-- AK-P14a · P14 Email foundation — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration) -- ============================================================================= -- Companion to hr-isolation.sql / crypto-isolation.sql / task-isolation.sql. The -- AK-P14a tables + enums + indexes ship in the tracked merge migration -- (prisma/migrations/_p14a_email_foundation, created at main-merge per AD-21). -- What lives in THIS file is the Row-Level-Security block, DELIBERATELY kept out -- of the auto-migration path: enabling RLS + FORCE before every access sets the -- GUC would make queries return ZERO rows, so activation is a coordinated cutover -- (R-P2b's org-wide P5 RLS cutover), not a schema diff. -- -- SCOPE: only the genuinely new, ALWAYS-tenant tables get policies here: -- AK-P14a: TenantSendingDomain, EmailSuppressionList, EmailTemplate. -- AK-P14b: RecipientSegment, SegmentSnapshotMember, CampaignVariant, -- KontaktMarketingConsent, Unsubscribe. -- The pre-existing boilerplate email tables (EmailSender / Campaign / -- OutboundEmail) carry a NULLABLE tenantId (global/operator sender) and predate -- this ticket; retrofitting RLS onto them is out of AK-P14a scope. -- -- CODE-SIDE PRECONDITIONS — DONE (AK-P14a): -- 1. [x] Every AK-P14a web/worker service runs every DB op for these tables -- inside withTenantRLS() (emailDomainService / suppression paths). -- The app-level scoping (where: { tenantId }) carries isolation until cutover. -- -- WHAT REMAINS — "Teil B" = the org-wide P5 RLS cutover (Raffael / R-P2b): -- a. Ship this block as its own forward-only migration. -- b. Switch the runtime DB connection to the restricted role `hivegrid_app` -- (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS); otherwise FORCE is a no-op for a superuser and -- an empty-read trap for a non-superuser owner. The GRANTs below cover it. -- c. Staging cutover + live cross-tenant 404 verification. -- -- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment per block. Order-dependent DDL is -- DO-guarded (P3018 protection: reproducible from an empty DB). Idempotent. -- ============================================================================= -- Row-level security on all AK-P14a tenant-scoped email tables ---------------- -- Pattern: "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true). The second -- argument `true` returns NULL instead of erroring when the GUC is not (yet) set -- — the policy then matches nothing (fail-closed). -- -- Inverse per table: -- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "" FROM hivegrid_app; -- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "_tenant_isolation" ON ""; -- ALTER TABLE "" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY; -- ALTER TABLE "" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY; DO $$ DECLARE tbl text; BEGIN FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[ 'TenantSendingDomain', 'EmailSuppressionList', 'EmailTemplate', -- AK-P14b — email marketing tables (always tenant-scoped). 'RecipientSegment', 'SegmentSnapshotMember', 'CampaignVariant', 'KontaktMarketingConsent', 'Unsubscribe' ] LOOP EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl); -- FORCE so the table owner is subject to the policies too (otherwise the -- owner silently bypasses RLS). EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl); IF NOT EXISTS ( SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies WHERE schemaname = current_schema() AND tablename = tbl AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation' ) THEN EXECUTE format( 'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));', tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl ); END IF; -- The restricted app role (R-P2b's hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS) needs table -- privileges to reach the rows the policy then filters. EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl); END LOOP; END $$; -- ============================================================================= -- Verify green before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma): -- pnpm prisma validate -- pnpm prisma migrate status -- CI: `prisma migrate deploy` against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch). -- Coordination: align ordering with R-P2b — P2 ships withTenantRLS() -- (SET LOCAL app.tenant_id); without a tenant context the policies match nothing -- (no data leak, just empty results) until the runtime role is hivegrid_app. -- =============================================================================