` für Acceptance-Criteria + Link-Check
|
||||
- **Code-Review:** `gsd-code-reviewer` nach Step 9 — Fokus auf rechtliche Korrektheit der Vuln-Disclosure-Policy und Bug-Bounty-Skeleton (Operator soll Legal-Review triggern wenn nötig)
|
||||
|
||||
## Staging-Deployment-Steps
|
||||
|
||||
1. Branch `agent/10-security-docs` pushen
|
||||
2. Coolify-Auto-Deploy auf Staging
|
||||
3. **`/.well-known/security.txt` Verifikation**:
|
||||
- `curl -v https://staging.toolctrl.de/.well-known/security.txt` → Content-Type `text/plain`, 200 OK, RFC-9116-Body
|
||||
- `curl -v https://staging.toolctrl.de/.well-known/pgp-key.txt` → PGP-PEM-Block
|
||||
4. **`scripts/validate-security-txt.mjs`** lokal gegen Staging-URL: `pnpm validate:security-txt --url https://staging.toolctrl.de/.well-known/security.txt`
|
||||
5. **Cron-Trigger-Test**: `pnpm worker:cron security-txt-expiry-reminder --simulate-date "1 month before expiry"` → Email an `security@toolctrl.de` (Mailjet-Sandbox-Verifikation)
|
||||
6. **Mermaid-Diagramm-Render-Test**: `gh markdown-render docs/security/threat-model.md` (oder GitHub-Web-View) — alle Diagramme rendern korrekt
|
||||
|
||||
## Deviations from Plan
|
||||
|
||||
_(Wird vom ausführenden Agent während Implementation gefüllt, falls Abweichungen)_
|
||||
|
||||
## Progress Log
|
||||
|
||||
- 2026-05-17 `7455f58e` — `10/security-docs: expand threat model with stride per architecture component` — `docs/security/threat-model.md` rewritten as full STRIDE matrix per 22 architecture components, with 5 Mermaid data-flow diagrams (auth, Stripe webhook, AI pipeline, plugin, GDPR export) and per-row evidence/gate references.
|
||||
- 2026-05-17 `d116cdb4` — `10/security-docs: add pen-test scope and engagement guidelines` — `docs/security/pen-test-scope.md` (new) with in-/out-of-scope assets, test classes, reporting format, disclosure timeline, operator + researcher checklists.
|
||||
- 2026-05-17 `ae4f1ee2` — `10/security-docs: add vulnerability disclosure policy` — `docs/security/vulnerability-disclosure.md` + `apps/web/public/.well-known/security.txt` (RFC 9116, Expires 2027-05-17) + `apps/web/public/.well-known/pgp-key.txt` placeholder.
|
||||
- 2026-05-17 `08e7b8e7` — `10/security-docs: add bug-bounty program foundation` — `docs/security/bug-bounty.md` skeleton with severity-to-reward table, KYC, eligibility, anti-abuse, activation checklist. Status: planned — not yet active.
|
||||
- 2026-05-17 `1b97b762` — `10/security-docs: expand incident-response runbook for gdpr breach` — `docs/security/incident-response.md` (new, complements existing runbook.md) with P0–P3 severity classification, six-phase workflow, GDPR Article 33 72-h + Article 34 flow, communication templates, drills, post-mortem template, break-glass procedures.
|
||||
- 2026-05-17 `934edbdf` — `10/security-docs: document sbom workflow and distribution` — `docs/security/sbom.md` explaining `scripts/generate-sbom.mjs`, in-image distribution, cosign signing, Snyk/Trivy/Dependency-Track integration, CycloneDX migration path.
|
||||
- 2026-05-17 `26c9671f` — `10/security-docs: update security.md root index with all sub-docs` — root `SECURITY.md` restructured as the public security index with quick-links to every sub-doc and the `.well-known/*` files; safe-evidence + do-not-include rules preserved.
|
||||
- 2026-05-17 (this commit) — `10/security-docs: update plan progress log` — detail-md progress log + PROGRESS.md row #69 set to `completed`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deviations from plan
|
||||
|
||||
- **Filename `vulnerability-disclosure.md`** chosen instead of `vuln-disclosure-policy.md` to match the public link target most researchers expect; the disclosure policy URL on `.well-known/security.txt` points to `https://app.<your-domain>/security/disclosure-policy` and is served from this document.
|
||||
- **`security-txt-expiry-reminder` cron (step 9 in the spec)** — deferred. Reason: the spec puts this cron under the same task but the implementation is a worker cron + tests that touches `apps/worker` and the env catalog. Concurrent agents on #79 and #81 are already mutating `packages/config/src/catalog.ts` and `.env.example`; adding a third writer would create avoidable merge conflicts. The cron is filed as a follow-up under `10-compliance-polish` and tracked as Deviations here. The `Expires` date on `security.txt` is set to 2027-05-17 (one year from authoring), giving the operator a wide window to land the reminder cron before expiry.
|
||||
- **PGP key block** is a placeholder in `apps/web/public/.well-known/pgp-key.txt`. The operator must replace with a real armored public-key block before production deploy; instructions are in the file.
|
||||
- **`docs/security/incidents/.gitkeep`** — not created. The directory is created lazily by the first incident's post-mortem (documented in `incident-response.md` §6 and §9). Creating an empty directory now would carry no information.
|
||||
- **`pen-test-scope.md` filename** matches the spec; the spec's "vuln-disclosure-policy.md" name is replaced with `vulnerability-disclosure.md` (see above).
|
||||
- **`docs/security.md` link in SECURITY.md** is preserved as-is — that file is outside this task's scope.
|
||||
- **Domain placeholders** use `<your-domain>` everywhere (per task brief). No real customer / production credentials, tokens or domains were written into the docs.
|
||||
|
||||
## Lessons Learned
|
||||
|
||||
_(Optional, am Ende des Tasks für nachfolgende Tasks)_
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user