Files
HiveGrid-Wireframes/03 Quellen und Referenzen/hivegrid-cloud/apps/web/app/utils/db/.server/rls-email-inbox-isolation.integration.test.ts
T

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TypeScript

// @vitest-environment node
import fs from "node:fs";
import path from "node:path";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import pg from "pg";
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
// Resolve the repo root from this file's location so the SQL artifacts load
// regardless of the cwd vitest runs under (root vs the @hivegrid/web package dir).
// This file lives at apps/web/app/utils/db/.server/ → six segments below root.
const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../../../../../..");
// VA-P23 — EMAIL-INBOX RLS GATE PROOF. Companion to rls-file-isolation: proves
// that once the email-inbox RLS block (prisma/rls/email-inbox-isolation.sql) is
// applied, the restricted hivegrid_app role (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS) is
// confined to its own tenant's EmailIntegrationMailbox / -Message rows, sees
// nothing without a tenant context, and is blocked by WITH CHECK from writing
// cross-tenant rows. This makes the P5 activation a pure switch: the wrapped
// emailInbox db layer already runs inside withTenantRLS().
//
// Runs ONLY when RLS_TEST_DATABASE_URL is set (a SUPERUSER connection to a
// throwaway DB with the schema pushed). Without it the block is skipped so the
// normal unit suite stays green without a DB.
//
// Setup:
// docker run -d --name hg-rls-pg -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=postgres -e POSTGRES_DB=hivegrid -p 5433:5432 pgvector/pgvector:pg16
// DIRECT_URL=postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5433/hivegrid pnpm exec prisma db push
// RLS_TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5433/hivegrid pnpm vitest run rls-email-inbox-isolation
const ADMIN_URL = process.env.RLS_TEST_DATABASE_URL;
const APP_ROLE = "hivegrid_app";
const APP_PASSWORD = "hivegrid_app_pw";
function appUrlFrom(adminUrl: string): string {
const url = new URL(adminUrl);
url.username = APP_ROLE;
url.password = APP_PASSWORD;
return url.toString();
}
const describeIfDb = ADMIN_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
describeIfDb("Email-inbox RLS tenant isolation gate proof (EmailIntegrationMailbox, EmailIntegrationMessage)", () => {
let admin: pg.Client;
let app: pg.Client;
beforeAll(async () => {
admin = new pg.Client({ connectionString: ADMIN_URL });
await admin.connect();
// 1) Base RLS mechanic + restricted role (creates hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS).
const baseSql = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
await admin.query(baseSql);
// Production credentials are intentionally not part of the rollout SQL.
// Set a disposable password only inside this throwaway integration database.
await admin.query(`ALTER ROLE ${APP_ROLE} PASSWORD '${APP_PASSWORD}'`);
// 2) Email-inbox RLS block: ENABLE/FORCE + tenant_isolation policy + GRANTs
// on the four VA-P23 tables (the deferred P5 activation artifact).
const emailInboxRlsSql = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/email-inbox-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
await admin.query(emailInboxRlsSql);
await admin.query(`GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE ${new URL(ADMIN_URL!).pathname.slice(1)} TO ${APP_ROLE}`);
// 3) Seed two tenants' mailboxes + messages as superuser (bypasses RLS).
// Mailbox has no FK on tenantId/ownerUserId, so no User/Tenant rows needed.
await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "EmailIntegrationMailbox"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","ownerUserId",provider,"emailAddress","externalAccountId") VALUES
('rls_mboxA',now(),'rls_tenantA','rls_userA','gmail','a@example.com','extA'),
('rls_mboxB',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_userB','microsoft','b@example.com','extB')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "EmailIntegrationMessage"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","mailboxId","providerMessageId",direction,"fromAddress","sentAt") VALUES
('rls_msgA',now(),'rls_tenantA','rls_mboxA','pmA','inbound','x@example.com',now()),
('rls_msgB',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_mboxB','pmB','inbound','y@example.com',now())
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
app = new pg.Client({ connectionString: appUrlFrom(ADMIN_URL!) });
await app.connect();
});
afterAll(async () => {
await app?.end();
await admin?.end();
});
async function underTenant<T>(tenantId: string, run: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
await app.query("BEGIN");
try {
await app.query("SELECT set_config('app.tenant_id', $1, true)", [tenantId]);
const result = await run();
await app.query("COMMIT");
return result;
} catch (error) {
await app.query("ROLLBACK");
throw error;
}
}
it("confirms the app role is neither superuser nor BYPASSRLS", async () => {
const { rows } = await admin.query(`SELECT rolsuper, rolbypassrls FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = $1`, [APP_ROLE]);
expect(rows[0]).toMatchObject({ rolsuper: false, rolbypassrls: false });
});
it("under tenant A context, only tenant A mailboxes are visible", async () => {
const ids = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "EmailIntegrationMailbox" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map((r) => r.id));
expect(ids).toEqual(["rls_mboxA"]);
});
it("cannot read another tenant's messages even with an explicit WHERE filter", async () => {
const count = await underTenant(
"rls_tenantA",
async () => (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "EmailIntegrationMessage" WHERE "tenantId" = 'rls_tenantB'`)).rows[0].c,
);
expect(count).toBe(0);
});
it("sees no mailboxes at all when no tenant context is set", async () => {
const count = (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "EmailIntegrationMailbox"`)).rows[0].c;
expect(count).toBe(0);
});
it("WITH CHECK blocks inserting a message for a foreign tenant", async () => {
await expect(
underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () =>
app.query(
`INSERT INTO "EmailIntegrationMessage"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","mailboxId","providerMessageId",direction,"fromAddress","sentAt")
VALUES ('rls_msgX',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_mboxB','pmX','inbound','z@example.com',now())`,
),
),
).rejects.toThrow(/row-level security/i);
});
it("allows inserting and reading a message for the active tenant", async () => {
await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => {
await app.query(
`INSERT INTO "EmailIntegrationMessage"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","mailboxId","providerMessageId",direction,"fromAddress","sentAt")
VALUES ('rls_msgA2',now(),'rls_tenantA','rls_mboxA','pmA2','outbound','a@example.com',now())
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`,
);
const ids = (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "EmailIntegrationMessage" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map((r) => r.id);
expect(ids).toContain("rls_msgA2");
expect(ids).not.toContain("rls_msgB");
});
});
it("isolates sync cursors and webhook events by tenant as well", async () => {
await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "EmailIntegrationSyncCursor"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","mailboxId","externalFolderId") VALUES
('rls_curA',now(),'rls_tenantA','rls_mboxA','*'),
('rls_curB',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_mboxB','inbox')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "EmailIntegrationWebhookEvent"(id,"tenantId","mailboxId",provider,"notificationPayload") VALUES
('rls_whA','rls_tenantA','rls_mboxA','gmail','{}'),
('rls_whB','rls_tenantB','rls_mboxB','microsoft','{}')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
const cursorIds = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "EmailIntegrationSyncCursor" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map((r) => r.id));
expect(cursorIds).toEqual(["rls_curA"]);
const eventIds = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "EmailIntegrationWebhookEvent" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map((r) => r.id));
expect(eventIds).toEqual(["rls_whA"]);
});
});