Files
HiveGrid-Wireframes/03 Quellen und Referenzen/hivegrid-cloud/apps/web/app/utils/db/.server/rls-hr-isolation.integration.test.ts
T

219 lines
11 KiB
TypeScript

// @vitest-environment node
import fs from "node:fs";
import path from "node:path";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import pg from "pg";
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
// Resolve the repo root from this file's location so the SQL artifacts load
// regardless of the cwd vitest runs under. This file lives at
// apps/web/app/utils/db/.server/ → six segments below root.
const REPO_ROOT = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../../../../../..");
// AK-P17a — HR RLS GATE PROOF. Companion to the task/file/tenant isolation tests:
// proves that once the HR RLS block (prisma/rls/hr-isolation.sql) is applied, the
// restricted hivegrid_app role (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS) is confined to its own
// tenant's HR rows (including all three password-safe tables), sees
// nothing without a tenant context, and is blocked by WITH CHECK from writing
// cross-tenant rows. This is what makes the P5 activation a pure switch: the
// wrapped hr*Service helpers already set the GUC, so flipping RLS on cannot break
// the module.
//
// Runs ONLY when RLS_TEST_DATABASE_URL is set (a SUPERUSER connection to a
// throwaway DB with the schema pushed). Without it the block is skipped so the
// normal unit suite stays green without a DB.
//
// Setup:
// docker run -d --name hg-rls-pg -e POSTGRES_PASSWORD=postgres -e POSTGRES_DB=hivegrid -p 5433:5432 pgvector/pgvector:pg16
// DIRECT_URL=postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5433/hivegrid pnpm exec prisma db push
// RLS_TEST_DATABASE_URL=postgresql://postgres:postgres@localhost:5433/hivegrid pnpm vitest run rls-hr-isolation
const ADMIN_URL = process.env.RLS_TEST_DATABASE_URL;
const APP_ROLE = "hivegrid_app";
const APP_PASSWORD = "hivegrid_app_pw";
function appUrlFrom(adminUrl: string): string {
const url = new URL(adminUrl);
url.username = APP_ROLE;
url.password = APP_PASSWORD;
return url.toString();
}
const describeIfDb = ADMIN_URL ? describe : describe.skip;
describeIfDb("HR RLS tenant isolation gate proof (HrEmployeeProfile, EmployeePasswordSafeEntry)", () => {
let admin: pg.Client;
let app: pg.Client;
beforeAll(async () => {
admin = new pg.Client({ connectionString: ADMIN_URL });
await admin.connect();
// 1) Base RLS mechanic + restricted role (creates hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS).
const baseSql = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
await admin.query(baseSql);
// Production credentials are intentionally not part of the rollout SQL.
// Set a disposable password only inside this throwaway integration database.
await admin.query(`ALTER ROLE ${APP_ROLE} PASSWORD '${APP_PASSWORD}'`);
// 2) HR RLS block: ENABLE/FORCE + tenant_isolation policy + GRANTs on the HR
// tables (the deferred P5 activation artifact, applied here).
const hrRlsSql = fs.readFileSync(path.join(REPO_ROOT, "prisma/rls/hr-isolation.sql"), "utf8");
await admin.query(hrRlsSql);
await admin.query(`GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE ${new URL(ADMIN_URL!).pathname.slice(1)} TO ${APP_ROLE}`);
// 3) Seed two tenants' HR rows as superuser (bypasses RLS). The HR models use
// bare scalars (AD-21), so no User/Tenant rows are required. The vault is
// seeded for the FK from the entry.
await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "HrEmployeeProfile"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","userId","position") VALUES
('rls_hrpA',now(),'rls_tenantA','rls_userA','Engineer'),
('rls_hrpB',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_userB','Engineer')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "EmployeePasswordSafeVault"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","name","createdByUserId") VALUES
('rls_vaultA',now(),'rls_tenantA','Vault A','rls_userA'),
('rls_vaultB',now(),'rls_tenantB','Vault B','rls_userB')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "EmployeePasswordSafeEntry"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","vaultId","title") VALUES
('rls_entryA',now(),'rls_tenantA','rls_vaultA','Entry A'),
('rls_entryB',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_vaultB','Entry B')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "EmployeePasswordSafeAccess"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","vaultId","userId","permissionLevel","grantedByUserId") VALUES
('rls_accessA',now(),'rls_tenantA','rls_vaultA','rls_userA','admin','rls_userA'),
('rls_accessB',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_vaultB','rls_userB','admin','rls_userB')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "HrAnnouncement"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","authorUserId",title,body,"audienceKind","audienceRef") VALUES
('rls_announcementA',now(),'rls_tenantA','rls_userA','Team A','Body A','team','team-A'),
('rls_announcementB',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_userB','Team B','Body B','team','team-B')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
await admin.query(`INSERT INTO "HrSurvey"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","authorUserId",title,"audienceKind","audienceRef") VALUES
('rls_surveyA',now(),'rls_tenantA','rls_userA','Survey A','location','location-A'),
('rls_surveyB',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_userB','Survey B','location','location-B')
ON CONFLICT (id) DO NOTHING`);
app = new pg.Client({ connectionString: appUrlFrom(ADMIN_URL!) });
await app.connect();
});
afterAll(async () => {
await app?.end();
await admin?.end();
});
async function underTenant<T>(tenantId: string, run: () => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
await app.query("BEGIN");
try {
await app.query("SELECT set_config('app.tenant_id', $1, true)", [tenantId]);
const result = await run();
await app.query("COMMIT");
return result;
} catch (error) {
await app.query("ROLLBACK");
throw error;
}
}
it("confirms the app role is neither superuser nor BYPASSRLS", async () => {
const { rows } = await admin.query(`SELECT rolsuper, rolbypassrls FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = $1`, [APP_ROLE]);
expect(rows[0]).toMatchObject({ rolsuper: false, rolbypassrls: false });
});
it("under tenant A context, only tenant A employee profiles are visible", async () => {
const ids = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "HrEmployeeProfile" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map((r) => r.id));
expect(ids).toEqual(["rls_hrpA"]);
});
it("cannot read another tenant's profile even with an explicit WHERE filter", async () => {
const count = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "HrEmployeeProfile" WHERE "tenantId" = 'rls_tenantB'`)).rows[0].c);
expect(count).toBe(0);
});
it("isolates audience-targeted announcements and surveys before object gates run", async () => {
const visible = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => {
const announcements = (
await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "HrAnnouncement" ORDER BY id`)
).rows.map((row) => row.id);
const surveys = (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "HrSurvey" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map(
(row) => row.id,
);
return { announcements, surveys };
});
expect(visible).toEqual({
announcements: ["rls_announcementA"],
surveys: ["rls_surveyA"],
});
});
it("sees no HR rows at all when no tenant context is set", async () => {
const count = (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "HrEmployeeProfile"`)).rows[0].c;
expect(count).toBe(0);
});
it("WITH CHECK blocks inserting a profile for a foreign tenant", async () => {
await expect(
underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () =>
app.query(`INSERT INTO "HrEmployeeProfile"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","userId") VALUES ('rls_hrpX',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_userB')`),
),
).rejects.toThrow(/row-level security/i);
});
it("isolates password-safe entries by tenant as well", async () => {
const ids = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "EmployeePasswordSafeEntry" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map((r) => r.id));
expect(ids).toEqual(["rls_entryA"]);
const crossCount = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "EmployeePasswordSafeEntry" WHERE "tenantId" = 'rls_tenantB'`)).rows[0].c);
expect(crossCount).toBe(0);
});
it("forces RLS on vault, entry and access rows for the restricted app role", async () => {
const { rows } = await admin.query(`
SELECT relname, relrowsecurity, relforcerowsecurity
FROM pg_class
WHERE relnamespace = 'public'::regnamespace
AND relname IN ('EmployeePasswordSafeAccess', 'EmployeePasswordSafeEntry', 'EmployeePasswordSafeVault')
ORDER BY relname
`);
expect(rows).toHaveLength(3);
expect(rows.every((row) => row.relrowsecurity && row.relforcerowsecurity)).toBe(true);
});
it("isolates vault grants and blocks cross-tenant IDOR writes", async () => {
const visible = await underTenant("rls_tenantA", async () => {
const vaults = (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "EmployeePasswordSafeVault" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map((row) => row.id);
const access = (await app.query(`SELECT id FROM "EmployeePasswordSafeAccess" ORDER BY id`)).rows.map((row) => row.id);
return { vaults, access };
});
expect(visible).toEqual({ vaults: ["rls_vaultA"], access: ["rls_accessA"] });
await expect(
underTenant("rls_tenantA", () =>
app.query(`INSERT INTO "EmployeePasswordSafeAccess"(id,"updatedAt","tenantId","vaultId","userId","permissionLevel","grantedByUserId")
VALUES ('rls_accessX',now(),'rls_tenantB','rls_vaultB','rls_userA','read','rls_userA')`)
)
).rejects.toThrow(/row-level security/i);
});
it("returns no vault, entry or access metadata without a bound tenant", async () => {
for (const table of ["EmployeePasswordSafeVault", "EmployeePasswordSafeEntry", "EmployeePasswordSafeAccess"]) {
const count = (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "${table}"`)).rows[0].c;
expect(count, table).toBe(0);
}
});
it("forces RLS and returns no audience metadata without a bound tenant", async () => {
for (const table of ["HrAnnouncement", "HrSurvey"]) {
const count = (await app.query(`SELECT count(*)::int AS c FROM "${table}"`)).rows[0].c;
expect(count, table).toBe(0);
}
const { rows } = await admin.query(`
SELECT relname, relrowsecurity, relforcerowsecurity
FROM pg_class
WHERE relnamespace = 'public'::regnamespace
AND relname IN ('HrAnnouncement', 'HrSurvey')
ORDER BY relname
`);
expect(rows).toHaveLength(2);
expect(rows.every((row) => row.relrowsecurity && row.relforcerowsecurity)).toBe(true);
});
});