-- AK-P16b · P16 Booking — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration) -- ============================================================================= -- Companion to calendar-isolation.sql / email-isolation.sql / apps-engine-isolation.sql. -- The AK-P16b tables + enums + indexes ship in the tracked merge migration -- (prisma/migrations/_p16b_booking, created at main-merge per AD-21). What -- lives in THIS file is the Row-Level-Security block, DELIBERATELY kept out of the -- auto-migration path: enabling RLS + FORCE before every access sets the GUC would -- make queries return ZERO rows, so activation is a coordinated cutover (R-P2b's -- org-wide P5 RLS cutover), not a schema diff. -- -- SCOPE: every AK-P16b table is ALWAYS tenant-scoped, so all get policies here: -- BookingPage, BookingPageProvider, AvailabilityRule, AvailabilityException, -- Appointment. -- NOTE on per-user owner-filtering (bookings.read_own): RLS isolates by TENANT. The -- stronger per-USER ownership rule (read_own users see only their own appointments, -- providerUserId = self) is enforced in the service layer (bookingAccess.server.ts -- owner-check + where: { providerUserId }). -- -- CODE-SIDE PRECONDITIONS — DONE (AK-P16b): -- 1. [x] Every AK-P16b web service runs each DB op for these tables inside -- withTenantRLS() (booking submit/admin/lifecycle paths). The public -- booking flow resolves the tenant from the {tenant} URL segment first. -- The app-level scoping (where: { tenantId, ... }) carries isolation until cutover. -- -- WHAT REMAINS — "Teil B" = the org-wide P5 RLS cutover (Raffael / R-P2b): -- a. Ship this block as its own forward-only migration. -- b. Switch the runtime DB connection to the restricted role `hivegrid_app` -- (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS); otherwise FORCE is a no-op for a superuser and -- an empty-read trap for a non-superuser owner. The GRANTs below cover it. -- c. Staging cutover + live cross-tenant 404 verification. -- -- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment per block. Order-dependent DDL is -- DO-guarded (P3018 protection: reproducible from an empty DB). Idempotent. -- ============================================================================= -- Row-level security on all AK-P16b tenant-scoped booking tables --------------- -- Pattern: "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true). The second -- argument `true` returns NULL instead of erroring when the GUC is not (yet) set -- — the policy then matches nothing (fail-closed). -- -- Inverse per table: -- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "" FROM hivegrid_app; -- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "_tenant_isolation" ON ""; -- ALTER TABLE "" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY; -- ALTER TABLE "" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY; DO $$ DECLARE tbl text; BEGIN FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[ 'BookingPage', 'BookingPageProvider', 'AvailabilityRule', 'AvailabilityException', 'Appointment' ] LOOP EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl); -- FORCE so the table owner is subject to the policies too (otherwise the -- owner silently bypasses RLS). EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl); IF NOT EXISTS ( SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies WHERE schemaname = current_schema() AND tablename = tbl AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation' ) THEN EXECUTE format( 'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));', tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl ); END IF; -- The restricted app role (R-P2b's hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS) needs table -- privileges to reach the rows the policy then filters. EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl); END LOOP; END $$; -- ============================================================================= -- Verify green before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma): -- pnpm prisma validate -- pnpm prisma migrate status -- CI: `prisma migrate deploy` against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch). -- Coordination: align ordering with R-P2b — P2 ships withTenantRLS() -- (SET LOCAL app.tenant_id); without a tenant context the policies match nothing -- (no data leak, just empty results) until the runtime role is hivegrid_app. -- =============================================================================