-- AK-P17a · P17 HR-Hub core — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration) -- ============================================================================= -- Companion to R-P2b's prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql, AK-P4a's -- prisma/rls/file-isolation.sql and AK-P4b's prisma/rls/task-isolation.sql. The -- HR tables + enums + indexes ship in the tracked merge migration -- (prisma/migrations/_p17a_hr_core, created at main-merge per AD-21). What -- lives in THIS file is the Row-Level-Security block, DELIBERATELY kept out of -- the auto-migration path (same stance as task-isolation.sql): turning RLS on -- before every access sets the GUC would break the feature, so activation is a -- coordinated cutover, not a schema diff. -- -- WHY DEFERRED: enabling RLS + FORCE makes every HR query WITHOUT `app.tenant_id` -- return ZERO rows. Per R-P2b's rule a table may only be RLS-enabled once ALL its -- accesses set the GUC. The app-level scoping (where: { tenantId }) carries -- isolation meanwhile. -- -- CODE-SIDE PRECONDITIONS — DONE (AK-P17a): -- 1. [x] Every HR web service runs every DB op inside withTenantRLS() -- (apps/web/app/utils/integrations/hr*Service.server.ts). Internal -- composition reuses the active transaction client via *WithTx helpers; -- functions never nest withTenantRLS(). The only unwrapped access is the -- GLOBAL User lookup (display-name resolution): User is not -- tenant-scoped, so it stays on the db singleton. -- Proven by apps/web/app/utils/db/.server/rls-hr-isolation.integration.test.ts -- (own-tenant only, 0 cross-tenant, 0 without context, WITH CHECK blocks -- foreign insert). -- -- WHAT REMAINS — "Teil B" = the org-wide P5 RLS cutover (Raffael / R-P2b): -- a. Ship this block as its own forward-only migration. -- b. Switch the runtime DB connection to the restricted role `hivegrid_app` -- (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS); otherwise FORCE is a no-op for a superuser and -- an empty-read trap for a non-superuser owner. The GRANTs below already -- cover that role for the HR tables. -- c. Staging cutover + live cross-tenant 404 verification. -- -- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment per block. Order-dependent DDL is -- DO-guarded (P3018 protection: reproducible from an empty DB). Idempotent. -- ============================================================================= -- Row-level security on all tenant-scoped HR tables --------------------------- -- Pattern: tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true). The second -- argument `true` returns NULL instead of erroring when the GUC is not (yet) set -- — the policy then matches nothing (fail-closed), and server-side scoping stays -- the hard path until the cutover. -- -- Inverse per table: -- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "" FROM hivegrid_app; -- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "_tenant_isolation" ON ""; -- ALTER TABLE "" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY; -- ALTER TABLE "" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY; DO $$ DECLARE tbl text; BEGIN FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[ 'HrEmployeeProfile', 'HrLocation', 'HrEmployeeDocument', 'HrResource', 'HrQuickLink', 'EmployeePasswordSafeVault', 'EmployeePasswordSafeEntry', 'EmployeePasswordSafeAccess', -- AK-P17b workflow tables 'EmployeeVacationRequest', 'EmployeeSickLeaveReport', 'HrAnnouncement', 'HrAnnouncementRead', 'HrAnnouncementReaction', 'HrAnnouncementComment', 'EmployeePayslip', 'EmployeeUploadReminder', 'EmployeeUploadReminderDispatch', 'HrRequestTemplate', 'HrRequest', 'HrSurvey', 'HrSurveyItem', 'HrSurveySubmission' ] LOOP EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl); -- FORCE so the table owner is subject to the policies too (otherwise the -- owner silently bypasses RLS). EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl); IF NOT EXISTS ( SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies WHERE schemaname = current_schema() AND tablename = tbl AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation' ) THEN EXECUTE format( 'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));', tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl ); END IF; -- The restricted app role (R-P2b's hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS) needs table -- privileges to reach the rows the policy then filters. EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl); END LOOP; END $$; -- ============================================================================= -- Verify green before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma): -- pnpm prisma validate -- pnpm prisma migrate status -- CI: `prisma migrate deploy` against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch, -- no order dependency on Raffael's P2 migration). -- Coordination: align ordering with R-P2b — P2 ships withTenantRLS() -- (SET LOCAL app.tenant_id); without a tenant context the policies match nothing -- (no data leak, just empty results) until the runtime role is hivegrid_app. -- =============================================================================