Track HiveGrid Cloud planning reference
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# BLOCKERS
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> **READINESS_AUTHORITY: non-authoritative blocker register.** This file is a
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> narrow list of unresolved external/operator risks and is not the deploy
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> readiness source of truth. The canonical readiness source is
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> `docs/improvement-plan/OPERATOR-CHECKLIST.md`; feature/runtime truth remains
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> in the linked feature docs, manifests, and runbooks.
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**Live external/operator blocker register.** Keep only unresolved risks here.
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Resolved incident details are intentionally not kept in this live file; use git
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history for forensic archaeology and the canonical feature/runbook docs for
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current runtime truth.
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## Active Blockers
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### B-006 — External Security Review of WASM Sandbox
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**Status:** waiting-for-operator-procurement
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**Owner:** operator/external security reviewer
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**Blocks:** production rollout of third-party plugin execution.
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The plugin runtime foundation has internal tests and production fail-closed
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gates, but production enablement remains blocked until an external security firm
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reviews the WASM sandbox and capability gateway.
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Review scope:
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- Sandbox-escape resistance
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- Capability-gateway tampering resistance
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- Ed25519 signature trust model
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- Crash-tracker bypass scenarios
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- Audit-log tamper-evidence
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Staging/foundation use is allowed behind `PLUGIN_RUNTIME_PRODUCTION_ENABLED=false`.
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Production signoff must happen through
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`docs/security/plugin-runtime-signoff.md`; current implementation truth lives in
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`docs/features/plugins.md`, `docs/operations/plugin-lifecycle.md`, and
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`docs/security/plugin-internal-findings.md`.
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Next operator step: procure the review, file findings under
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`docs/improvement-plan/06-plugin-system/security-findings/`, address all
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Critical/High findings, then record final signoff in the security runbook.
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## Unresolved Risks
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### B-012 — Gitea-runner Docker `default-address-pool` recurrence risk
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**Status:** mitigated-now-but-recurs-without-config-change
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**Owner:** operator
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**Blocks:** no active deploy; future push-to-main deploys can be blocked if
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self-hosted runner Docker networks leak again.
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The self-hosted Gitea Actions runner previously exhausted Docker's default
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address pool after leaked per-job networks accumulated beside long-lived service
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networks. A one-time prune restored deploy workflow execution, but recurrence
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remains possible until the runner host is hardened.
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Permanent operator actions:
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1. Enlarge Docker `default-address-pools` on the runner host and restart Docker
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during a maintenance window.
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2. Add scheduled cleanup for orphaned Gitea Actions task networks.
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3. Consider moving CI runners to dedicated infrastructure so CI network churn
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cannot contend with long-lived service stacks.
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Repo-side support already exists through deploy and Docker baseline checks:
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`pnpm run verify:deploy-workflow` and `pnpm run verify:docker-baseline`.
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## Resolved
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Resolved entries were removed from this live register on 2026-05-28 to avoid
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stale operational claims and sensitive incident residue. Canonical current docs:
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- `docs/improvement-plan/OPERATOR-CHECKLIST.md`
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- `docs/features/plugins.md`
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- `docs/operations/plugin-lifecycle.md`
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- `docs/ops/worker-queues.md`
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- `docs/architecture/csrf.md`
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- `docs/observability/sentry-selfhost.md`
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- `docs/ops/stripe-meters-migration.md`
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