import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest"; import { createHmac } from "node:crypto"; import { signUnsubscribeToken, verifyUnsubscribeToken } from "./unsubscribe-token.js"; const SECRET = "0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"; const TOKEN_VERSION = "u1"; /** * Forge a token whose signature is valid for `SECRET` but whose payload * bytes are attacker-chosen. This lets us probe the verifier's post- * signature payload validation (JSON parse, shape + field-type guards) * without relying on the well-behaved `signUnsubscribeToken` serializer. */ function forgeSignedToken(rawPayload: string, secret = SECRET): string { const payloadB64 = Buffer.from(rawPayload, "utf8").toString("base64url"); const sig = createHmac("sha256", Buffer.from(secret, "utf8")) .update(`${TOKEN_VERSION}.${payloadB64}`) .digest() .toString("base64url"); return `${TOKEN_VERSION}.${payloadB64}.${sig}`; } describe("verifyUnsubscribeToken — malformed signed payloads", () => { it("rejects a structurally invalid token (wrong part count)", () => { expect(verifyUnsubscribeToken("u1.onlytwo", { secret: SECRET })).toBeNull(); expect(verifyUnsubscribeToken("a.b.c.d", { secret: SECRET })).toBeNull(); }); it("rejects a token whose signature uses non-base64url characters", () => { const valid = signUnsubscribeToken({ runId: "run_1", secret: SECRET }); const parts = valid.split("."); const badSig = `${parts[0]}.${parts[1]}.not*valid*sig`; expect(verifyUnsubscribeToken(badSig, { secret: SECRET })).toBeNull(); }); it("rejects a correctly-signed but non-JSON payload", () => { const token = forgeSignedToken("definitely-not-json{"); expect(verifyUnsubscribeToken(token, { secret: SECRET })).toBeNull(); }); it("rejects a correctly-signed payload that is valid JSON but not an object", () => { expect(verifyUnsubscribeToken(forgeSignedToken("123"), { secret: SECRET })).toBeNull(); expect(verifyUnsubscribeToken(forgeSignedToken("null"), { secret: SECRET })).toBeNull(); expect(verifyUnsubscribeToken(forgeSignedToken('"a string"'), { secret: SECRET })).toBeNull(); }); it("rejects a correctly-signed object payload missing a runId", () => { expect(verifyUnsubscribeToken(forgeSignedToken("{}"), { secret: SECRET })).toBeNull(); expect( verifyUnsubscribeToken(forgeSignedToken(JSON.stringify({ runId: "" })), { secret: SECRET }) ).toBeNull(); }); it("normalises wrongly-typed leadId / tenantId / iat to null / 0 defaults", () => { const token = forgeSignedToken( JSON.stringify({ runId: "run_x", leadId: 5, tenantId: true, iat: "nope" }) ); expect(verifyUnsubscribeToken(token, { secret: SECRET })).toEqual({ runId: "run_x", leadId: null, tenantId: null, iat: 0, }); }); it("defaults absent optional fields when only runId is present", () => { const token = forgeSignedToken(JSON.stringify({ runId: "run_y" })); expect(verifyUnsubscribeToken(token, { secret: SECRET })).toEqual({ runId: "run_y", leadId: null, tenantId: null, iat: 0, }); }); it("does not honour a forged payload signed with a different secret", () => { const token = forgeSignedToken(JSON.stringify({ runId: "run_z" }), "f".repeat(64)); expect(verifyUnsubscribeToken(token, { secret: SECRET })).toBeNull(); }); });