102 lines
5.5 KiB
SQL
102 lines
5.5 KiB
SQL
-- AK-P4b · P4 Tasks + EntityLink — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Companion to R-P2b's prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql and AK-P4a's
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-- prisma/rls/file-isolation.sql. The Task / TaskWatcher / EntityLink tables +
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-- enums + indexes + the single-assignee CHECK + the pg_trgm title index ship in
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-- the tracked migration prisma/migrations/<ts>_p4b_tasks_entitylinks. What lives
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-- in THIS file is the Row-Level-Security block, DELIBERATELY kept out of the
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-- auto-migration path (same stance as file-isolation.sql): turning RLS on before
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-- every access sets the GUC would break the feature, so activation is a
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-- coordinated cutover, not a schema diff.
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--
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-- WHY DEFERRED: enabling RLS + FORCE makes every Task/TaskWatcher/EntityLink query
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-- WITHOUT `app.tenant_id` return ZERO rows. Per R-P2b's rule a table may only be
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-- RLS-enabled once ALL its accesses set the GUC. The app-level scoping
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-- (where: { tenantId }) carries isolation meanwhile.
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--
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-- CODE-SIDE PRECONDITIONS — DONE (AK-P4b "Teil A", 2026-06-24):
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-- 1. [x] Task/EntityLink web services run every DB op inside withTenantRLS()
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-- (apps/web/app/utils/integrations/taskService.server.ts,
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-- apps/web/app/utils/integrations/entityLinkService.server.ts).
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-- The only unwrapped access is the GLOBAL User lookup (resolveUserLabels);
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-- User is not tenant-scoped, so it intentionally stays on the db singleton.
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-- 2. [x] Worker maintenance crons set the tenant GUC per tenant: the archive +
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-- reminder sweeps enumerate active tenants from the global Tenant
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-- registry and run the Task/TaskWatcher reads/writes inside
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-- withTenantRLS() (apps/worker/src/handlers.ts via
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-- apps/worker/src/db/tenantRls.ts). notify() runs outside the tx.
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-- Proven by apps/web/app/utils/db/.server/rls-task-isolation.integration.test.ts
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-- (own-tenant only, 0 cross-tenant, 0 without context, WITH CHECK blocks foreign
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-- insert; Task + TaskWatcher + EntityLink).
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--
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-- WHAT REMAINS — "Teil B" = the org-wide P5 RLS cutover (Raffael / R-P2b):
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-- a. Ship this block as its own forward-only migration.
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-- b. Switch the runtime DB connection to the restricted role `hivegrid_app`
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-- (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS); otherwise FORCE is a no-op for a superuser
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-- and an empty-read trap for a non-superuser owner. The GRANTs below already
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-- cover that role for the three Task tables.
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-- c. MAINTENANCE-WORKER NOTE: the cross-tenant archive/reminder sweeps read the
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-- global "Tenant" registry to enumerate tenants. Under hivegrid_app that
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-- needs `GRANT SELECT ON "Tenant" TO hivegrid_app` (the registry holds no
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-- per-tenant payload, only tenant ids/slugs) OR the maintenance worker runs
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-- under a privileged connection. Decide with R-P2b at cutover.
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-- d. Staging cutover + live cross-tenant 404 verification.
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--
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-- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment per block. Order-dependent DDL is
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-- DO-guarded (P3018 protection: reproducible from an empty DB). Idempotent.
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Row-level security on the three Tasks/EntityLink tables ---------------------
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-- Pattern: tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true). The second
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-- argument `true` returns NULL instead of erroring when the GUC is not (yet)
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-- set — the policy then matches nothing (fail-closed), and server-side scoping
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-- stays the hard path until the cutover.
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--
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-- Inverse per table:
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-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
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-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
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-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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DO $$
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DECLARE
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tbl text;
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BEGIN
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FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY['Task', 'TaskWatcher', 'EntityLink']
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LOOP
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EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
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-- FORCE so the table owner is subject to the policies too (otherwise the
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-- owner silently bypasses RLS).
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EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
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IF NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
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WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
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AND tablename = tbl
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AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
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) THEN
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EXECUTE format(
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'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
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tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
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);
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END IF;
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-- The restricted app role (R-P2b's hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS) needs table
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-- privileges to reach the rows the policy then filters. Mirrors the GRANT in
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-- prisma/rls/tenant-isolation.sql for "TenantUser".
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EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
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END LOOP;
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END
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$$;
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Verify green before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma):
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-- pnpm prisma validate
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-- pnpm prisma migrate status
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-- CI: `prisma migrate deploy` against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch,
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-- no order dependency on Raffael's P2 migration).
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-- Coordination: align ordering with R-P2b — P2 ships withTenantRLS()
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-- (SET LOCAL app.tenant_id); without a tenant context the policies match nothing
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-- (no data leak, just empty results) until the runtime role is hivegrid_app.
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-- =============================================================================
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