95 lines
4.5 KiB
SQL
95 lines
4.5 KiB
SQL
-- AK-P14a · P14 Email foundation — RLS ROLLOUT ARTIFACT (deferred, NOT in the auto-migration)
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Companion to hr-isolation.sql / crypto-isolation.sql / task-isolation.sql. The
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-- AK-P14a tables + enums + indexes ship in the tracked merge migration
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-- (prisma/migrations/<ts>_p14a_email_foundation, created at main-merge per AD-21).
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-- What lives in THIS file is the Row-Level-Security block, DELIBERATELY kept out
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-- of the auto-migration path: enabling RLS + FORCE before every access sets the
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-- GUC would make queries return ZERO rows, so activation is a coordinated cutover
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-- (R-P2b's org-wide P5 RLS cutover), not a schema diff.
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--
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-- SCOPE: only the genuinely new, ALWAYS-tenant tables get policies here:
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-- AK-P14a: TenantSendingDomain, EmailSuppressionList, EmailTemplate.
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-- AK-P14b: RecipientSegment, SegmentSnapshotMember, CampaignVariant,
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-- KontaktMarketingConsent, Unsubscribe.
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-- The pre-existing boilerplate email tables (EmailSender / Campaign /
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-- OutboundEmail) carry a NULLABLE tenantId (global/operator sender) and predate
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-- this ticket; retrofitting RLS onto them is out of AK-P14a scope.
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--
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-- CODE-SIDE PRECONDITIONS — DONE (AK-P14a):
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-- 1. [x] Every AK-P14a web/worker service runs every DB op for these tables
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-- inside withTenantRLS() (emailDomainService / suppression paths).
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-- The app-level scoping (where: { tenantId }) carries isolation until cutover.
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--
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-- WHAT REMAINS — "Teil B" = the org-wide P5 RLS cutover (Raffael / R-P2b):
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-- a. Ship this block as its own forward-only migration.
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-- b. Switch the runtime DB connection to the restricted role `hivegrid_app`
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-- (NOSUPERUSER, NOBYPASSRLS); otherwise FORCE is a no-op for a superuser and
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-- an empty-read trap for a non-superuser owner. The GRANTs below cover it.
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-- c. Staging cutover + live cross-tenant 404 verification.
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--
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-- Forward-only (DoD 28). Inverse SQL as comment per block. Order-dependent DDL is
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-- DO-guarded (P3018 protection: reproducible from an empty DB). Idempotent.
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Row-level security on all AK-P14a tenant-scoped email tables ----------------
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-- Pattern: "tenantId" = current_setting('app.tenant_id', true). The second
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-- argument `true` returns NULL instead of erroring when the GUC is not (yet) set
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-- — the policy then matches nothing (fail-closed).
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--
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-- Inverse per table:
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-- REVOKE SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON "<tbl>" FROM hivegrid_app;
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-- DROP POLICY IF EXISTS "<tbl>_tenant_isolation" ON "<tbl>";
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-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" NO FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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-- ALTER TABLE "<tbl>" DISABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
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DO $$
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DECLARE
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tbl text;
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BEGIN
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FOREACH tbl IN ARRAY ARRAY[
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'TenantSendingDomain',
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'EmailSuppressionList',
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'EmailTemplate',
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-- AK-P14b — email marketing tables (always tenant-scoped).
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'RecipientSegment',
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'SegmentSnapshotMember',
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'CampaignVariant',
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'KontaktMarketingConsent',
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'Unsubscribe'
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]
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LOOP
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EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
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-- FORCE so the table owner is subject to the policies too (otherwise the
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-- owner silently bypasses RLS).
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EXECUTE format('ALTER TABLE %I FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;', tbl);
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IF NOT EXISTS (
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SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies
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WHERE schemaname = current_schema()
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AND tablename = tbl
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AND policyname = tbl || '_tenant_isolation'
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) THEN
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EXECUTE format(
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'CREATE POLICY %I ON %I USING ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true)) WITH CHECK ("tenantId" = current_setting(''app.tenant_id'', true));',
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tbl || '_tenant_isolation', tbl
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);
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END IF;
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-- The restricted app role (R-P2b's hivegrid_app, NOBYPASSRLS) needs table
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-- privileges to reach the rows the policy then filters.
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EXECUTE format('GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE ON %I TO hivegrid_app;', tbl);
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END LOOP;
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END
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$$;
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-- =============================================================================
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-- Verify green before the cutover migration (AGENTS.md §Prisma):
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-- pnpm prisma validate
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-- pnpm prisma migrate status
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-- CI: `prisma migrate deploy` against an EMPTY DB (reproducible from scratch).
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-- Coordination: align ordering with R-P2b — P2 ships withTenantRLS()
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-- (SET LOCAL app.tenant_id); without a tenant context the policies match nothing
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-- (no data leak, just empty results) until the runtime role is hivegrid_app.
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-- =============================================================================
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