# BLOCKERS > **READINESS_AUTHORITY: non-authoritative blocker register.** This file is a > narrow list of unresolved external/operator risks and is not the deploy > readiness source of truth. The canonical readiness source is > `docs/improvement-plan/OPERATOR-CHECKLIST.md`; feature/runtime truth remains > in the linked feature docs, manifests, and runbooks. **Live external/operator blocker register.** Keep only unresolved risks here. Resolved incident details are intentionally not kept in this live file; use git history for forensic archaeology and the canonical feature/runbook docs for current runtime truth. ## Active Blockers ### B-006 — External Security Review of WASM Sandbox **Status:** waiting-for-operator-procurement **Owner:** operator/external security reviewer **Blocks:** production rollout of third-party plugin execution. The plugin runtime foundation has internal tests and production fail-closed gates, but production enablement remains blocked until an external security firm reviews the WASM sandbox and capability gateway. Review scope: - Sandbox-escape resistance - Capability-gateway tampering resistance - Ed25519 signature trust model - Crash-tracker bypass scenarios - Audit-log tamper-evidence Staging/foundation use is allowed behind `PLUGIN_RUNTIME_PRODUCTION_ENABLED=false`. Production signoff must happen through `docs/security/plugin-runtime-signoff.md`; current implementation truth lives in `docs/features/plugins.md`, `docs/operations/plugin-lifecycle.md`, and `docs/security/plugin-internal-findings.md`. Next operator step: procure the review, file findings under `docs/improvement-plan/06-plugin-system/security-findings/`, address all Critical/High findings, then record final signoff in the security runbook. ## Unresolved Risks ### B-012 — Gitea-runner Docker `default-address-pool` recurrence risk **Status:** mitigated-now-but-recurs-without-config-change **Owner:** operator **Blocks:** no active deploy; future push-to-main deploys can be blocked if self-hosted runner Docker networks leak again. The self-hosted Gitea Actions runner previously exhausted Docker's default address pool after leaked per-job networks accumulated beside long-lived service networks. A one-time prune restored deploy workflow execution, but recurrence remains possible until the runner host is hardened. Permanent operator actions: 1. Enlarge Docker `default-address-pools` on the runner host and restart Docker during a maintenance window. 2. Add scheduled cleanup for orphaned Gitea Actions task networks. 3. Consider moving CI runners to dedicated infrastructure so CI network churn cannot contend with long-lived service stacks. Repo-side support already exists through deploy and Docker baseline checks: `pnpm run verify:deploy-workflow` and `pnpm run verify:docker-baseline`. ## Resolved Resolved entries were removed from this live register on 2026-05-28 to avoid stale operational claims and sensitive incident residue. Canonical current docs: - `docs/improvement-plan/OPERATOR-CHECKLIST.md` - `docs/features/plugins.md` - `docs/operations/plugin-lifecycle.md` - `docs/ops/worker-queues.md` - `docs/architecture/csrf.md` - `docs/observability/sentry-selfhost.md` - `docs/ops/stripe-meters-migration.md`