import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; import { DeletionTokenSecretMissingError, signDeletionToken, verifyDeletionToken, } from "./deletionToken.server"; const TEST_SECRET = "x".repeat(48); describe("deletionToken", () => { const originalDeletion = process.env.DELETION_TOKEN_SECRET; const originalSession = process.env.SESSION_SECRET; beforeEach(() => { process.env.DELETION_TOKEN_SECRET = TEST_SECRET; delete process.env.SESSION_SECRET; }); afterEach(() => { if (originalDeletion === undefined) delete process.env.DELETION_TOKEN_SECRET; else process.env.DELETION_TOKEN_SECRET = originalDeletion; if (originalSession === undefined) delete process.env.SESSION_SECRET; else process.env.SESSION_SECRET = originalSession; }); it("sign + verify roundtrip returns userId and requestedAt", () => { const requestedAt = new Date("2026-05-17T12:00:00Z"); const tok = signDeletionToken({ userId: "user_1", requestedAt }); const decoded = verifyDeletionToken(tok); expect(decoded).not.toBeNull(); expect(decoded?.userId).toBe("user_1"); expect(decoded?.requestedAt).toBe(Math.floor(requestedAt.getTime() / 1000)); }); it("defaults to 24-hour TTL", () => { const fixedNow = () => new Date("2026-05-17T00:00:00Z"); const tok = signDeletionToken({ userId: "user_1", now: fixedNow }); const decoded = verifyDeletionToken(tok, { now: fixedNow }); expect(decoded).not.toBeNull(); expect((decoded!.exp - decoded!.iat) / (60 * 60)).toBeCloseTo(24); }); it("clamps TTL to max 72 hours", () => { const fixedNow = () => new Date("2026-05-17T00:00:00Z"); const tok = signDeletionToken({ userId: "user_1", expiresInHours: 9999, now: fixedNow }); const decoded = verifyDeletionToken(tok, { now: fixedNow }); expect(decoded).not.toBeNull(); expect((decoded!.exp - decoded!.iat) / (60 * 60)).toBeLessThanOrEqual(72); }); it("returns null for expired tokens", () => { const past = () => new Date("2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"); const future = () => new Date("2026-12-31T00:00:00Z"); const tok = signDeletionToken({ userId: "user_1", expiresInHours: 1, now: past }); expect(verifyDeletionToken(tok, { now: future })).toBeNull(); }); it("returns null for tampered payload", () => { const tok = signDeletionToken({ userId: "user_1" }); const [v, _p, s] = tok.split("."); const tampered = Buffer.from( JSON.stringify({ userId: "user_hijack", requestedAt: 0, iat: 0, exp: 2 ** 31 - 1 }), "utf8", ).toString("base64url"); expect(verifyDeletionToken(`${v}.${tampered}.${s}`)).toBeNull(); }); it("returns null for tampered signature", () => { const tok = signDeletionToken({ userId: "user_1" }); const [v, p] = tok.split("."); const badSig = Buffer.alloc(32, 0).toString("base64url"); expect(verifyDeletionToken(`${v}.${p}.${badSig}`)).toBeNull(); }); it("returns null for wrong version prefix", () => { const tok = signDeletionToken({ userId: "user_1" }); const [, p, s] = tok.split("."); expect(verifyDeletionToken(`v1.${p}.${s}`)).toBeNull(); }); it("returns null for malformed tokens", () => { expect(verifyDeletionToken("")).toBeNull(); expect(verifyDeletionToken(null)).toBeNull(); expect(verifyDeletionToken(undefined)).toBeNull(); expect(verifyDeletionToken("not.a.token.extrapart")).toBeNull(); expect(verifyDeletionToken("dsgvo1.@@@.bad")).toBeNull(); }); it("throws when neither DELETION_TOKEN_SECRET nor SESSION_SECRET is set", () => { delete process.env.DELETION_TOKEN_SECRET; delete process.env.SESSION_SECRET; expect(() => signDeletionToken({ userId: "user_1" })).toThrow(DeletionTokenSecretMissingError); }); it("throws when configured secret is shorter than 32 chars", () => { process.env.DELETION_TOKEN_SECRET = "too-short"; expect(() => signDeletionToken({ userId: "user_1" })).toThrow(DeletionTokenSecretMissingError); }); it("falls back to SESSION_SECRET when DELETION_TOKEN_SECRET is unset", () => { delete process.env.DELETION_TOKEN_SECRET; process.env.SESSION_SECRET = "s".repeat(48); const tok = signDeletionToken({ userId: "user_1" }); expect(verifyDeletionToken(tok)?.userId).toBe("user_1"); }); it("verify returns null when secret env is missing", () => { const tok = signDeletionToken({ userId: "user_1", secret: TEST_SECRET }); delete process.env.DELETION_TOKEN_SECRET; delete process.env.SESSION_SECRET; expect(verifyDeletionToken(tok)).toBeNull(); }); it("rejects empty userId on sign", () => { expect(() => signDeletionToken({ userId: "" })).toThrow(TypeError); }); it("rotation: token signed with secret-A fails verify under secret-B", () => { const secretA = "a".repeat(48); const secretB = "b".repeat(48); const tok = signDeletionToken({ userId: "user_1", secret: secretA }); expect(verifyDeletionToken(tok, { secret: secretB })).toBeNull(); expect(verifyDeletionToken(tok, { secret: secretA })?.userId).toBe("user_1"); }); it("rejects lead-token format (cross-system isolation)", () => { // A v1 lead-token shape must NOT verify under dsgvo1. const leadShape = "v1." + Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ userId: "u", iat: 0, exp: 2 ** 31 - 1 }), "utf8").toString("base64url") + ".AAAA"; expect(verifyDeletionToken(leadShape)).toBeNull(); }); });