94 lines
4.6 KiB
SQL
94 lines
4.6 KiB
SQL
-- VA-P23 · P23 Postfach-Sync (Gmail/Outlook) — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Companion to calendar-isolation.sql / email-isolation.sql. The VA-P23 tables +
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-- enums + indexes ship in the tracked merge migration (prisma/migrations/<ts>_
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-- p23_email_inbox, created at main-merge per AD-21). What lives in THIS file is
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-- the Row-Level-Security block, DELIBERATELY kept out of the auto-migration path:
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-- enabling RLS + FORCE before every access sets the GUC would make queries return
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-- ZERO rows, so activation is a coordinated cutover (R-P2b's org-wide P5 RLS
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-- cutover), not a schema diff.
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--
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-- SCOPE: every VA-P23 table is ALWAYS tenant-scoped, so all get policies here:
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-- EmailIntegrationMailbox, EmailIntegrationMessage, EmailIntegrationSyncCursor,
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-- EmailIntegrationWebhookEvent.
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-- NOTE on per-user visibility (M09 Block I): RLS isolates by TENANT. The stronger
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-- per-USER rule (email.read_own sees only mailboxes with ownerUserId = self) is
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-- enforced in the service layer (emailInboxAccess.server.ts + where clauses).
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-- The webhook-ingest lookups (mailbox by subscription id / email address) run
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-- WITHOUT a tenant GUC by design (provider pushes carry no tenant) — same
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-- documented exception as the calendar webhook route.
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--
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-- CODE-SIDE PRECONDITIONS — DONE (VA-P23):
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-- 1. [x] Every VA-P23 web/worker service runs each DB op for these tables
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-- inside withTenantRLS() (sync/match/list/send paths), except the two
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-- documented global webhook lookups above.
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-- The app-level scoping (where: { tenantId, ownerUserId }) carries isolation
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-- until cutover.
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--
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-- WHAT REMAINS — "Teil B" = the org-wide P5 RLS cutover (Raffael / R-P2b):
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-- a. Ship this block as its own forward-only migration.
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-- b. Switch the runtime DB connection to the restricted role `hivegrid_app`
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-- (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS); otherwise FORCE is a no-op for a superuser and
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-- an empty-read trap for a non-superuser owner. The GRANTs below cover it.
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-- c. Staging cutover + live cross-tenant 404 verification.
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--
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-- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment per block. Order-dependent DDL is
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-- DO-guarded (P3018 protection: reproducible from an empty DB). Idempotent.
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Row-level security on all VA-P23 tenant-scoped email-inbox tables ------------
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-- Pattern: "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true). The second
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-- argument `true` returns NULL instead of erroring when the GUC is not (yet) set
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-- — the policy then matches nothing (fail-closed).
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--
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-- Inverse per table:
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-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
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-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
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-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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DO $$
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DECLARE
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tbl text;
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BEGIN
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FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
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'EmailIntegrationMailbox',
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'EmailIntegrationMessage',
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'EmailIntegrationSyncCursor',
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'EmailIntegrationWebhookEvent'
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]
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LOOP
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EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
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-- FORCE so the table owner is subject to the policies too (otherwise the
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-- owner silently bypasses RLS).
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EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
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IF NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
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WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
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AND tablename = tbl
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AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
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) THEN
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EXECUTE format(
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'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
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tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
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);
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END IF;
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-- The restricted app role (R-P2b's hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS) needs table
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-- privileges to reach the rows the policy then filters.
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EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
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END LOOP;
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END
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$$;
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Verify green before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma):
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-- pnpm prisma validate
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-- pnpm prisma migrate status
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-- CI: `prisma migrate deploy` against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch).
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-- Coordination: align ordering with R-P2b — P2 ships withTenantRLS()
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-- (SET LOCAL app.tenant_id); without a tenant context the policies match nothing
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-- (no data leak, just empty results) until the runtime role is hivegrid_app.
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-- =============================================================================
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