Files
HiveGrid-Wireframes/03 Quellen und Referenzen/hivegrid-cloud/apps/api/src/auth/login-rate-limit.ts
T

245 lines
8.2 KiB
TypeScript

import { createHmac } from "node:crypto";
import { getTrustedProxyClientIp } from "@hivegrid/foundation/trusted-client-ip";
import { createFixedWindowRateLimiter, type FixedWindowRateLimiter, type SharedStore } from "@hivegrid/shared-store";
import { getApiRuntimeConfig } from "../config.js";
import { getSharedStore } from "../shared-store.js";
export const LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS = 60_000;
export const LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_IP_ATTEMPTS = 10;
export const LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_ACCOUNT_ATTEMPTS = 5;
const LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS = Math.ceil(LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS / 1000);
const UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP = "unknown";
const UNKNOWN_ACCOUNT_KEY = "unknown-account";
const FINGERPRINT_PREFIX = "acct_";
const UNAVAILABLE_ACCOUNT_FINGERPRINT = `${FINGERPRINT_PREFIX}unavailable`;
export type LoginRateLimitScope = "ip" | "account";
export type LoginRateLimitRequest = {
headers?: Headers | Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;
remoteAddress?: string | null;
account?: unknown;
};
export type LoginRateLimitAllowed = {
allowed: true;
clientIp: string;
accountFingerprint: string;
};
export type LoginRateLimitBlocked = {
allowed: false;
scope: LoginRateLimitScope;
retryAfterSeconds: number;
clientIp: string;
accountFingerprint: string;
};
export type LoginRateLimitResult = LoginRateLimitAllowed | LoginRateLimitBlocked;
/**
* Lazy holder around the two fixed-window limiters. Built on first use
* so tests can swap the SharedStore via `__setLoginRateLimitStoreForTests`
* before any limiter is constructed.
*/
type Limiters = {
ip: FixedWindowRateLimiter;
account: FixedWindowRateLimiter;
store: SharedStore;
};
let limiters: Limiters | null = null;
let storeFactory: () => SharedStore = () => getSharedStore();
let keySecretFactory: () => string = defaultKeySecret;
function defaultKeySecret(): string {
const secret = getApiRuntimeConfig().jwtSecret?.trim();
if (!secret) {
throw new Error("API login rate-limit key secret is unavailable.");
}
return secret;
}
function pseudonymousBucketKey(scope: "account" | "ip", value: string): string {
return createHmac("sha256", keySecretFactory()).update(`v1\0${scope}\0${value}`).digest("hex");
}
function getLimiters(): Limiters {
if (limiters !== null) {
return limiters;
}
const store = storeFactory();
limiters = {
store,
ip: createFixedWindowRateLimiter({
store,
prefix: "login-rate-limit:ip",
windowSeconds: LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS,
max: LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_IP_ATTEMPTS,
}),
account: createFixedWindowRateLimiter({
store,
prefix: "login-rate-limit:account",
windowSeconds: LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS,
max: LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_ACCOUNT_ATTEMPTS,
}),
};
return limiters;
}
export async function checkLoginRateLimit(request: LoginRateLimitRequest): Promise<LoginRateLimitResult> {
const clientIp = deriveLoginRateLimitClientIp(request);
const accountKey = normalizeLoginRateLimitAccount(request.account);
try {
const accountFingerprint = createLoginRateLimitAccountFingerprint(accountKey);
const { ip, account } = getLimiters();
// Reserve before the expensive password comparison. Each consume is an
// atomic Lua operation, so a parallel burst cannot send every request
// through bcrypt. HMAC-derived bucket keys keep raw IPs and enumerable
// account identifiers out of Redis. Check IP first so an already-blocked
// source cannot poison arbitrary account buckets without reaching a
// verifier.
const ipReservation = await ip.consume(pseudonymousBucketKey("ip", clientIp));
if (!ipReservation.allowed) {
return {
allowed: false,
scope: "ip",
retryAfterSeconds: retryAfterSeconds(ipReservation.resetAt),
clientIp,
accountFingerprint,
};
}
const accountReservation = await account.consume(pseudonymousBucketKey("account", accountKey));
if (!accountReservation.allowed) {
return {
allowed: false,
scope: "account",
retryAfterSeconds: retryAfterSeconds(accountReservation.resetAt),
clientIp,
accountFingerprint,
};
}
return {
allowed: true,
clientIp,
accountFingerprint,
};
} catch {
// A missing secret or unavailable shared store must not silently remove
// brute-force protection. Return only a fixed non-PII diagnostic marker.
return {
allowed: false,
scope: "ip",
retryAfterSeconds: LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECONDS,
clientIp: UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP,
accountFingerprint: UNAVAILABLE_ACCOUNT_FINGERPRINT,
};
}
}
export async function recordFailedLoginAttempt(request: LoginRateLimitRequest): Promise<void> {
// The attempt was already reserved atomically by checkLoginRateLimit before
// password verification. Keep this compatibility hook while callers migrate;
// consuming again here would double-count every failed password.
void request;
}
export async function recordSuccessfulLogin(request: Pick<LoginRateLimitRequest, "account">): Promise<void> {
const { account } = getLimiters();
await account.reset(pseudonymousBucketKey("account", normalizeLoginRateLimitAccount(request.account)));
}
export async function resetLoginRateLimiterForTests(): Promise<void> {
// Drop any cached limiter pair and best-effort drain any keys the
// previous limiters wrote to the shared-store. Tests that need full
// isolation can also inject a fresh store via
// `__setLoginRateLimitStoreForTests`.
const previous = limiters;
limiters = null;
if (previous) {
try {
for await (const fullKey of previous.store.adapter.scan(`shared-store:${previous.store.namespace}:rl:fixed:login-rate-limit:*`)) {
// adapter keys are absolute (namespace already applied); strip the
// namespace prefix when calling store.del which re-applies it.
const prefix = `shared-store:${previous.store.namespace}:`;
if (fullKey.startsWith(prefix)) {
await previous.store.del(fullKey.slice(prefix.length));
}
}
} catch {
// Best-effort; isolated tests use the store seam instead.
}
}
}
/** Test seam: inject a SharedStore that backs the limiters. */
export function __setLoginRateLimitStoreForTests(store: SharedStore): void {
limiters = null;
storeFactory = () => store;
}
/** Test seam: provide an isolated HMAC key without loading production config. */
export function __setLoginRateLimitKeySecretForTests(secret: string | null): void {
keySecretFactory = () => {
const normalized = secret?.trim();
if (!normalized) throw new Error("API login rate-limit key secret is unavailable.");
return normalized;
};
}
/** Test seam: revert to the default factory (real shared-store singleton). */
export function __resetLoginRateLimitStoreForTests(): void {
limiters = null;
storeFactory = () => getSharedStore();
keySecretFactory = defaultKeySecret;
}
export function deriveLoginRateLimitClientIp(request: Pick<LoginRateLimitRequest, "headers" | "remoteAddress">): string {
return getTrustedProxyClientIp((name) => readHeader(request.headers, name), request.remoteAddress) ?? UNKNOWN_CLIENT_IP;
}
export function createLoginRateLimitAccountFingerprint(account: unknown): string {
const normalized = normalizeLoginRateLimitAccount(account);
const digest = createHmac("sha256", keySecretFactory()).update(`v1\0account-log\0${normalized}`).digest("hex");
return `${FINGERPRINT_PREFIX}${digest.slice(0, 24)}`;
}
function normalizeLoginRateLimitAccount(account: unknown): string {
if (typeof account !== "string") {
return UNKNOWN_ACCOUNT_KEY;
}
const normalized = account.trim().toLowerCase();
return normalized || UNKNOWN_ACCOUNT_KEY;
}
function retryAfterSeconds(resetAt: Date): number {
return Math.max(1, Math.ceil((resetAt.getTime() - Date.now()) / 1000));
}
function readHeader(headers: LoginRateLimitRequest["headers"], name: string): string | undefined {
if (!headers) {
return undefined;
}
if (headers instanceof Headers) {
return headers.get(name) ?? undefined;
}
const lowerName = name.toLowerCase();
for (const [headerName, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {
if (headerName.toLowerCase() !== lowerName) {
continue;
}
return Array.isArray(value) ? value[0] : value;
}
return undefined;
}